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Summary 
This dissertation investigates whether population ageing is associated with a distribution-based in-
tergenerational conflict. While comparing two pioneers of ageing, Germany and Japan, the analysis 
attempts to show tendencies that are relevant for a wider set of countries amid their own demo-
graphic developmental paths. 
Studying intergenerational relations on both the societal and the family level, this analysis is more 
nuanced than previous studies. A two-dimensional typology is proposed to define four ideal scenari-
os of intergenerational relations, of which intergenerational conflict is one case (consisting of weak 
solidarity on both the societal and the family level). 
Narrowing down the scope of analysis from the aggregate to the family and individual level, inter-
generational solidarity is first presented based on National Transfer Accounts data. This discussion 
shows how public and private (financial) transfers secure the lives of individuals over the life cycle 
with elderly persons being net receivers of public transfers and net donors of private transfers. 
Onwards, the evolution of intergenerational solidarity is discussed in the context of political, eco-
nomic and institutional factors, such as family. 
On the societal level, this study draws on the literature of labour market dualisation, Rueda’s insider-
outsider model, and Mannheim’s concept of political generations. Based on data from the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme, spanning over 20 years (1996-2016), policy preferences regarding 
government expenditure on old-age are found to differ with regard to age, cohort and employment 
status. Results show that intergenerational societal solidarity has remained strong in Germany but 
has vanished in Japan. 
On the family level, intergenerational relations are studied based on theories of saving and transfer 
giving, together with the concepts of social care and de-familialisation policies. Using data from the 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe and the Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement, 
covering 11 (2004-2015) and 6 years (2007-2013) respectively, financial and non-financial transfer 
giving between generations is scrutinised. Results show strong solidarity within families for both 
countries. 
In comparison, Germany appears to find itself in a more favourable position to sustain its unwritten 
contract of intergenerational sharing consisting of the public and private sector. In Japan, signs of a 
political generation are emerging, whose interests differ significantly from those of older genera-
tions regarding the role of the welfare state. Developments in Japan may have repercussions for the 
design of the welfare state in years to come. 
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I Introduction 
I.1 Global and historical context 
In their widely cited publication from 2004, “The End of World Population Growth in the 21st Centu-
ry”, demographers Wolfgang Lutz, Warren Sanderson, and Sergei Scherbov made a case that has 
become widely known: if in demographic terms, the 20th century was the century of population ex-
plosion – with the world’s number of human inhabitants quadrupling from 1.6 to 6.1 billion – the 
21st century is that of population ageing (Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov 2004). At the end of the 
1970s, more than half of the world’s population had lived in countries with intermediate fertility of 
2.1 to 5 births per woman and almost a quarter lived in countries with a fertility rate above 5. In the 
former half of the current decade, 46 percent of the world’s population was living in countries with a 
fertility rate below the replacement level of around 2.1 children per woman, a proportion that is 
projected to rise to 69 percent by 2045-2050 (UN 2017). At the same time, world average longevity 
has increased from around 60 years in the late 1970s to around 70 years in 2010-2015, and it is ex-
pected to rise to 75 years by 2045-2050 (UN 2017). Low child mortality, low fertility and high longev-
ity are the factors that cause population ageing. 
This megatrend – certainly the result of favourable developments such as improved medical care 
and increased living standards – comes with new questions about how society ought to be organised 
and how living standards and wealth can be sustained or further improved and distributed. A popu-
lation explosion during the last century led to fears of “hunger, economic collapse, and ecological 
catastrophe” (Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov 2004, p.3), all of which are challenges not yet solved at 
least for the majority of the world. Demographic ageing has added questions about the sustainability 
of pension and healthcare systems and provoked worries that those countries affected are entering 
an era of social, political, and economic stagnation. “Demographic changes will make the 21st centu-
ry like no other”, Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov argued, and “forecasting these changes, understand-
ing their consequences, and formulating appropriate policies will, indeed, be challenging” (Lutz, 
Sanderson, and Scherbov 2004, p.3). 
On a global level, these challenges could still be called “luxury problems” as they arise from favoura-
ble developments as mentioned above. Indeed, demographic ageing is a phenomenon largely con-
fined to rich countries. Demographic transition theory argues this is no coincidence but that instead 
ageing is strongly interlinked with economic development (Kirk 1996; Lesthaeghe 1983; van De Kaa 
2002). As the theoretic explanation goes, a population boom tends to foster an economic boom 
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once the largest birth cohorts enter the workforce, where a large pool of producers and consumers 
ideally constitutes a virtuous cycle of economic growth. During this part of the so-called demograph-
ic transition those at working-age start to invest more into the education of their offspring, among 
other things leading to increased cost of children and lowered fertility. Once the population boom 
time’s birth cohorts who fed the economic boom, reach retirement the economy will once again 
profit from them. This time, however, not because of their labour productivity but because of the 
wealth they have accumulated, which they will either redistribute to their offspring or otherwise 
make it available in terms of liquidity for the financial industry. At the same time, however, their in-
creased longevity is becoming a burden for working-age individuals financing their life at old-age. 
The world’s rich countries, mainly consisting of the OECD, have entered this latter phase of econom-
ic and demographic environment where the proportion of old-age individuals has been increasing 
for some time (UN 2017). Considering the theoretical literature and the projections above, however, 
population ageing will not remain limited to the richest parts of the world. Rather, the developing 
and emerging world of today will follow suit. And possibly, one will be able to take the trajectories of 
today’s ageing societies as textbook examples for future political strategies. With demographic age-
ing happening right now, much still needs to be learned about how societies evolve in the light of 
this megatrend. I am hoping that this dissertation will contribute to the understanding thereof. 
I.2 Questions of demographic ageing 
Is population ageing associated with a distribution-based generational conflict? Various academic 
works have posed this question in recent years without reaching a conclusive answer (Streeck 2007). 
Some of the inconsistencies relate to the perspectives adopted. While some scholars have focused 
on a policy spending bias towards the growing old-age groups (Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun 2004; 
Myles 2002; Sinn and Uebelmesser 2002; Tremmel 2006a), others have emphasised that intrafamili-
al transfers tend to flow from the older towards younger members of a society (Kluge 2009; Kohli 
1999a, 2004, 2006; Künemund and Rein 1999; R. Lee 2003a; Ogawa, Mason, Chawla, and Matsukara 
2010; Wilkoszewski 2006, 2011). While some works have pointed at age-specific voting behaviour 
with the elderly thereby reigning over the young (Berry 2014; Button 1992; Campbell 2002b; 
Binstock 2004), others insisted that age is not a variable that significantly determines a person’s po-
litical attitudes or voting behaviour (Attias-Donfut and Arber 2000; Davidson 2014; Kohli 2006). 
Chiefly three developments, which have so far largely been confined to democratic and industrial-
ised societies, make the possibility of a distribution-centred generational conflict a topical question: 
population ageing, universal suffrage, and the establishment of a modern welfare state (Streeck 
2007). In the simplest of scenarios, other things being equal, their combination hints at a growing 
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proportion of the population that is economically dependent while keeping its political influence be-
cause of their right to vote. And since pay-as-you go-pension systems are based on the assumption 
of a fairly stable ratio of elderly versus working population, demographic ageing would increase the 
burden on the young and/or working-age population (Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun 2004; Myles 
2002; Sinn and Uebelmesser 2002; Streeck 2007; Tremmel 2006a). Against this background, Streeck 
brings up the following question: 
“The more the population share of the elderly rises, the more difficult it gets to imagine them as passive 
recipients of social benefits. If politics is to produce a binding answer to the Lasswellian question of ‘who 
gets what, when and how?’, then the ongoing demographic shift is opening up a worrying possibility of 
a shift from a welfare-state based generational contract towards an intergenerational conflict” (Streeck 
2007, p.281, own translation). 
A crucial question that follows from Streeck’s thoughts is the distinction of intergenerational solidar-
ity and intergenerational conflict: where does one end and where does the other start? Can there be 
an overlap between the two or are they mutually exclusive societal scenarios? To understand this, it 
also needs to be asked what the subject of conflict or solidarity is. Such question over the subject of 
conflict or solidarity, in turn, regards the legitimate demands the old can have towards the rest of 
society and vice versa. Hence, “which part of the welfare-state based generational contract would 
need to be renegotiated” (Streeck 2007, p. 282). Potentially, this regards all spheres of public policy. 
Streeck names the transport system, labour market, health care and housing as examples, all of 
which face different challenges in light of demographic ageing, eventually leading to the question of 
who has to pay for it. Busemeyer et. al. (2009) have singled out the social policy sphere around un-
employment benefits, pensions, health care and education. Esping Andersen (Esping-Andersen et al. 
2002; 2002) focuses on education policy, Tremmel (2006a) emphasises the labour market while 
those works with an economic focus often look more broadly at taxation (Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and 
Tosun 2004; Sinn and Uebelmesser 2002), and others have mentioned the welfare state as a whole 
(Lynch 2006; Myles 2002; Preston 1984; Streeck 2007; Thomson 1989). 
Esping-Andersen (2002) argues, however, that an intergenerational competition over resources is 
not inevitable. Though the “conventional intergenerational contract is becoming problematic” 
(Esping-Andersen 2002, p.51) and “it is young adults who are mainly affected by unemployment, 
eroding wage levels, and by new more vulnerable household arrangements” (Esping-Andersen 2002, 
p. 35). One of his chief policy suggestions is to increase investment into child-centred education as 
this would allow for stronger labour market performance of those targeted, which could also pre-
vent later old-age poverty. Regarding resource allocation between generations, Esping-Andersen 
argues that “there is no golden rule that dictates that the welfare of one implies the misery of the 
other. […] Spending on the elderly may, of course, crowd out resources for the young but such a 
scenario can be avoided” (Esping-Andersen 2002, p.51). 
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So far, though, there has no consensus been reached over whether there is a distribution-based 
generational conflict altogether. Some have pointed at the direction of transfers and a distinction of 
their nature into public and private ones. Whereas public transfers, organised through the welfare 
state, typically have an upward direction from the younger working-age groups to the retired ones, 
private intrafamilial transfers are on aggregate trending downwards in the form of bequests and in-
ter vivo transfers (Kluge 2009; Kohli 1999a, 2004, 2006; Künemund and Rein 1999; R. Lee 2003a; 
Ogawa, Mason, Chawla, and Matsukara 2010; Wilkoszewski 2006, 2011). These patterns have some-
times been interpreted as intergenerational solidarity undermining notions of conflict (Attias-Donfut 
and Arber 2000; Davidson 2014; Künemund and Rein 1999; Vanhuysse, Pieter; Goerres 2012). One 
side of this argument is not only the existence of intrafamilial transfers but also the very nature of 
ageing: every young person expects to be old one day and in an egoistic anticipation, or out of mo-
tives such as social norms, love or mere altruism, one would prefer to cooperate in making transfers 
oneself (Davidson 2014; Kohli 1999a). 
In addition, the mere existence of a welfare state including pensions and care schemes may set free 
capacities for the working population, so that the younger age groups can also be seen as beneficiar-
ies: the more generously the welfare state is treating old-age individuals, the more freely tend work-
ing-age group individuals, who would otherwise need to support their parents’ generation to a 
stronger extent, to be able to make use of their own time (Kohli 1999a; Ogawa, Matsukura, and 
Chawla 2012). A welfare state expansion in this regard over the last decades has especially increased 
the working potential for women, who have typically been occupied with unpaid care work more 
than men (Attias-Donfut and Arber 2000; Ogawa, Matsukura, and Chawla 2012). 
Furthermore, other fault lines in society have been found to be more pronounced than the one de-
fined by age: typically, social inequality within generations and across gender are mentioned, and 
since these are the dimensions that really manifest inequality, the intergenerational level is of minor 
importance (Attias-Donfut and Arber 2000; Binstock 2004; Davidson 2014; Vanhuysse, Pieter; 
Goerres 2012; Streeck 2007). 
However, all these contestations do not refute the possibility of there being an intergenerational 
conflict altogether. Two obvious counter-arguments to the above-discussed points would be these: 
Claiming that one specific conflict is not as large as another or mitigated by some other dynamic is 
different from saying that it does not exist. And even if one assumed that currently, such a conflict 
does not exist at all this would be insufficient for expecting it also not to emerge in the future. 
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I.3 Gap in the literature 
To some extent, wording may be to blame for the disagreement over the relevance of an intergen-
erational conflict. Since the term “conflict” is vague, it often remains open to interpretation whether 
“intergenerational conflict” means an outspoken battle where people take to the street and polemi-
cize, or rather an implicit, silent trade-off in decision-making that (some) people may not even notice 
(Attias-Donfut and Arber 2000; Busemeyer, Goerres, and Weschle 2009; Preston 1984; Goerres 
2009; Streeck 2007; Thomson 1989; Tremmel 2006a; Sobotka 2010). This distinction is important as 
depending on the understanding of “conflict” appraisals have taken different directions. 
Over time, the term “generational conflict” has already made a sharp turn. Not long ago, it was used 
to express disagreement over values between the old members of society and the young (Kohli 
2006; Streeck 2007): for instance, Western countries experienced fierce debates in the late 1960s 
amid the cultural and sexual revolution; and inside the family union, a conflict between parents and 
growing-up children often arises based on different expectations about how one should lead his life. 
More recently, though, “generational conflict” and similar terms have been used in another context: 
instead of describing a battle over values they now mean one over distribution of resources (Attias-
Donfut and Arber 2000; Preston 1984; Streeck 2007; Thomson 1989; Tremmel 2006a). 
Operationalising a distribution-based generational conflict in terms of individual opinions over the 
role of the welfare state, Busemeyer et. al. (2009) have used the term “weak cleavage” to describe 
relations between generations. Thereby, they acknowledge that even in the absence of political 
frontlines, there may be age-correlated preference stratification. This approach as well, though, has 
brought about conflicting results. Using data of the International Social Survey Programme’s 1996 
wave, Busemeyer et. al. (2009) have analysed opinions on the policy fields unemployment benefits, 
pensions, health care and education, discriminating by age and occupational status. Generally, the 
result is that retirees favour higher government spending on pensions and health care but less ex-
penditure on education, while younger respondents have opposite preferences. With the Population 
Policy Acceptance Study of 2003, Wilkoszewski (2006) finds for Germany that the median age for 
those opposing higher child benefits is about five years above that of those who would favour a 
spending increase. These results are in line with regressions of support for higher public spending on 
pensions and age, where Hicks (2001), Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), and Kohli (2006) have 
found weak but at least positive correlations. Logan and Spitze (1995) found that older people with 
more children are also more likely to support spending programmes on the younger generations. 
Other works, however, even when using earlier waves of the same International Social Survey Pro-
gramme as Busemeyer et. al. in their work, have questioned such results on the basis that the age 
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dimension is not strong enough an indicator for the support of respective policies (Papadakis and 
Bean 1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998). Along this line, Andreß and Heien (2001), also using the In-
ternational Social Survey Programme, argue that a single dimension such as age is not only insuffi-
cient to explain policy preferences but that this strategy also easily leads to neglecting the specific 
context of any country, such as its cultural, political or economic institutions. Arts and Gelissen 
(2010) came to a similar conclusion. 
The inconclusiveness over the interplay of demographic ageing and intergenerational relations 
points at a gap in the literature. On the one hand, many of the quantitative works in this field that 
compare a larger set of countries with regression techniques have come at the cost of a lack of coun-
try contextualisation. On the other hand, most studies so far have focused on one single dimension 
to explain intergenerational relations, be it voting behaviour, private and/or public transfers, genera-
tional accounting, or individual attitudes. Approaches with both, a close look at the country context 
and regression techniques of more than one dimension of intergenerational relations, have so far, to 
the best of my knowledge, not been in the focus of attention. Yet, such an approach may shed some 
light on the question whether and in what way there is a distribution-based generational conflict 
surging in the light of ageing, and if so, what are factors pushing or mitigating it. Hence, this work 
shall deliver both, comparative research with a high degree of country contextualisation and a con-
sideration of more than one dimension of intergenerational relations. Both these parts will be ar-
gued and explained in more detail below. 
I.4 Dimensions and definitions 
A piece of work that seeks to understand how intergenerational relations evolve in the light of de-
mographic ageing needs to be clear on what it understands under the term generation. A concept 
that comes to mind for the analysis of intergenerational relations is that of Mannheim (1964), who 
coined the term in a sociological way and defined “political generations” as those who are shaped by 
a common experience, consciousness thereof and a shared attitude or even some degree of organi-
sation. Since the above-discussed literature has made it appear doubtful whether the conditions for 
such political generations are fulfilled in today’s industrialised countries, this dissertation will use a 
different terminology. Crucially, once developments over time are accounted for, three concepts 
shall be distinguished. Firstly, individuals can be grouped by the point in time of their birth. This is 
defined as birth cohort. A second approach is the age that individuals have at the point in time of 
analysis or surveying. Thirdly, individuals can be grouped by their position in the social sequence of 
reproduction and ageing. Here, typical categories are children, parents, grandparents and so on, 
which broadly coincide with an individual’s age-varying positions on the labour market, such as be-
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ing at education/training-age, working-age, or pension/old-age. I will be using the term “generation” 
for this lattermost meaning. 
Further, it is important to understand the term “generational contract”, as alluded to by Streeck 
(2007). According to his understanding, a society’s “welfare-state based generational contract” is to 
be thought of as a set of policies and institutions ensuring that different age groups or generations 
are financed and supported by one another through the public sector, where every individual over 
the life course will form part of those age groups or generations that are predominantly being sup-
ported (education/training-age), as well as those mainly giving support (working-age) and eventually 
again those that are mostly enjoying the support of the others (pension/old-age). 
In order to then understand the social environment for such intergenerational policies, which are to 
sustain the “welfare-state based generational contract”, it would lead to unsatisfying results to re-
peat previous studies like those cited above. Instead, research with this aim must fulfil the following 
three conditions: Firstly, to solve at least some of the contradictory results discussed above, it needs 
to employ more than one indicator of intergenerational relations. Secondly, to pay justice to the 
strong role the family as an institution is likely to play in any intergenerational context, analysis 
needs to not only distinguish the societal from the family level, but understand the interaction be-
tween intergenerational solidarity on the family level and on the societal level. Thirdly, to avoid con-
ceptual misunderstandings and misleading conclusions, changes across age, period and cohort need 
to be accounted for. Based on these considerations, I will take an integrated approach consisting of 
two dimensions indicating intergenerational relations, one taking place on the societal level and one 
on the family level. As will be argued in more detail below, the former will be termed “family solidar-
ity”, while the latter will be called “societal solidarity.” 
In order to proceed to the analytical part of this work, definitions of these two dimensions will be 
necessary. The first definition shall be termed “intergenerational societal solidarity”, and the second 
shall be called “intergenerational family solidarity.” In the remainder, the following concepts shall be 
worked with: 
• Definition 1: The term intergenerational societal solidarity depicts a relation of solidarity be-
tween two or more generations or age groups on the societal level. 
• Definition 2: The term intergenerational family solidarity depicts a relationship of solidarity 
between two or more generations or age groups on the family level. 
Though these two basic definitions appear simple, the assumptions on which they rest require some 
explanation. Often – including many of those mentioned above – studies that analyse intergenera-
tional relations on a societal level use the term conflict, while those focusing on the family level tend 
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to use the term solidarity. Because of this tendency, one might expect that while conflict is some-
thing that mostly takes place at a more abstract level between persons who possibly do not even 
know each other, solidarity is the glue that keeps together those who are already in a close relation-
ship. Of course, however, there may be and indeed is solidarity on the societal level, as much as 
there may also be (a distribution-based) conflict on the family level. To avoid the misunderstanding 
that conflict be a phenomenon of the societal sphere and solidarity one of the familial, this work will 
operate with the term solidarity for both dimensions, societal and familial. 
The interplay between the societal and the familial dimension must be seen in this light. For example, 
on the societal level, while the welfare state is ensuring intergenerational solidarity, the pressures 
coming from demographic ageing may pose a challenge to this solidarity. Reasons may be questions 
over the just or sustainable allocation of resources and burdens. On the family level, in turn, solidari-
ty is to be thought of as a strong tradition since the family is the unit inside which humans tend to be 
the closest to one another and where they might be the most likely to help each other. Therefore, in 
case intergenerational solidarity is challenged on the societal level, such a development may be mit-
igated on the family level by means of solidarity there. Such reasoning makes intuitive sense from a 
rational choice point of view: if it is observed that on a societal level, there is the threat of a lack of 
sustainability of the welfare state-based intergenerational contract, family members are wise to 
support each other in a solidary way as a sort of insurance against the risk of a solidarity collapse on 
the societal level. In other words, intrafamilial intergenerational solidarity may serve as a bulwark 
against a possible collapse of societal intergenerational solidarity. 
I.5 Case selection 
Though the context of industrialised countries will be accounted for as much as possible, this work 
will focus on two cases, Germany and Japan. The most obvious reason for this choice is their role as 
pioneers of demographic ageing. With a median age of 46.2 years (Germany) and 46.5 years (Japan), 
the two countries are countries where ageing has advanced the most worldwide (UNDP 2017). 
Hence, whatever results come about in this work will be relevant for a wider set of countries that are 
facing similar development and challenges already today or will in the future. 
In addition, as will be shown below and in more detail in the next chapter, both countries share 
many commonalities in respect to various political and economic characteristics on the one hand; 
but on the other hand, they have been reacting to their demographic pressures in rather different 
ways. This combination of similar challenges within different institutional contexts constitutes a suit-
able test case to understand how the welfare state and its public policies, but also the labour market, 
the economy as a whole, and the family influence intergenerational relations. 
I Introduction 
9 
Among the similarities between Germany and Japan is the vast change of the age composition over 
the last decades, which is largely due to prolonged low fertility following a short-lived fertility boom 
as well as high and increasing longevity. As of Japan’s official estimate from 2012, the proportion of 
the population aged 65 or older is projected to increase to 38.8 percent in 2050, while the propor-
tion of the working-age population will fall from 62.1 to 51.5 percent (Statistics Bureau Japan 2014). 
Germany’s estimate as of 2014 projects the population share of those aged 65 or older to reach a 
share ranging between 31.8 and 33.1 percent in 2050. The proportion of the working-age population 
is expected to decline from 66.1 percent in 2012 to a value between 55.6 and 56.8 percent by 2050 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2014). Another similarity between Germany and Japan, and in accordance 
with the general OECD trend, regards an ongoing trend of dualisation on the labour market, into 
regular and non-regular employment, as will be shown in more detail in later sections. Also in line 
with the OECD trend, both countries have been experiencing changes in living arrangements and the 
composition of families, with a trend towards smaller family units and single households. More gen-
erally, both Germany and Japan are liberal democracies that, following the destruction of the Second 
World War, have advanced to become some of the richest and most high-skilled economies in the 
world. In addition, both countries have traditionally adhered to a male-breadwinner family regime, 
which is only successively changing towards more gender-equal constellations. 
In the course of population ageing, however, the two countries’ spending focuses of the welfare 
states differ significantly. While Japan’s welfare state has significantly expanded over the last dec-
ades and today strongly favours old-age recipients, Germany’s expenditure structure has been ad-
justed and is today more balanced across age groups. The following chapter will show this in more 
detail. Further differences regard various social policies, such as eldercare or spending on families. 
For instance, Germany’s expenditure on families as a share of GDP is about twice as high as that of 
Japan, hinting at a relatively higher financial burden for families in Japan compared to Germany. Re-
garding eldercare, in turn, whereas Japan introduced its long-term care insurance scheme in 2000 
based on the ten years older German model, Japan took a step further. As opposed to Germany’s, 
Japan’s scheme does not allow family members to provide formal eldercare and cash in for this ser-
vice instead of relying on professional carers doing the job. This hints at a higher degree of de-
familialisation in Japan in the case of eldercare, which will be argued in further detail in chapter IV. 
Furthermore, the extent of some developments – whether the speed of population ageing as a 
whole or the change in female employment, living arrangements or dualisation – differs between 
the two countries. Japan tends to be the country where various changes have been more abrupt or 
rapid: among other developments, as will be shown in the next chapter, the age composition of Ja-
pan’s population has been in transformation notably more rapidly than that of Germany. Similarly, 
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the typical patterns of living arrangements, which in Japan were marked by three-generational 
households or nuclear families, have been evolving towards more diverse patterns at a higher pace. 
Dualisation on the labour market (Häusermann, Silja; Schwander 2012; Peng 2012), another phe-
nomenon happening across industrialised countries, has not only happened at a high pace but has 
also brought about a higher proportion of labour market outsiders in Japan compared to Germany. 
Against this background, the results from comparative analysis of Germany and Japan will shed light 
on the challenges of countries with institutions similar to those of the two subjects of this analysis in 
particular but also to all countries whose populations are generally ageing. As noted above, Germany 
and Japan share similarities in terms of their standards of living, their basic political systems, and 
their major demographic trends. But they differ from each other in the magnitude or speed of vari-
ous crucial developments as well as their policy responses to the challenges notably brought about 
by population ageing. Results from this comparison, hence, will shed light on what societal challeng-
es tend to come about in the light of demographic ageing in general, but in particular, it shall also 
become clearer how certain institutional conditions may coincide with certain patterns of intergen-
erational relations. 
I.6 Outlook 
With the aforementioned in mind, the overarching research questions are: 
1) Under what circumstances is population ageing associated with weakened intergenerational 
solidarity regarding the distribution of resources? 
2) What are the conditions under which the family as an institution may mitigate or resolve 
challenges to solidarity that are taking place on the societal level? 
3) Do weak intergenerational solidarity and strong intergenerational solidarity have to be un-
derstood as mutually exclusive scenarios, or may it be possible that both coexist? 
The remainder of this work will be structured as follows. Chapter II will give an overview of funda-
mental indicators showcasing the basic demographic and institutional developments in Germany 
and Japan, and as much as the available data allow, they will be placed in the OECD context. On an 
aggregate level, intergenerational solidarity will be discussed using National Transfer Accounts data. 
At the end of this chapter, an analytical framework will be established, on the basis of which the fol-
lowing two analytical parts of this dissertation will be carried out. Chapter III will focus on intergen-
erational relations on a societal level. In this context, the welfare state regimes and labour market 
developments in each country will be discussed in the light of the relevant welfare state literature 
and the insider-outsider theory. Based on the hypotheses derived thereof, I will apply regression 
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techniques to data from the 1996, 2006, and 2016 waves of the International Social Survey Pro-
gramme(GESIS 1999, 2008; ISSP 2016; NHK 2018). The independent variable will measure individual 
attitudes towards what role the welfare state should have amid demographic ageing. Chapter IV will 
move the focus from this societal level to the family sphere. Discussing the predominant family re-
gimes and their developments until today, as well as regimes of eldercare and the welfare state’s 
engagement in terms of family policies, theories of giving will be applied to derive hypotheses over 
the making and receiving of private transfers. The data for this analytical part, which will also consist 
of regression techniques, are coming from the longitudinal studies Survey of Health, Ageing and Re-
tirement in Europe (Börsch-Supan 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e) and the Japanese Study of 
Aging and Retirement(RIETI 2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2017). In the case of SHARE, data from 
2004, 2007, 2011, 2013, and 2015 are available. For JSTAR, there are data from 2007, 2009, 2011, 
and 2013. The main independent variable being made intrafamilial intergenerational transfers, soli-
darity on the family level will be tested. Based on these results, the cases of Germany and Japan will 
once again be discussed on the basis of the analytical framework developed earlier. The conclusion 
will also provide policy recommendations as to how intergenerational solidarity may be secured un-
der certain conditions. 
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II Demographic development and foundations 
II.1 Basic demographic indicators 
Table 1 shows key demographic indicators for Germany1 and Japan.2 In the absence of international 
migration of sufficiently high proportions, population ageing occurs when three conditions are in 
place – high longevity, low fertility and low child mortality. While the latter measure tends to be sim-
ilarly low across industrialised countries (You et al. 2015), the former two are more relevant in this 
context. In both countries, the fertility rate has been below replacement levels of around 2.1 per 
woman for decades (Espenshade, Guzman, and Westoff 2003). Other things being equal, this leads 
to a lowering population share of young persons. In addition to low fertility, high and increasing lon-
gevity raises the population share of older persons. In both countries, this trend is stronger than on 
average in the OECD, while it is even more pronounced in Japan than in Germany. 
A factor that may, and in the case of Germany indeed does, contribute to a mitigation of population 
ageing is immigration. In Germany, the proportion of foreign nationals in the population increased 
from 7 percent in the early 1980s to 8 percent in the first half of the current decade (OECD 2017a). 
Between the early 2000s and the five year range 2010-14, the average annual inflow of foreign na-
tionals relative to the total population increased from 0.8 to 1.2 percent, though with a higher share 
in the years of 2013 and 2014 amid the recent influx of refugees. This share was set to increase fur-
ther in 2015, though this is not presented in table 1, where the five-year averages of the time from 
2000 to 2014 are shown. In Japan, in turn, the foreign-national population share also increased be-
tween 2000 and 2014, though at a much lower level from 1.5 to 1.6 percent.3 This is because the 
inflow of foreign nationals hardly increased since 2000; the inflow of foreign nationals relative to the 
total population remained below 0.3 percent and in fact even slightly decreased. However, though 
migration has mitigated the speed of population ageing in Germany, including this topic would go 
beyond the scope of this work. As a result, this topic shall be disregarded here, which in turn, should 
be borne in mind while reading. 
                                                            
1
 The values before 1990 for Germany refer only to West Germany. 
2
 In most tables with timelines and wherever applicable, data is shown as five-year averages. The purpose is that by doing 
so, a longer time span can be shown on one page, allowing for a better understanding of the trends analysed. 
3
 In an attempt to address the labour shortages in some sectors, including and especially eldercare, Japan has since 2006 
been actively attracting an influx of foreign care workers, mostly by means of bilateral agreements with South East Asian 
countries. To date, however, the numbers of attracted workers are too low to balance out the undersupply in the care 
sector let alone halt the shrinking of the population (see for example: Vogt 2018). 
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Table 1: Demographic indicators, Germany and Japan, percent (unless otherwise stated). 
 1980-84 avg 1985-89 avg 1990-94 avg 1995-99 avg 2000-04 avg 2005-09 avg 2010-13 avg 
Age dependency ratio (0-20 and 65+ as share of working-age population) 
Germany 37.71  34.77  36.30  37.97  38.96  39.62  39.41  
Japan 39.56  38.99  37.95  37.40  38.32  39.95  41.65  
OECD av. 44.14  42.71  41.66  41.07  40.48  40.06  40.05  
        
Youth dependency ratio (0-20 year old as share of working-age population) 
Germany 43.78  36.61  34.07  34.26  33.64  32.19  30.16  
Japan 49.67  46.02  40.12  34.74  32.15  30.78  30.46  
OECD av. 59.77  55.12  51.05  48.25  45.59  43.22  41.60  
        
Old dependency ratio (65+ year old as share of working-age population) 
Germany 20.06  19.15  23.22  26.26  29.35  33.14  34.51  
Japan 15.79  17.90  21.04  25.01  29.97  35.76  40.94  
OECD av. 19.27  19.42  20.37  21.46  22.42  23.63  25.20  
        
80+ year old population share 
Germany 2.85  3.44  3.89  3.79  3.98  4.71  5.30  
Japan 1.56  2.03  2.68  3.37  4.23  5.59  6.86  
OECD av. 2.03  2.33  2.68  2.90  3.17  3.65  4.07  
        
Life expectancy at birth (in years) 
Germany 73.54 74.92 75.86 77.28 78.60 79.96 80.80 
Japan 76.78 78.28 79.28 80.30 81.68 82.54 83.05 
OECD av. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Period total fertility rate (Source: Human Fertility Database 2015) 
Germany 1.48  1.42  1.32  1.34  1.37  1.38  1.41  
Japan 1.76  1.68  1.51  1.40  1.32  1.31  1.39  
OECD av. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Inflow of foreign population as percentage total population (latest data cover 2010-14) 
Germany n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.78 0.70 1.22 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.28 0.26 0.24 
OECD av. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Population share of foreign nationals 
Germany 7.15 7.30 8.16 8.91 8.74 8.19 8.71 
Japan 0.70 0.74 1.01 1.16 1.45 1.67 1.63 
OECD av. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source (unless stated otherwise): OECD (2017c), own calculations. 
Despite the differences in migration, the population share of those aged 80 years and above has in-
creased to levels considerably higher than the OECD average in both countries, though particularly 
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so in Japan. These trends are mirrored in the indicators age dependency ratio, youth dependency 
ratio and old-age dependency ratio. A dependency ratio indicates the numerical relation in which 
the likely financial dependants such as young or old persons stand to the working-age population. A 
higher dependency ratio means a lower share of working-age persons that can financially sustain the 
dependants. It is important to note, however, that such dependency ratio do not necessarily repre-
sent the true proportion of dependants since the criterion for classification is age and does not fac-
tor in the productivity of an economy.4 Nevertheless, dependency ratios give a first indication of not 
only the age composition of a society but also the financial consequences thereof. The youth de-
pendency ratio has been decreasing throughout the OECD average since at least the 1980s, but low 
fertility in Germany and Japan has reduced the ratio there considerably further. In a similar way has 
the old-age dependency ratio in Germany and Japan increased faster than on average in other indus-
trialised countries. Compared to the OECD average, Japan’s old-age dependency ratio is now 60 per-
cent higher and that of Germany is still more than one third higher. In Japan, it is especially the 
speed of ageing that is striking. Other than in Germany, where the old-age dependency ratio was 
above the OECD average already in the 1980s, Japan’s value used to be well below that. These de-
velopments have led to an increase in the total age dependency ratio (including both the young and 
old relative to the working-age population) in Germany and Japan, though not yet in the average of 
the OECD. In other words, Germany and Japan’s low population proportion of young dependants is 
outweighed by a respectively higher share of old dependants leading to an overall increasing total 
dependency ratio. This relative increase of financial dependants tends to put additional financial 
pressure on the working-age population and, other things being equal, renders intergenerational 
transfers over the lifecycle increasingly important. The advanced stadia of ageing and an increasing 
share of dependants makes Germany and Japan two especially relevant cases of comparative analy-
sis. 
II.2 Labour force participation 
In order to know the real situation of dependants as dependency ratios increase amid population 
ageing (see 2.1), it is crucial to know how high a population share across age groups is actually en-
gaged in paid work, which is shown in table 2. In terms of actual labour force participation (not dis-
tinguishing between full- or part-time or various forms of non-regular employment), Germany’s em-
ployment rate has been rising until the latest available data in 2013 while that of Japan has been on 
the decline since the mid1990s. In terms of sex and age, Germany’s young labour participation has 
                                                            
4
 For a discussion of effective working years over the life cycle especially in the context of ageing in the European context, 
see Ebbinghaus (2016). 
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been decreasing slightly while that of older people has slightly increased, both of which is the case 
for either sex. The most notable change, however, is labour participation of women aged between 
30 and 64 years. The labour force participation rate of 50-64 year old women almost doubled to 66 
percent between 1980 and 2014, while that of women aged 30-49 increased by almost one half to 
83 percent. Female labour participation is also the most notable change in Japan though the in-
crease has been less drastic, with rates now well below the German ones. On the other hand, Japa-
nese female labour participation was higher than Germany’s in the 1980s. Also in Japan, labour force 
participation for young men (15-29 years) has decreased slightly, though that for young women has 
increased. In general, however, part-time and non-regular employment is much more common 
among females than males in both countries, which partly explains lower incomes among females 
(see chapter III). Different from Germany, Japan’s labour participation rate of elderly persons has 
decreased considerably since 1980. This is especially the case among elderly men though the  
decrease has been taking place from a much higher level of participation and it remains higher over-
all compared to Germany. This is not surprising considering the old-age-biased welfare expansion in 
Japan (see chapter III), rendering it possible for more persons than in earlier years to cease to work 
at old age. Overall, labour force participation statistics call the above-discussed concept of depend-
ency ratios into question to some extent: especially for Japan, a considerable portion of the elderly 
Table 2: Labour force participation, Germany and Japan, percent. 
 
1980-84 avg 1985-89 avg 
1990-94 
avg 1995-99 avg 2000-04 avg 
2005-09 
avg 
2010-14 
avg 
Labour force participation rate (by sex and age, as share of total population in age group) 
(Source: National Labour Force Surveys, taken from ILO 2017) 
Germany 55.20  55.52  58.52  57.72  57.30  59.04  60.08  
Men Total 71.46  70.98  70.76  67.94  65.74  66.26  66.34  
15-29 years 69.49  69.51  67.79  65.17  64.05  64.67  63.65  
30-49 years 97.01  96.43  96.18  95.43  95.18  95.41  94.76  
50-64 years 71.93  68.13  66.22  64.81  67.28  73.20  78.63  
65+ years 6.34  4.98  4.54  4.30  4.28  5.42  7.06  
Women Tot. 40.76  41.76  47.36  48.24  49.34  52.18  54.10  
15-29 years 58.02  59.14  59.91  56.45  55.94  57.25  57.64  
30-49 years 57.75  60.88  72.27  76.08  79.46  81.06  82.51  
50-64 years 33.81  33.99  38.95  44.01  49.42  57.82  65.87  
65+ years 2.86  1.96  1.70  1.66  1.72  2.46  3.32  
Japan 63.42  62.78  63.70  63.36  61.36  60.26  59.34  
Men Total 79.48  77.46  77.72  77.44  74.86  72.88  70.88  
15-29 years 61.60  61.40  62.97  62.97  61.11  59.61  58.83  
30-49 years 97.47  97.22  97.87  97.82  97.25  96.76  96.32  
50-64 years 87.54  86.15  88.25  88.79  87.15  87.48  88.01  
65+ years 39.46  36.08  37.60  36.42  31.44  29.50  29.10  
Women Tot. 48.26  48.86  50.40  50.02  48.72  48.46  48.60  
15-29 years 46.92  49.01  52.05  52.78  53.14  54.05  54.32  
30-49 years 60.17  62.30  64.17  64.67  66.10  68.73  71.42  
50-64 years 49.72  50.69  54.14  55.17  55.45  58.01  61.94  
65+ years 15.84  15.54  16.28  15.30  13.46  12.98  13.62  
OECD av. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: National Labour Force Surveys, taken from ILO (2017). 
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are still engaged in paid work so that these persons, despite their age cannot strictly be called finan-
cial dependants, though there is no information about their income or work contract and they may 
already be recipients of pensions. 
Table 3 shows two further indicators for the labour market division by gender. One is the gender pay 
gap, which is here defined as the median earnings for full-time jobs. Both countries show a trend of 
a closing gender gap. In Japan, it has decreased from 42 percent in the early 1980s to 27 percent in 
the early 2010s. Though this decline is considerable, it has not reached the level of Germany, which 
decreased from 24 percent in the early 1990s to 16 percent in the early 2010s. Another dimension of 
marked gender differences on the labour market are the average weekly working hours. In Germany 
it can be seen that the proportion of working men (of any age) with weekly average working hours of 
40+ hours has decreased from almost 100 percent in the early 1980s to just over two thirds in the 
early 2010s. Meanwhile, work hours akin to part-time jobs have become more common over the 
decades. 
Table 3: Work and gender differences, Germany and Japan, percent. 
 
1980-84 
avg 
1985-89 
avg 
1990-94 
avg 
1995-99 
avg 
2000-04 
avg 
2005-09 
avg 
2010-14 
avg 
 
Gender pay gap (in median earnings for full-time jobs) 
Germany n.a. n.a. 23.81  20.91  20.36  17.70  15.93  
Japan 41.93 41.29  39.13  36.06  32.67  31.31  27.01  
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Average weekly working hours by gender (% of all working men/women at any age) 
Germany, men, 0-
19h 
0.92 0.89 1.46 2.53 3.52 5.02 5.72 
men, 20-39h 1.91 25.72 51.63 45.04 41.30 30.35 26.75 
men, 40h+ 97.17 73.39 46.91 52.43 55.18 64.63 67.54 
women, 0-19h 13.43 8.17 11.92 15.37 19.02 21.26 20.29 
women, 20-39h 19.94 39.42 56.92 54.72 52.65 46.67 45.71 
women, 40h+ 66.63 52.41 31.16 29.90 28.34 32.08 34.00 
Japan, men, 0-19h n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.74 3.07 3.40 
men, 20-39h n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.00 17.28 20.03 
men, 40h+ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 79.70 79.12 75.88 
women, 0-19h n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.93 9.45 10.41 
women, 20-39h n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 25.22 42.64 45.07 
women, 40h+ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 29.13 47.42 43.85 
OECD T., men, 0-19h 2.47 2.31 2.41 2.59 3.01 3.65 4.28 
men, 20-39h 10.01 16.62 19.45 17.40 18.98 19.63 20.75 
men, 40h+ 85.16 79.52 76.26 78.24 77.33 76.72 74.97 
women, 0-19h 8.31 8.93 9.08 9.32 10.22 11.19 11.70 
women, 20-39h 24.39 30.99 32.83 31.45 34.99 37.36 38.00 
women, 40h+ 59.14 54.32 52.43 54.08 52.81 51.44 50.30 
Source (unless stated otherwise): OECD (2017c), own calculations. 
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In addition for women in Germany, average weekly work-hours of 40+ hours have in fact become 
less but lower average workloads more common. The reason is that although compared to earlier 
decades, a higher share of women is employed, those who are working are often working part-time 
or less. This trend for Germany is also in line with the general development in OECD countries, 
though Germany’s diversity – meaning that a relatively high share is to be found in each category of 
average weekly work hours – has risen above the OECD average. For Japan, data is only available 
from the early 2000s onwards, and those for women in those first years that are accounted for do 
not add up to 100 percent. Nevertheless, a trend can be seen that differs to some extent from that 
in Germany and the OECD: the share of men in Japan who work on average 40+ hours per week has 
been declining, though with 76 percent it is still at a higher level than in Germany or the whole OECD. 
In turn, the average labour workload among working women has increased, with 44 percent working 
40+ hours per week. In Japan, where full-time work includes overtime work on a more or less regular 
basis (Boling 2015), this is a sign of an increased integration of women into the labour market. 
II.3 Family indicators 
II.3.1 Fertility, marriage, divorce 
Table 4 shows the most relevant basic family indicators to highlight family-demographic develop-
ments. One common trend is the conversion of crude marriage rates and crude divorce rates over 
time. Though in Germany, the crude divorce rate has slightly decreased since the 1980s, the mar-
riage rate has fallen faster. In Japan, both rates have been converging. In Japan, considerably more 
than in Germany, this family-demographic trend coincides strongly with the low fertility shown 
above. Almost no children are born out of wedlock in Japan, while childbearing outside marriage has 
become an even more common pattern in Germany than it was already in the 1980s. Hence, to a 
much stronger extent than in Germany, the postponement and the abstention from marriage 
(Raymo 2014; Adam et al. 2011) are factors that are closely correlated with low fertility in Japan.5 
The custom that giving birth only happens within a legal union is a cultural factor that distinguishes 
Japan from many other industrialised countries (Raymo 2014), though it has to be noted that the 
share of marriages in Japan triggered by unintended pregnancy is also estimated to be high (Castro-
Vázquez 2015). On the other hand, the share of never-married women has been increasing. In the 
age-group of 25-29 it increased from 18 percent in 1970 to 60 percent in 2010, and among those 
aged 35-39 it increased from 6 to 23 percent during the same period (S. Fukuda 2013). Raymo (2014) 
estimates a further increase of never-married women even at age 50 from 5.5 percent for the 1950 
                                                            
5
 For rich overviews of the fertility developments in either country, see Kreyenfeld & Konietzka (2017) for Germany and 
Europe, and Fukuda (2016) for Japan. 
II Demographic development and foundations 
18 
birth cohort to 23.5 percent for those born in 1990. Once married, about a third of unions end in 
divorce in Japan today (Raymo 2014). Moreover in Germany there has been an increase in the num-
ber of divorces per 100 newly married couples per year. In West Germany, it had been at around 20 
in the early 1980s, reaching a peak near 45 in the mid-2000s. Then, as a result of the former West 
German divorce regulations being applied to the former East German states, divorce procedures 
were delayed, after which the value has, similarly to Japan, reached about one third by 2014 
(Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung 2017). Not included in divorce statistics are break-ups of 
non-married couples. 
Table 4: Family indicators, Germany and Japan (percent, unless otherwise stated). 
 80-84 avg 85-89 
avg 
90-94 avg 95-99 avg 00-04 avg 05-09 
avg 
10-13 
avg* 
 
Crude Marriage rate (per 1,000 people) 
Germany 6.28 6.64 5.74 5.20 4.76 4.58 4.68 
Japan 6.50 5.86 6.14 6.28 6.08 5.72 5.28 
OECD average n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Crude divorce rate (per 1,000 people) 
Germany 2.08 2.28 1.84 2.22 2.50 2.32 1.78 
Japan 1.38 1.34 1.46 1.80 2.24 2.02 1.88 
OECD average n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Share of unmarried births (percentage of all births; for Japan not 5-year avg. but each 1st year until ‘99) 
Germany 14.06 15.84 15.10 18.64 25.88 30.96 34.30 
Japan 0.80 0.20 1.10 1.20 1.82 2.06 2.20 
OECD average n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Living arrangements (of all households; source: (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016), (Statistics Bureau Japan 2016), for Germa-
ny not 5-year avg. but each 1st year with the latest value from 2015). 
Germany: One-gen hh. n.a. n.a. n.a. 63.7 66.2 67.9 70.8 
Middle gen. with children n.a. n.a. n.a. 34.50 32.10 30.60 28.10 
Middle gen. with parents n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.60 
Three generations n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.90 0.80 0.60 0.50 
Japan: Single household 19.83  20.79  23.09  25.60  27.60  29.47  n.a. 
Middle gen., no children 13.72  15.48  15.48  17.36  18.89  19.64  n.a. 
Middle gen. with children 42.10  39.99  37.30  34.24  31.89  29.85  n.a. 
Middle gen. with parents 2.15  2.20  2.21  2.26  2.26  2.24  n.a. 
Three generations 14.58  13.85  12.15  10.47  8.52  6.97  n.a. 
OECD average n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source (unless stated otherwise): OECD (2017c), own calculations. 
Other than fertility, later and/or fewer marriages as well as higher divorce rates and break-ups are 
affecting living arrangements and therefore the circumstances under which family members can 
support each other. In general, both countries are experiencing an increase of family arrangements 
beyond the nuclear family. To better understand this trend, the origins of the family as an institution 
will be discussed later (see chapter IV). 
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II.3.2 Living arrangements 
Germany and Japan, though from different cultural spheres, share fundamental commonalities in 
their traditional family structures. Both countries have traditionally considered the family as the 
natural first provider of welfare, whereas intrafamily welfare services such as care for young and old 
dependants or housework would typically be provided by wives (Ogawa et al. 2012; Palier 2010; 
Boling 2015). The male-breadwinner model was endorsed by Confucian beliefs in Japan and by Ca-
tholicism in Germany, but the basic principles are similar in this regard (Boling 2015). Even to date, 
there is a legal duty to provide care for old-age family members in need of care (Ogawa et al. 2012; 
Ostner 2010). One important difference, however, is the traditionally much higher occurrence of 
three-familial households in Japan compared to Germany (Raymo 2014; Bundesinstitut für 
Bevölkerungsforschung 2016a). 
The trends in living arrangements are shown in table 4. Though the statistical offices of the two 
countries are measuring living arrangements in slightly different ways – with Germany not distin-
guishing between single households and other types of one-generation households in the same da-
taset – the available data can nevertheless show the most important differences and developments. 
In Germany, the share of one-generation households has been the most common form of living ar-
rangements, and between 1995 and 2015 its share of all households increased further, from 64 to 71 
percent. Among two-generation households, nuclear families (i.e. couples living with children) are 
much more common than couples living with an elderly parent, the latter type of living arrangement 
making up an almost insignificant share of below 1 percent. Similarly, the share of three-generation 
households, with an adult generation member, his, her or their offspring, and his, her or their par-
ent(s) has been a rare type. In 1995, its share stood at 0.9 percent, and it had decreased to 0.5 per-
cent by 2015. Furthermore, other official data not represented in table 4 document a decline of the 
share of households in which under-age children are living, falling from 27 percent in 1991 to 20 per-
cent in 2014. At the same time, at the expense of the nuclear family, which was the classical post-
war family model in Germany (Bosch and Jansen 2010), the share of single households has been in-
creasing (Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung 2016b). However, the emergence of single 
households is not equal to a retreat of the nuclear family as such, since a large proportion of the 
former is made up by elderly persons living alone after that person’s partner has passed away. 
In Japan, the occurrence of single households has also increased vastly. In the early 1980s, its share 
had been 20 percent, but it rose to 29 percent in the mid-2010s. This trend is mostly to be explained 
by a shift of crucial life-course events such as marriage and fertility. As the above-mentioned low 
share of unmarried births shows, marriage and fertility in Japan is correlated even closer than in 
many other countries, so that a delay of one typically coincides with a delay of the other. However, 
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forming a single household upon moving out of the parental home at young adult-age has not be-
come a common pattern in Japan. Between 60 and 70 percent of never-married adults aged 20-34 in 
the 2000s still lived with their parents (S. Fukuda 2009). The result that single-households have be-
come more common in general appears to be a result strongly shaped by those population groups 
beyond young adult-age. In turn, the strong decrease in three-generational households in Japan is 
also a result of low fertility, as childless adults (or those with only one child) are unlikely to live to-
gether with two older generations (Suzuki 2013). Japan’s traditional family model has been the 
three-generation household with grandparents, parents and children living under one roof and as-
sisting each other in their respective lives (Ogawa et al. 2012; Raymo 2014). In 1965, 24 percent of 
all private households consisted of adult children and their parents living together, regardless 
whether the adult children had their own children or not. By 2005, this share has dropped to 9 per-
cent. The share of three-generation households, a subset of the former, dropped from 22 to 7 per-
cent. Meanwhile, the share of single households has almost quadrupled from 8 to 29 percent 
(Statistics Bureau Japan 2016). On the other hand, according to the International Survey of Lifestyles 
and Attitudes of the Elderly, 21 percent of persons aged 65 years and above were still living in three-
generation households in 2005 (Ogawa et al. 2012). This figure has been on the decline but is still 
very high in an international context, as for example in Germany, it stood at only 1 percent at the 
same time (Ogawa et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the decline of Japan’s three-generational household, 
from 15 percent of all households in the early 1980s to 7 percent in the mid-2010s, is considerable 
and likely also explained by a value and policy shift. Ogawa et.al. (Ogawa, Matsukara, and Chawla 
2011) observe in the Japanese National Survey on Family Planning that when Japan’s government, 
after a successive expansion in care policies, shifted some care responsibilities back to the family in 
the 1980s (see chapter IV), a value change could be seen: the proportion of middle-aged women, 
who considered the familial provision of eldercare for parents or parents in law to be a “good cus-
tom” or “natural duty as children”, had dropped and continued to fall further afterwards. At the 
same time, the share of mothers under age 50, who expected to rely on receiving care services from 
their children once they would reach old-age, has declined from almost two thirds in 1950 to just 
over 10 percent in 2004. Ogawa et.al. conclude from this that “Japanese children’s utility as a source 
of old-age security for their parents had almost disappeared by the beginning of the twenty-first 
century” (Ogawa, Matsukara, and Chawla 2011, p.481). Overall, the nuclear family has become less 
common as a form of living arrangement since the 1980s, with its share of all households declining 
from 42 to 30 percent. Possibly relevant for intergenerational solidarity such as family care, the 
share of three-generational households has also been on decline in Japan. However, when compared 
to Germany, where the share of three-generational households has been below 1 percent over dec-
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ades, three-generational household have remained a relatively typical living arrangement in Japan 
until today. 
II.4 Economic development 
The development of demographics, social policies, regime transition and relations between genera-
tions cannot be properly understood without accounting for the economic context in which these 
are taking place. Developments in Germany and Japan over the past decades share commonalities 
but are also marked by differences. As shown in table 5, both Japan and Germany have experienced 
an increase in GDP per capita, which is in line with the OECD trend. Yet the two countries differ in 
terms of real GDP growth. Germany experienced a dip in the early 2000s when the costs of German 
reunification became apparent, upon which deep structural reforms followed (see chapter III), as 
well as in the latter half of the same decade amid the global financial crisis. Since the beginning of 
the current decade, however, Germany’s real growth has been relatively high, especially considering 
weakening growth in the Eurozone, Germany’s most important trade partner. Real GDP growth in 
Japan was very high until the early 1990s when the burst of a speculation bubble marked an end to 
an extended growth period. The following years have often been called “the lost decade(s)” because 
real GDP growth has since been significantly lower than it used to be. However, Japan’s growth data 
has to be seen in the context of an ageing (and shrinking) workforce and a shrinking total population. 
In both countries, the general increase in GDP per capita has not contributed to a reduction in in-
come inequality, expressed by the Gini coefficient. Income inequality is slightly higher in Japan than 
in Germany. 
Table 5: General economic development, Germany and Japan. 
 
1980-84 avg 1985-89 avg 1990-94 avg 1995-99 avg 2000-04 avg 2005-09 avg 2010-14 avg 
 
GDP per capita (US-Dollar) 
Germany 12,076.65  16,000.42  21,361.26  24,967.26  29,643.23  36,117.93  43,724.44  
Japan 10,435.08  15,066.01  20,840.03  24,081.79  27,419.52  32,184.07  35,678.24  
OECD 10,258.41  13,911.39  17,963.49  21,948.84  26,862.73  33,078.57  37,527.15  
 
Real GDP growth (%) 
Germany 1.19 3.78 2.76 1.67 1.02 0.63 2.06 
Japan 3.58 5.16 2.15 0.79 1.39 -0.28 1.46 
OECD 2.28 3.78 2.29 3.11 2.53 1.09 1.96 
 
Income inequality (Gini Coefficient) 
Germany n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.29 0.29 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.34 0.33 
OECD n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source (unless stated otherwise): OECD (2017c), own calculations. 
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Intergenerational and intragenerational differences are also important in terms of poverty. Table 6 
shows the development of two measures of relative (income) poverty. In general, poverty has in-
creased in both countries by either measure. When poverty is defined as earning less than 60% of 
median income after taxes and transfers, which is the typical standard, Germany’s poverty share 
increased from 30% to 35% within two and a half decades. In Japan, the share had been only 23% in 
the late 1990s but has increased at a significantly higher pace to 36%. The relative poverty shares are  
much lower once it includes only those who earn less than 50% of the median income. While this 
standard is internationally less common, the data are available by age groups. In Germany, the pov-
erty share compared to the 1980s has increased in every age group since, but the increases have 
been higher among young persons at working age. On the other hand, relative poverty is still most 
common among the oldest age groups when measured as disposable income being less than 50% of 
the median. Also in Japan, relative poverty is most common among those aged 76 years or above. 
However, compared to the 1980s, this age group is the only one whose poverty share has fallen ra-
Table 6: Poverty risk, Germany and Japan, percent. 
 1980-84 
avg 
1985-89 avg 1990-94 avg 1995-99 avg 2000-04 
avg* 
2005-09 
avg** 
2010-13 
avg*** 
Poverty share, post tax/transfers (defined as less than 60% of mean income) 
* for GER only 2000, 2004; for JP only 2000, 2003; ** for GER only 2008, 2009; for JP only 2006, 2009; *** for GER only 
2011, 2012; for JP only 2012. 
Germany n.a. 30.30  29.30  31.90  34.45  35.45  35.75  
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. 23.10  29.60  34.35  36.60  
OECD av. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Poverty share across age groups, after tax/transfers (disp. income less than 50% of median) 
* for GER only 2008, 2009; for JP only 2006, 2009; * for GER only 2011, 2012; for JP only 2012. 
Germany all n.a. 5.60  5.50  7.20  7.60  9.00  8.75  
0-17 years n.a. 5.90  5.20  8.00  8.80  9.10  8.60  
18-25 years n.a. 7.90  6.50  11.10  12.90  14.05  12.45  
26-40 years n.a. 4.60  4.20  5.50  6.50  8.20  8.50  
41-50 years n.a. 2.40  2.70  5.20  4.30  5.85  5.55  
51-65 years n.a. 4.30  3.80  5.90  6.10  8.25  9.10  
66-75 years n.a. 6.80  8.80  8.60  8.70  8.65  7.90  
76+ years n.a. 11.40  13.70  11.10  10.40  13.55  12.15  
Japan all n.a. 12.00  n.a. 13.70  15.30  15.85  16.10  
0-17 years n.a. 10.90  n.a. 12.10  14.50  14.95  16.30  
18-25 years n.a. 10.50  n.a. 14.20  16.60  18.05  19.70  
26-40 years n.a. 9.40  n.a. 10.60  12.60  12.35  12.90  
41-50 years n.a. 9.50  n.a. 10.20  11.70  12.15  14.10  
51-65 years n.a. 13.30  n.a. 13.40  14.40  14.85  14.40  
66-75 years n.a. 22.80  n.a. 21.10  19.60  18.00  17.00  
76+ years n.a. 23.40  n.a. 26.20  23.60  23.65  21.30  
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source (unless stated otherwise): OECD (2017c), own calculations. 
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ther than risen. The poverty share among those aged 18-25 years, in turn, almost doubled to 19.7%. 
For all age groups, Japan’s relative poverty share is higher than that in Germany. 
A trend of increasing pressure can also partly be observed at the household level. Table 7 shows da-
ta indicating the development of the financial position of private households. In Germany, mean dis-
posable household income has doubled since the 1980s. As a result, Germany’s household net sav-
ings rate remained constant, which implies a boost in consumption. In Japan, in contrast, the five-
year averages of mean disposable household income have been falling since a peak in the latter half 
of the 1990s. An important reason is the effect of the burst of a speculation bubble in 1990, after 
which economic growth significantly fell and Japan’s previously strongly seniority-based pay regime 
on the labour market was successively replaced by non-regular employment without ensured wage 
increases (JILPT 2017). As a result, the household net savings rate in Japan fell significantly from 9.4% 
in the 1990s to 1.5% in the 2010s. One interpretation of this significant decline is that in order to 
enable a largely unchanged standard of living, households have increasingly been waiving on future 
consumption. Japan’s decreased household debt share (as a share of total financial assets) over the 
same period shows that financial prudence has been partly shifted from higher saving to lower debt-
taking. Japan’s increasing poverty shares and decreasing disposable income, as well as the slightly 
rising Gini coefficient hints at rising intragenerational inequality, also to a stronger extent than in 
Germany. 
Table 7: Household finance indicators, Germany and Japan. 
 1980-84 avg 1985-89 
avg 
1990-94 
avg 
1995-99 
avg 
2000-04 
avg 
2005-09 
avg* 
2010-14 
avg** 
Mean disposable household income (local currency, current prices, annual value) 
* for GER only 2008, 2009; for JP 2006, 2009; ** for GER 2010, 2011, for JP 2012. 
Germany (€) n.a. 11,467 14,598 17,139 19,330 22,563 23,333 
Japan (￥) n.a. 2,437,726 n.a. 3,308,561 3,214,918 2,922,722 2,783,000 
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
        
Household net savings rate (of household income, percent) 
Germany n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.20 9.70 10.17 9.43 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.44 3.81 1.36 1.14 
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
        
Household debt share of total financial assets (percent) 
Germany n.a. n.a. n.a. 105.81 113.09 103.22 95.62 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. 138.30 139.27 134.69 129.70 
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source (unless stated otherwise): OECD (2017c), own calculations. 
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II.5 Intergenerational solidarity 
The previous sections have shown that amid population ageing, other things being equal, intergen-
erational sharing becomes an increasingly important dimension of social life and politics. A macro 
dimension of this is captured by National Transfer Accounts (NTA). NTA forms an internationally 
harmonised database of intergenerational transfers based on the logic of macroeconomic national 
accounting (R. Lee and Mason 2017). It includes private and public transfers, takes the individual as 
its unit of analysis, and allows an interpretation of the financial position of an average person over 
the lifecycle. NTA operates in two accounts, called lifecycle deficit and age reallocations. The former 
is defined as the difference of labour income and consumption at any given age: if consumption is 
greater than income, the lifecycle deficit is positive. In turn, the age reallocations account, whose 
total sum is by definition equal to the lifecycle deficit, consists of public transfers, private transfers 
and asset-based reallocations. Receiving transfers is counted as an inflow, equivalent to consump-
tion, while making a transfer is an outflow equivalent to income. In the age reallocations account, 
the item public transfers includes government-run transfers such as pensions, healthcare and educa-
tion, while private transfers are made between individuals, such as intrafamilial support. Asset-
based reallocations, including saving and other forms of wealth, are a balancing item: when individ-
uals save they generate outflows while dissavings are defined as inflows. 
Figure 1: Consumption and income in Germany, per capita. 
 
Source: Kluge (2012, 2014), own calculations. 
On a rather general level, all countries can be expected to have a similar shape: At young age, an 
individual consumes more than he/she produces; at working age, a person starts to generate surplus 
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income; and at old age, he or she again turns into individual deficit. Important cross-country differ-
ences can be seen in the points in time of transition from deficit to surplus and vice versa as well as 
in the magnitude of that surplus. Once more cross-sections of one country are taken into account, 
developments of the lifecycle deficit and age reallocations can be observed over time, and therefore 
be judged in the context of institutional or demographic changes occurring at certain points in time 
or periods. Two cross-sections are available for each country: 2003 and 2008 for Germany, and 2004 
and 2009 for Japan. The insights from looking at only two cross-sections may seem limited, especial-
ly since the years around 2008 and 2009 are marked the beginning of the global financial crisis. 
However, firstly, most budget adjustments by governments followed in the years after, and secondly, 
albeit only offering a narrow time frame, even accounts of two cross-sections show basic regularities 
in both countries. 
Figure 2: Consumption and income in Japan, per capita. 
 
Source: Ogawa et.al (2012, 2014), own calculations. 
Figure 1 shows income and consumption per capita in Germany in the years 2003 and 2008, while 
figure 2 shows the same for Japan in the years 2004 and 2009. It is evident for Germany that the av-
erage ageing person tends to consume more during the life cycle. At birth, consumption is higher in 
the years following and at late youth years it is higher too. At old age, consumption tends to increase 
in 2008. Income starts to exceed consumption at age 27 in 2003 and at 26 in 2008, peaks around age 
40 and falls below consumption at age 58 in 2003 and 59 in 2008. Figure 2 shows a similar shape in 
Japan, though two important differences can be seen. Firstly, the age of gaining financial independ-
ence did not decrease between 2004 and 2009, as it did in Germany, but increased instead. The av-
erage person’s income in 2004 started to exceed consumption at age 26, but in 2009 this only start-
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ed at age 29. The age of turning into a deficit at old age remained unchanged at 60 years. Peak in-
come was also postponed from age 47 in 2004 to age 51 in 2009. Consumption at old age was in-
creasing with every additional year of age in either cross-section. 
Figure 3: Consumption and income in Germany, aggregate, normalised by avg. income of 30-49 year olds. 
 
Sources: Kluge(2012, 2014), own calculations. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the respective two cross-sections on an aggregate level for either country. This 
means that the per capita value for each age group has been multiplied with the number of persons 
in each age group. To enable comparison, all cross-sections have been normalised by the average 
income of the 30-49 year olds in the respective cross-section, as is common practice when working 
with NTA (R. Lee and Wilmoth 2013). Especially in Japan, shown in figure 4, the importance of the 
size of certain age groups can be seen. The hike in the light dotted line, depicting income in 2004, 
consists of the first babyboomers born around 1947-49. While their earnings had an important effect 
on the total income of the economy, their retirement starting from around 2009 has dragged income 
downwards (shown in the lower hike in dark dots) and will continue to do so. Another large cost fac-
tor to society consists of those persons in the latter half of their 80s, mostly due to consumption of 
health services as will be shown further below. Germany’s change over the five years is less dramatic 
than Japan’s, though cohort effects on both income and consumption can also be seen: the hike in 
income in the late 30s (light dotted line, 2003) is shifted towards the early 40s (dark dotted line, 
2008), if one compares the two cross-sections. One consumption hike in Germany in each cross-
section (shifting from the early 60s in 2003, dark dots, to the mid-60s in 2008, dark line) is also made 
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up by the same cohort, those born in the early/mid 1950s. The consumption level of those aged 85 
years and above in Germany is relatively lower than that in Japan. 
Figure 4: Consumption and income in Japan, aggregate, normalised by avg. income of 30-49 year olds. 
 
Source: Ogawa et.al (2012, 2014), own calculations. 
Figure 5 shows the lifecycle deficit – the difference of consumption and income – in aggregate values 
over the lifecycle. In both countries, deficit at young age peaks in the late teenage years, which 
mostly marks the final years of schooling. At old age, both countries show a hike around the late 60s, 
but Japan has an even higher peak for those aged around 90 years or more. Regarding this peak 
from around age 90, which occurs in both countries, it has to be noted that this is not only explained 
by increasing health consumption. In addition, 90+ years is an age category including all individuals 
aged 90 and older. Hence, the strong hike is also due to this group being larger than other groups 
only including persons of one same year of age. Another reason is rising healthcare expenditure at 
older age, as will be shown below in figures 12 to 14. In figure 6, showing the lifecycle deficit for all 
ages, it can be seen that while the overall lifecycle deficit is positive in both countries (consumption 
exceeding income overall), it is relatively lower in Germany and decreased slightly between 2003 
and 2008. In Japan, it is higher and increased between 2004 and 2009. When there is an overall 
lifecycle deficit in an economy, the negative remainder must be either financed by debt or wealth. A 
society with an increasing deficit is, in the absence of economic growth or other factors, therefore 
becoming less wealthy. Figure 7 shows the change of the lifecycle deficit by age groups. In both 
countries, the increase is positive and highest among young persons, indicating that financial inde-
pendence is becoming more difficult in Germany and Japan. In Germany, but not in Japan, increasing 
II Demographic development and foundations 
28 
incomes (leading to a decrease in lifecycle deficit) compensate for the increasing deficits of other 
age groups. 
Figure 5: Lifecycle deficit, aggregate, normalised by average income of 30-49 year olds. 
 
Sources: Kluge (2012, 2014), Ogawa et.al (2014, 2012), own calculations. 
Figure 6: Lifecycle deficit, aggregate, all ages, normalised by average income of 30-49 year olds. 
 
Sources: Kluge (2012, 2014), Ogawa et.al (2014, 2012), own calculations. 
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Figure 7: Lifecycle deficit change by age group in Germany (2003-08) and Japan (2004-09). 
 
Sources: Kluge (2012, 2014), Ogawa et.al (2014, 2012), own calculations. 
Figures 8 to 11 show age reallocations in Germany (figures 8, 9) and Japan (10, 11) in a normalised 
format, with all values being divided by the average income of the 30-49 year olds of the respective 
country. In both cross-sections of either country the working-age population is a net giver of both 
public (light grey) and private transfers (dark grey), while asset-based reallocations (black) shows a 
net inflow, which is equivalent to net dissaving. Net dissaving is highest upon retirement in both 
cross-sections of either country, which indicates consumption smoothing in the years of transition-
ing from living of labour income to mainly living of pension income. The largest portion of inflows in 
asset-based reallocations in both countries consists of private pensions, typically employment-
based.6 Another major factor, also in both countries, is the consumption of private savings. Net 
dissaving, including the receipt of private pensions and consumption of private savings, generally 
decreases with increasing age, in other words: assets are increasingly used up. The consumption of 
wealth is related to private transfer outflows. In Germany in 2003 (figure 8), starting from age 31 the 
average individual generated a net outflow of private transfers. Even at a very high age, persons in 
Germany on aggregate were giving private transfers to younger age groups. In 2008 (figure 9), a 
similar pattern persisted, though the net outflow of private transfers shows a sudden decrease from 
age 86. This decrease, in turn, coincides with an abrupt decrease in the net inflow of asset-based 
                                                          
6
 While public pensions are categorised under public transfers, employment-based pensions and other private pension 
plans come under asset-based reallocations. In turn, whole life insurances count as asset-based reallocations, but term life 
insurances are not included as in this case they are considered risk pooling and not intergenerational transfers (Mason et al. 
2006). 
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reallocations and public transfers (light grey). In other words, making intergenerational transfers ap-
pears to be related to receiving intergenerational transfers. The data for Japan show a similar picture 
in this sense. In 2004 (figure 10), the average Japanese person made a net outflow of private trans-
fers until age 76, after which private transfers turned into a net inflow. The turn of being a net giver 
to a net receiver of private transfers coincides with the stronger decrease of the inflow of asset-
based reallocations as well as public transfers. In 2009 (figure 11), the average person in Japan 
turned into a net receiver of public transfers only from age 81, but at the same time the decreases in 
inflows of public transfers and asset-based reallocations were less steep. In more general, the share 
of public transfers of all in- and outflows are higher in Germany than in Japan. This is equivalent to 
the larger size of the welfare relative to GDP in Germany compared to Japan, as shown above based 
on OECD data. Different sources of transfers being substitutes for each other, a lower share of public 
transfers renders private transfers and wealth more important. This raises questions over the con-
nection of intergenerational and intragenerational inequality. Though NTA does not provide data of 
income and wealth inequality within one age group, the implications are straightforward: where in 
the (partial) absence of a redistributing welfare state the individual private income position is more 
important for intergenerational solidarity, the effect that population ageing has on the wealth of a 
society depends to a greater extent on social and economic differences within a society. 
Figure 8: Age reallocations in Germany, 2003. 
 
Sources: Kluge(2012, 2014), own calculations. 
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Figure 9: Age reallocations in Germany, 2008. 
 
Sources: Kluge(2012, 2014), own calculations. 
Figure 10: Age reallocations in Japan, 2004. 
 
Source: Ogawa et.al (2012, 2014), own calculations. 
II Demographic development and foundations 
32 
Figure 11: Age reallocations in Japan, 2009. 
 
Source: Ogawa et.al (2012, 2014), own calculations. 
In order to see how the available resources are being used across age, figures 12-15 show consump-
tion by item. Three items that strongly vary across age are distinguished here: education, health and 
others, whereas “others” includes domains such as housing, durables and for Japan also long-term 
care. Each of the three items are distinguished by the spending agent, which can either be “private” 
(the individual), or “government” (the welfare state). Since changes over time between the two 
cross-sections are modest, only the latter cross-section of each country is displayed here. Figure 12 
depicts Germany’s consumption by item per capita in 2008. At any given age, “private other con-
sumption” (full grey colouring, top one of the two areas with the same tone) is the largest or one of 
the largest items of consumption. At young child age, public consumption of health (light grey, bot-
tom) and other (full grey, bottom) combined are almost as high as other private consumption. From 
age 6, public education (black, bottom) becomes an item of considerable relative weight, whereas 
private consumption of education (black, top) is more relevant at university age (early 20s) but never 
forms a major part of total consumption. Private consumption of health increases relatively con-
stantly from reaching adulthood, but remains a minor item across the life course. Public consump-
tion of health increases strongly at old age, significantly contributing to the general trend that con-
sumption increases with age. Considering the aggregate level (figure 13), hence accounting for the 
size of each age group, the total cost of the healthcare and education systems become apparent. In 
Germany in 2008, the highest total consumption occurred among those aged between 42 and 47 
years, as well as those aged 67 to 69. The latter form the cohort born between 1939 and 1941, the 
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former, in many cases, are the children of the latter. In 2008, the birth cohort of 1939-41 had retired 
a few years earlier and, and at their age there was also a per capita increase in public health con-
sumption (light grey, bottom), the hike in figure 13 shows a cohort effect. Vice versa, while per capi-
ta (public health) consumption is highest at old age, old persons did not exert strong pressure on 
aggregate total consumption in 2008 because of the then relatively small age group size of the older 
among the elderly. Also at young age, the total (aggregate) cost of public education consumption 
(black, bottom), mostly benefitting young persons, is considerably lower than public health con-
sumption (light grey, bottom), which tends to be consumed to a higher extent with increasing age. 
Figure 12: Consumption by item in Germany, per capita, 2008. 
 
Sources: Kluge(2012, 2014), own calculations. 
Figure 13: Consumption by item in Germany, aggregate, 2008. 
 
Sources: (Kluge 2012, 2014, Ogawa, Matsukura, and Chawla 2012, 2014), own calculations. 
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Figure 14 shows per capita consumption in Japan for the year 2009. Though the pattern appears sim-
ilar to that of Germany at first sight, there are marked differences. The hike at young adult age is 
considerably more pronounced in Japan, mostly owed to public education consumption (black, bot-
tom) and, compared to Germany, also to a larger extent due to private education consumption 
(black, top). The strong increase in public ‘other’ consumption (full grey, bottom) with age is to a 
considerable extent explained by Japan’s long-term care insurance, which is included in this item. In 
Japan in 2009 on an aggregate level (figure 14), consumption of those aged 59-61 (born between 
1948 and 1950) hikes, which is the cohort effect of the baby boomers. Those born between 1966 
and 1973 (aged 36-43 in 2009) are in many cases the children of the baby boomers, the so-called 
second baby boomers. Though the per capita consumption level of the second baby boomers is not 
higher than that of those slightly older or younger (see figure 14), their aggregate consumption 
shows a hike in figure 15. Projecting such cohort effects to the future, the ageing of these two large 
cohorts will exert pressure on the welfare system. This is especially the case since aggregate public 
health consumption increases strongly for the above-mentioned cohorts. Given the combination of 
high longevity, low fertility and the spending composition of welfare state, as was already shown in 
tables 1 and 2 above, other things being equal, the pressure on the welfare state in decades to come 
can be expected to be even stronger in Japan than in Germany. 
Figure 14: Consumption by item in Japan, per capita, 2009. 
 
Source: Ogawa et.al (2012, 2014), own calculations. 
II Demographic development and foundations 
35 
Figure 15: Consumption by item in Japan, aggregate, 2009. 
 
Source: Ogawa et.al (2012, 2014), own calculations. 
II.6 Preliminary findings 
As consumption per capita increases with age, while income decreases from retirement onwards, an 
ageing population is confronted with increasing costs for the whole economy. In other words, the 
working-age population has to generate additional income in order to keep consumption levels con-
stant. Where this condition cannot be fulfilled, either consumption has to be reduced or the remain-
ing gap between income and consumption has to be filled by issuing new debt or using up wealth. 
Therefore, a society where these factors are at play at the same time will tend to get less wealthy in 
the face of ageing. The discussion of descriptive statistics of Germany and Japan in this chapter 
shows this to be the case for both countries, though to a stronger extent in Japan. It has also been 
shown that in Japan, more than in Germany, in addition to the welfare state, individual families are 
shouldering considerable shares of the costs of ageing. This is especially noteworthy considering the 
strong welfare state expansion in Japan over the last decades, which nevertheless could not prevent 
the older elderly in Japan from turning into net receivers of both public and private transfers in their 
early 80s. In Germany, in contrast, people at old age are net receivers of public transfers but remain 
net givers of private transfers. This is an important difference: young persons, well-off or precarious 
(see chapter IV), can on aggregate count on less support from their oldest elderly family members in 
Japan compared to Germany, at least from a certain high age. This is one aspect of a weakened base 
for intergenerational support. 
The need for this support, however, appears to be stronger in Japan than in Germany. This is also 
shown in that in Japan, the age from which an individual becomes financially independent has in-
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creased over the two cohorts shown here. If the reason for this development were increased spend-
ing on education, which may turn into higher productivity at later age, a postponement of financial 
independence would seem less alarming. However, the most important reason for this shift is lower 
income among labour market entrants. The lifecycle deficit of young persons in Germany has also 
increased because of lower income levels of young adults; however, the age of reaching financial 
independence did not change. The total lifecycle deficit for Germany slightly decreased while that in 
Japan increased. 
In either country, these trends make intrafamilial intergenerational support increasingly important. 
But several factors appear to render just such support more difficult. One is, though only shown in 
the descriptive statistics but not in NTA data (see chapter IV), socioeconomic inequality. Where it is 
the individual or his or her family rather than the welfare state providing support, those materially 
worse off tend to be burdened with higher costs relative to their individual financial position. In oth-
er words, intragenerational inequalities, as shown above can be expected to be one determinant 
regarding the extent to which members of the working-age population can shoulder increased finan-
cial pressure due to ageing on the one hand and increasing precariousness among those at younger 
age on the other. Richer families will be able to provide levels of support that poorer ones cannot. 
This can be expected to be an important factor for those individuals at younger old-age who are net 
providers of intrafamilial (private) transfers. Another factor is low fertility and childlessness. As dis-
cussed above, those individuals at old age with fewer or no children lack important sources from 
which they could receive intergenerational private transfers if in need, which is more likely to hap-
pen at higher old-age. In Japan, as shown above, the older individuals among the elderly are net re-
ceivers of private transfers. An additional possible factor undermining intrafamilial intergenerational 
support is the change in living arrangements. A decrease in average household size is taking place in 
both countries, consisting of a decrease in the share of two- and three-generational households but 
an increase in the share of one-generation household and also single households. More individualis-
tic living arrangements may have an effect on intrafamilial support too, which will be analysed at a 
later stage (see chapter IV). 
Judging from this discussion of fundamental institutional, familial, and demographic indicators, it 
appears that Japan’s demographic pressure is even stronger than that of Germany. At the same time, 
however, it is shown that both countries are in the same boat once they are considered in an inter-
national context of OECD countries. Considering the financial flows shown in the NTA database in 
combination with the trends in population composition by age, it can be said that in both Germany 
and Japan, there is increased pressure on the working-age generation taking place, calling the (un-
written) generational contract of pay-as-you go pension systems and intergenerational sharing in the 
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private realm into question: the increased burden on the most economically productive age group is 
at least a challenge in financial terms. To what extent the above-discussed developments also pro-
vide fertile ground for – or are already constituting – intergenerational conflict and solidarity re-
mains to be scrutinised in later sections. In the remainder, it shall be analysed how political (welfare 
state), economic (labour market) and societal (family) factors in either country contribute to an eas-
ing or intensifying of demographic pressure. 
II.7 Scenarios of intergenerational relations 
Against the above-discussed background of demographic ageing amid its various institutional influ-
ences, several scenarios of intergenerational relations are possible. The definitions of intergenera-
tional societal solidarity and intergenerational family solidarity made in the beginning (see chapter I) 
help frame such scenarios in a more nuanced way than various previous works have done. Though 
this dissertation is not making an attempt to normatively judge intergenerational justice or the mor-
al and/or social desirability of specific public policies, it is trying to deliver a framework by which one 
can understand the social environment for what shall be called intergenerational policies, which en-
sure intergenerational solidarity on a societal level. In other words, this framework shall serve to 
understand the conditions under which the aforementioned “welfare-state based generational con-
tract” can be sustained or strengthened. By intergenerational policies, I simply understand those 
public policies that are predominantly favouring one generation while most of its burden is borne by 
one or more other generations. Examples are wholly or partly public-sector financed pensions plans, 
health plans, long-term care insurance schemes, or education programmes. For the purpose of this 
study, intergenerational policies do not include mere regulations, such as laws requiring family 
members to care for each other. The reasoning behind this is that although regulations that require 
family members or the alike to support each other across generations is a crucial instrument of the 
state to insure solidarity, such a tool is essentially reducing solidarity to the intrafamilial level. Hence, 
no societal solidarity is enhanced, which is why such regulations are not considered an intergenera-
tional policy here. 
Bearing this in mind, figure 16 shows the matrix based on the two dimensions of intergenerational 
relations. If there is found to be strong “intergenerational family solidarity” in a country, a willing-
ness among generations to render intergenerational support can be assumed to be present in prin-
ciple. However, solidarity in this case takes place inside the family and not on a societal level. There-
fore, to understand how the concept of intergenerational support may translate from the private 
and intrafamilial into the societal and social policy sphere, the notion of “intergenerational societal 
solidarity” is important: for example, if there is less public support for intergenerational policies, 
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there is less political potential to translate possible intergenerational support into the public welfare 
state level. Figure 16 displays the basic matrix and the interpretation of its outcomes. 
Figure 16: Matrix of intergenerational solidarity, potential for solidary policies. 
 Family level 
Strong Weak 
 
Societal 
level 
Strong Strong basis for intergenerational policies 
(1) 
Welfare state can compensate for lack of family 
support (3) 
Weak Little potential for intergenerational poli-
cies (2) 
Open intergenerational conflict, collapse of solidari-
ty (4) 
 
One basic assumption here is that public and private transfers are at least partial substitutes for each 
other, which is supported by other studies (Albertini 2016; Ogawa, Matsukara, and Chawla 2011; 
Albertini, Kohli, and Vogel 2007). Another crucial assumption is that with rising dependency ratios, 
intergenerational support is needed. And from a policy planner’s perspective, intergenerational poli-
cies through the welfare state are generally preferable to intrafamilial transfers because the former 
eases socioeconomic inequalities more effectively. In this light, the matrix in figure 16 denotes four 
societal situations under which the conditions for the enactment or protection of intergenerational 
policies can be expected to differ. 
Concisely, in scenario 1, family solidarity is strong, and societal solidarity is also strong, so that there 
is private intergenerational support happening, and also potential support for public policies that 
integrate generations. In scenario 2, the weak state of societal solidarity indicates that there is likely 
little support for intergenerational policies, while the presence of strong family solidarity shows that 
the family as an institution is playing an important role. Hence, there is a familialisation of intergen-
erational solidarity. In scenario 3, there is strong solidarity on the societal level, but only weak intra-
family solidarity, which means that though no strong intergenerational familial support is happening, 
there appears to be potential support for an engaging welfare state. Scenario 4, in turn, is the case 
of open intergenerational conflict where there is only little support taking place on the private level 
and there is no apparent support for intergenerational policies either.7 Hence, following this logic, 
intergenerational conflict would be a result of a combination of two states of societal and family sol-
idarity, so that the picture of the presence or absence of generational conflict or solidarity becomes 
more nuanced. 
This approach to intergenerational relations and intergenerational policies in the light of demo-
graphic ageing has several advantages. One is that while it gives a hint at the combinations of inter-
                                                            
7
 While it may appear at first sight that scenario 1 is to be considered superior to 2, 2 to be superior to 3 and so on, this is 
not necessarily the case. For instance, a country may show little support for intergenerational policies because there is just 
no need for such policies as everybody is taken sufficient care of. Hence, this matrix cannot in principle make statements 
over the desirability of each scenario without further information. 
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generational societal solidarity and family solidarity under which a current “welfare-state based 
generational contract” might or might not be politically sustainable, questions as to how such a situ-
ation came about are outside this framework in a narrow sense, and can possibly be answered with 
a range of approaches that are theoretically independent of this matrix. Another advantage is that 
this approach is in principle suitable to everything from a single-case study to a comparison of a 
larger set of countries, depending on the theory, case-specific contextualisation and data one uses. 
However, this framework’s scope of research has limits. Through empirical analysis using definition 1 
(see chapter I), it can be shown whether societal solidarity between generations is strong or weak. 
Through empirical analysis based on definition 2, the same can be shown regarding actual solidarity 
on the family level. What cannot be tested is which of the two tendencies – societal or family soli-
darity – is stronger. Hence, it will not be shown in this work whether in any given situation, intergen-
erational societal solidarity is stronger or weaker than intergenerational family solidarity. The total 
extent of either is also hard to be measured. Regardless of these limitations, however, critical ap-
praisal of intergenerational relations and conclusions can be drawn. For example, if in one country 
(or both) empirical analysis shows the existence of a generational conflict, or strong solidarity on 
both dimensions, such results allow for cautious policy recommendations. For instance, where socie-
tal solidarity is strong, a welfare state expansion in terms of intergenerational policies appears feasi-
ble. This may be especially advisable where either family solidarity is weak or familial solidarity is 
strong but poverty among certain age groups is relatively common so that they could benefit from 
the support of a strong welfare state. Where societal solidarity is weak, in turn, there appears little 
room for expansion of intergenerational policies, indeed the opposite may be advisable. In any case, 
it would require further scrutiny in a next step as to what kind of policy expansion or adjustment 
would be advisable, for example regarding pensions, healthcare, old-age care, or family policies. 
Such analysis, however, would go beyond the scope of this work. Rather, this work with its contex-
tual analysis and its more general analytical framework can be understood as a point of departure 
from which more detailed policy measures could be designed. 
In the remainder of this work, the concept of “intergenerational societal solidarity” shall form the 
analytical basis for chapter III, in which solidarity between generations on the societal level shall be 
tested. The concept of “intergenerational family solidarity” will be the foundation for chapter IV, 
where forces driving support between generations inside the family will be investigated. 
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III Analysis 1: intergenerational societal solidarity 
III.1 Theory 
III.1.1 Theory of political preferences 
III.1.1.1 Why care about preferences? 
The endeavour to analyse how intergenerational relations evolve on the societal level in the light of 
demographic ageing has been approached from various perspectives. While some researchers 
(Kotlikoff 1988; Haveman 1994) have focused on the fiscal burden of today’s individuals and future 
generations, other studies have explored age-relevant differences in government spending (Lynch 
2006; Myles 2002; Preston 1984; Streeck 2007; Thomson 1989) or differences according to age or 
cohort with regard to projected lifetime income, voting behaviour or poverty risk (Esping-Andersen 
and Sarasa 2002; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun 2004; Sinn and 
Uebelmesser 2002; Sobotka 2010; Tremmel 2006b, 2006a; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2010). Another 
branch has been researching how stated preferences on government spending, reported in social 
science surveys, differ with regard to certain individual characteristics, one of which is age (for 
example: Busemeyer, Goerres, and Weschle 2009; Sørensen 2013; Wilkoszewski 2011). 
While this work falls into the latter category, it also seeks to incorporate some of the focuses of the 
former such as age-based spending biases of the government. In addition, this work seeks to intro-
duce dualisation, a field of study that has so far mostly been applied on the intragenerational level 
only, to the intergenerational level (as will be explained further below). In essence, it is the attempt 
here to understand how an individual’s socioeconomic position, notably but not exclusively his or 
her employment status, as well as the welfare state’s treatment of the group he or she forms a part 
of, is associated with certain attitudes8 towards the welfare state’s role in intergenerational policies. 
The main reason for the focus on preferences is that they constitute a crucial expression of inter-
human relations. Ignoring preferences and only concentrating on government spending and/or soci-
oeconomic determinants of government (pension) policies would allow singling out patterns of ad-
vantage and disadvantage. But whether patterns of disadvantage and vulnerability are recognised as 
problematic requires knowing about the attitudes or preferences of the people. Hence, social soli-
darity, or conflict, is closely linked to attitudes or preferences between those groups who are directly 
or indirectly in a solidary or conflictive relation with each other. 
                                                            
8
 The terms attitudes and preferences are used interchangeably in this work. 
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In addition to this theoretical argument, studies have shown that political attitudes that voice sup-
port for certain policies tend to have a positive impact on actual government spending on such poli-
cies (Burstein 2003; Brooks and Manza 2007). Systematically coding academic publications with re-
gard to their findings in this respect, Burstein (2003) finds that the impact of public opinion on policy 
outcomes is substantial and increases with the salience level of a certain policy case. Another finding 
is that the impact of public opinion remains strong once the influence of political organisations and 
economic elites are accounted for. Brooks and Manza (2007) compare attitudes towards the role of 
the welfare state in 16 OECD countries and find that internationally, government spending levels in a 
given policy field correlate positively with according public opinion levels towards that policy field. 
Using the International Social Survey Programme’s cross-sectional data (though enriched with na-
tional-level survey data), the authors establish causality, but nevertheless show a striking association 
between public support for policies and the actual existence of these. 
III.1.1.2 Rational-choice framework 
In the realm of the study of (policy) preferences, it has been found that although the concept of the 
rational actor is often a suitable framework to explain preferences; its applicability is limited once a 
rather narrow concept of rationality is used (Kitschelt and Rehm 2006; Druckman 2004; Ringe 2005; 
Wildavsky 1987; Wilkoszewski 2011).9 For instance, individuals may have altruistic preferences 
(Wilkoszewski 2011) or simply lack information or other capacities and therefore not know their real 
preferences (Kitschelt and Rehm 2006). In addition, based on experiments, Druckmann (2004) shows 
how contextual factors such as deliberation and competition between social groups as well as indi-
vidual attributes such as expertise affect the extent to which individuals are prone to manipulation. 
He concludes that the better informed actors are about a certain topic, the more robust will their 
opinion be against changes in the framing of a question about that topic. Ringe (2005) shows similar 
results. Alesina and Giuliano (2011), comparing preferences for redistributive policies across the US, 
European and Asian countries, find that not only gender, age and employment status are important 
determinants but also personal experiences, cultural factors, and ideology, not all of which could 
easily be explained by rational self-interest.10 
                                                            
9 A methodological problem regarding the analysis of preferences extracted from surveys, as will be done in the analytical 
section of this chapter, is that of actors adhering to social desirability in their response behaviour (Krumpal 2013). While 
this problem will not be solved here, it shall nevertheless be borne in mind as a possible response bias and limitation of the 
findings. 
10
 Other explanatory variables are institutions, which also do not appear to follow notions of rationality. Alesina and Giuli-
ano show this in terms of regional differences, for example that respondents in Asian countries on average show a lower 
preference for redistribution compared to those from Europe. One explanation, borrowed from Esping-Andersen (1999), is 
that family ties are stronger: “Thus in societies where the family performs these functions the preferences for government 
intervention are different (i.e. there is less demand for it) than in countries where the family does not perform such func-
tions” (Alesina and Giuliano 2011, 20). 
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Nevertheless, various studies of policy preferences at least implicitly operate on the assumption of a 
narrow rational choice model where actors want to maximise their personal economic wellbeing 
(Busemeyer, Goerres, and Weschle 2009; Marx 2014; Wilkoszewski 2011; Sørensen 2013; de Mello 
et al. 2016). Studying the association of new social risks (see below in this chapter) and policy pref-
erences, Kitschelt and Rehm (2006) emphasise the following when studying policy preferences of 
larger groups:  
“As long as critical minorities in each risk class have a keen understanding of their risk conditions and of 
the policies that improve their risk exposure, we should find systematic statistical relations between ag-
gregate group characteristics and policy preferences, even if the vast majority of citizens has a poor un-
derstanding of their interests that makes them voice policy preferences in a randomized fashion. A mi-
nority of “rational information misers” is all that’s needed in order to produce what looks like rational 
relations at the level of population aggregates” (2006, 54) 
Against the background of such conceptions (though formulated earlier than the specific work of 
Kitschelt and Rehm mentioned above), Esser, leaning on Lindenberg (1985), has proposed the so-
called RREEMM concept, which stands for the “Resourceful, Restricted, Expecting, Evaluating, Max-
imizing Man” (Esser 1993, 238). This approach to understanding human behaviour constitutes a third 
way qualifying the often too strict assumptions of the (narrowly rational) homo economicus (espe-
cially regarding cognitive capacities and the availability of information) and the homo sociologicus 
(which according to Esser tends to lack a selection mechanism to explain behaviour). According to 
RREEMM, a typical person makes (the arguably best forward-looking and expecting) selection ac-
cording to the information available, though various factors are restricting the actor’s capacity to do 
so. 
This work shall consider rationality in the same light as Esser: while (a narrow sense of) rationality is 
understood as economic rationality where people maximize their economic self-interest, it is not 
considered to be the only and perhaps not even the most important determinant of human behavior. 
In turn, those characteristics that manifest economic rationality, again in accordance with Kitschelt 
and Rehm, are expected to be socioeconomic traits such as employment status or income, and other 
characteristics that position an individual into society in terms of their financial or social class. Other 
characteristics, such as political interest or ideology, may or may not work against this narrow self-
interested rational drive of preferences.  
In the remainder of this section, the theoretical discussion shall therefore focus on those traits that 
in the process of demographic ageing, under given institutional arrangements and developments, 
make certain groups (more) vulnerable. In addition, the institutions allowing or impeding such vul-
nerability will be discussed, all with regard to what preferences individuals are expected to have 
against this background. 
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III.1.2 Political generations 
III.1.2.1 Mannheim’s concept and related works 
In the study of intergenerational relations and policy preferences, Karl Mannheim’s (1964) concept 
of political generations is a natural point of departure. Though it was not explicitly designed for de-
mographic ageing, it was meant to generally explain under what circumstances a generation may 
form a common conscience and interest and as a result become a political actor in order to influence 
political decision-making. Mannheim theorised that amid constantly and inevitably happening socie-
tal change, three major conditions must be met for the emergence of such a “political generation.” 
Firstly, there must be common challenges during their formative (younger) years, secondly, there 
must be a common source of discontent, and thirdly, there needs to be a certain degree of organisa-
tion within the generation so to form a group. 
Originally written in 1923, the concept has been subject to criticism on various grounds. May (2010) 
argues that generations often do not self-identify as such but are labelled by outsiders such as scien-
tists, which appears at odds with the condition of political organisation. Another point she raises is 
that social or societal influences are mostly diverse and the lifecycle of major events driving these 
typically consist of short time periods so that it is hard to form a collective conscience on such a ba-
sis. Taking the example of Germany, May finds no indication of there being any politicised genera-
tion in a twist with another generation but that instead, intergenerational relations were intact. In 
opposition to those observing generational conflict on the societal level, May hypothesises that in 
principle, intergenerational relations do not evolve around the welfare state but the family. In addi-
tion, Zinnecker (2003) has considered the concept too broad for empirical analysis. 
Nevertheless, Mannheim’s work has become a cornerstone of generational research (Pilcher 1994) 
and over decades been used for analyses differentiating groups by either age, generation or point in 
time of the analysis over decades (Johnson and Falkingham 1988; Thompson 1991; Wilkoszewski 
2006, 2011; Higgs and Gilleard 2010; Sackmann 2004; Ryder 1965). Ryder (1965) crucially expanded 
the concept by considering generations as cohorts, hence such groups that share a similar point of 
entry such as birth, marriage or similar life-changing events, and illustrated how cohort replacement 
is a driver of societal change. Building on Mannheim and Ryder, Sackmann (2004), who provides an 
overview of various conceptualisations of generations and cohorts, argues that one crucial factor for 
a generation to form a common conscience are, next to demographic trends, the characteristics of 
the welfare states and possible competition over resources resulting from it. The findings of 
Wilkoszewski (2011), differentiating policy preferences in Germany by age and other characteristics 
based on the Population Policy Acceptance Survey and the Generations and Gender Survey, appear 
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to support this argument. He draws on Mannheim’s theory of political generations and shows that 
younger people are more in favour of transfers to the younger generation than older people are, 
though his study cannot separate age effects from cohort effects (see below for a discussion of the 
importance of this separation). The concept of political generations, in turn, will be one at the heart 
of the analysis in this chapter. 
III.1.2.2 What makes a political generation today? 
In order to generate hypotheses over where a political generation may be emerging, one needs to 
single out influences that may trigger such an upcoming. An obvious and often-mentioned possible 
influence is demographic ageing and the effects this is having on public finances. The argument is 
that especially pension systems running on a pay-as-you-go logic will place a heavy burden on small-
er cohorts once larger older cohorts reach retirement age (Thompson 1991; Wilkoszewski 2011; 
Higgs and Gilleard 2010; Johnson and Falkingham 1988; Falkingham and Hills 1995). This topic is dis-
cussed below in the contexts of Germany and Japan respectively. A second possible influence, which 
is already widely discussed regarding intragenerational relations but much less so in the realm of 
intergenerational equity, is dualisation and the emergence of new social risks. “New social risks” are 
commonly understood as characteristics that raise the financial and/or socioeconomic vulnerability 
other than “old risks” such as unemployment or illness and disability. Such new forms of risks have 
become relatively common over the last decades in the face of structural changes of the economy as 
de-industrialisation, an increasing female labour participation, and an inflation of education (Bonoli 
2007; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2010; Thelen 2014). Consequentially, new social risks most typically refer 
to not being financially able to combine work and family, not getting sufficient returns on invest-
ments into education, one’s labour skills becoming obsolete by structural change, and being in non-
regular employment (Kitschelt and Rehm 2006). Depending on the welfare regime, those affected by 
new social risks are to varying degrees disadvantaged in the pension system compared to those not 
affected. Therefore, in addition to intragenerational inequity, new social risks also constitute an in-
tergenerational challenge. This argument will be presented in more detail below. 
III.1.2.3 Effects of period, age or cohort 
All influences that may provoke the formation of political preferences need to be considered in the 
context of demographic ageing being a dynamic process with effects of age, cohort and period, 
though these are often difficult to separate from each other. Many investigations into intergenera-
tional relations so far have lacked a distinction of these three concepts (e.g. Busemeyer, Goerres, 
and Weschle 2009; Wilkoszewski 2011), though they are fundamental to demographic research. 
When intergenerational relations have in the past been analysed in terms of the distribution of re-
sources, as this work also does, the reason for this neglect was mostly a lack of suitable data consist-
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ing of either sufficiently long longitudinal or a sufficient sequence of repeated cross-sections. How-
ever, the distinction between age, period and cohort is crucial since in its absence, one cannot de-
termine whether a certain “political generation” has formed its idiosyncratic preferences because of 
their commonalities based on their birth cohort or because of their age at a certain point in time. In 
the case of the former, the specific preferences of that generation would remain distinct at a later or 
earlier point in time, while in the case of the latter these preferences would tend to fade amid tran-
sitioning into a new (age-based) phase of the life course. A period effect, in turn, would tend to af-
fect all age groups or cohort in a similar way at one certain point in time. 
Of the few works that have distinguished age and cohort effects, Sørensen (2013) has studied pref-
erences regarding social expenditure in 22 countries between 1985 and 2006 based on International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data. It is found there that even once birth cohort is accounted for 
older people prefer more government spending on pensions and health more often than younger 
respondents. The effects, though, are relatively weak. A shortcoming of Sørensen’s work is that he 
does not discuss the specifics of country cases so that conclusions about the relationship between 
political and policy institutions and different age groups’ or birth cohorts’ preferences have to 
remain rather broad. 
Based on the OECD social expenditure database spanning from 1980 to 2010, Plante and Jensen 
(2017) find that while in terms of public expenditure there are more resources allocated to larger 
cohorts this happens with a time lag so that in many cases there are shortages and windfalls for 
larger and smaller birth cohorts respectively. In this case, however, though rational choice is implicit 
to their assumptions regarding policy expansion, the authors do not estimate the actual association 
of individual preferences and policy spending levels. 
In turn, single case studies on preferences have been carried out on the US based General Social 
Survey (Fullerton and Dixon 2010; Plutzer and Berkman 2005; Street and Cossman 2006) and based 
on the Swedish Welfare State Survey (Svallfors 2008). It is found for the US, for instance, that later 
birth cohorts tend to support public health expenditure more often than earlier birth cohorts (Street 
and Cossman 2006), and that later cohorts have become more supportive of public education 
spending compared to earlier ones (Plutzer and Berkman 2005; Fullerton and Dixon 2010). For 
Sweden, it is found that public support for older people has become more popular over time and 
that this is not solely explained by an age effect but also by later cohorts that have been supporting 
generous old-age schemes increasingly more often (Svallfors 2008). Though not generalisable to 
other country contexts, these results suggest that the often-observed increasing preference for old-
age support policies in ageing societies is at least not solely based on lifecycle effects but may also 
be explained by cohort effects. 
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In this fashion, this work shall investigate, to the extent that this is possible given the available data, 
if and how political generations have been occurring in Germany and Japan – and if this is based on 
age and/or cohort. 
III.1.3 Dualisation and insider-outsider theory 
III.1.3.1 Types of dualisation as a challenge to solidarity 
As alluded to above, demographic ageing comes with at least two challenges to intergenerational 
solidarity on the societal level, both of which are directly or indirectly linked to the role of the wel-
fare state and a possible conflict over resources. The first one is the distribution resulting from the 
pension system, consisting of possibly unequal contributions and benefits across cohorts. In this case, 
the intergenerational link between population ageing and the welfare state is direct. The other chal-
lenge regards the intergenerational effects of the emergence of new social risks, and also refers to 
unequal distribution of contributions and benefits from the pension system. Here, the intergenera-
tional link is indirect because intergenerational inequality results from inequality on the intragenera-
tional level between those affected by new social risks and those who are not. 
III.1.3.2 Rueda’s insider-outsider model 
In the case of either direct or indirect challenges to intergenerational societal solidarity, the logic of 
insiders and outsiders is applicable, which is explained in this section. The insider-outsider model, 
inspired by works on dual labour markets and competition between the employed and the unem-
ployed (Blanchard and Summers 1986; Lindbeck and Snower 1986; Rueda 2005; Saint-Paul 1996), 
was originally developed by Rueda (2005). His basic distinction is the following: 
“I define insiders as those workers with highly protected jobs. They are sufficiently protected not to feel 
greatly threatened by high levels of unemployment. Outsiders, on the other hand, are either unem-
ployed or hold jobs characterised by low salaries and low levels of protection, employment rights, bene-
fits, and social security privileges. […] [T]he precariously employed and the unemployed are the main 
group to suffer the consequences of economic fluctuations (being hired in good times and laid off in 
downturns)” (Rueda 2005, 62–63). 
Given their distinct positions in the labour market, Rueda (2005) points out, insiders and outsiders 
have different interests. Insiders care about the protection of their own jobs, while spending on un-
employment benefits and training mainly burdens them with higher taxes and increases low-wage 
competition. Outsiders, in turn, worry about employment and poverty and can therefore be ex-
pected to have a preference for employment creating government expenditure. However, they op-
pose higher protection of insider jobs, as this means an entry barrier to the full-time jobs they would 
like to have. 
This distinction is relevant here for two reasons. Firstly, since the 1970s and synchronously with 
population ageing, all OECD countries have been witnessing such tendencies of dualisation, leading 
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to or amplifying a divide between insiders and outsiders (Emmenegger et al. 2012b; Rueda 2014; 
Thelen 2014; Marques and Salavisa 2017). This trend is especially tangible in Germany and Japan, in 
fact, these two countries stand out in international comparison (Emmenegger et al. 2012b; Thelen 
2014; Heinrich 2013; Nishiyama 2017). The increasing number of outsiders in these countries is not 
only disadvantaged in both the welfare state and the labour market in terms of benefit entitlements 
and income (see discussion below) but also faces a higher poverty risk at old age (Emmenegger et al. 
2012b). Secondly, dualisation on income, old-age policies and pensions is giving rise to an intergen-
erational divide. Just by population ageing and thereby rising dependency ratios alone, makes a dis-
tinction of “lucky and less lucky generations” (Myles 2002, 138), where the latter are those cohorts 
smaller in rise and carrying the burden of supporting larger cohorts of the elderly. 
In a similar fashion, though looking at income by cohorts, Chauvel and Schröder (2014) find that co-
horts entering the labour market in times of economic booms have higher lifetime incomes than 
those entering in recession or stagnation. Furthermore, they show that dualisation within a genera-
tion, as witnessed since the 1970s, also brings about inequalities between generations. In other 
words, where there are outsiders within a generation, an insider-outsider dynamic is likely to be pre-
sent also between younger and older persons. One reason is that, depending on a given welfare re-
gime (see below for a discussion), labour market outsiders also have lower pension entitlements. 
Another reason is path dependency between low income at younger age and low income at older 
age. Borrowing the terminology of Rueda’s insider-outsider model, today’s pensioners can for this 
matter be considered as (pension) insiders, while future pensioners (or today’s non-elderly) can be 
considered (pension) outsiders. This interpretation makes the insider-outsider model not only appli-
cable to intra- but also to intergenerational inequalities. 
III.1.3.3 Types of disadvantage 
The driving force of the insider-outsider model is the distribution of a possibly scarce resource be-
tween societal groups. Translating competition over intragenerational welfare state spending, as 
focused on by Rueda, to the intergenerational level, competition most strikingly posits an antago-
nism between the elderly and the non-elderly regarding public expenditure on old-age. Today’s el-
derly can be called pension insiders as they currently benefit from a certain pension policy initiated 
in the past, while today’s workforce (pension outsiders) may be put at a disadvantage by the time of 
their retirement if today’s elderly (pension insiders) are treated too generously. The case that there 
is competition over a scarce resource regarding old-age spending can be easily made. Following the 
current (pay-as-you-go) pension logic (see discussion below), in absence of comprehensive reforms, 
pensions generally become less (or more) generous as the old-age dependency ratio rises (or falls). 
In this way, other things being equal, just as labour market insiders and outsiders are expected to 
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have different interests regarding labour and welfare policies, pension outsiders and pension insid-
ers are expected to have different interests regarding expenditure on old-age such as pensions. 
In fact, adding the intergenerational dimension to the intragenerational one focused upon by Rueda, 
a third dimension of conflict may emerge. Because labour market outsiders, compared to labour 
market insiders, also tend to have lower pension entitlements, this group stands at a double disad-
vantage (both intragenerationally and intergenerationally). As Chauvel and Schröder (2014) show, 
this tendency holds across welfare regimes but is especially strong in continental and familialistic 
regimes (see below for a discussion of welfare regimes). Fervers and Schwander (2015) find similar 
results. Thus, even without being part of a “less lucky generation”, in Myles’ (2002) words, there is a 
path dependency from being a labour market outsider to becoming disadvantaged or poor at old age. 
Being part of a “less lucky generation”, ceteris paribus, should intensify the degree of disadvantage. 
Hence, in addition to testing whether there is indeed a intergenerational conflict of interests be-
tween elderly and non-elderly (or pension system insiders and pension system outsiders), it will also 
be tested in this work whether this double disadvantage is associated with a systematic difference of 
interests between labour market insiders and outsiders regarding pension spending. In other words, 
it will be scrutinised whether labour market outsiders reject rich spending on pensions more strongly 
than labour market insiders, because the outsiders would enjoy even less of those perks. Against the 
background of these fundamental dynamics, the distinct shape of a given pension system may 
strengthen or weaken insider-outsider divides and thus influence the likelihood of differences in atti-
tudes towards government spending. 
III.1.3.4 Challenges with analysing preferences 
The attempt to understand individuals’ preferences over the role of the welfare state comes with a 
challenge here, which lies in the nature of intergenerational relations. When individuals are asked 
about their preferences on intergenerational policies, they are implicitly also being asked a question 
with a strong inter-temporal dimension. For instance, a pension outsider may prefer lower pension 
expenditure so that his/her current burden is reduced, but he/she may as well prefer higher ex-
penditure so to one day receive a higher pension him/herself. One part of this problem is survey 
questions not being unequivocal; another is the possible diversity of inter-temporal preferences 
among respondents of surveys. 
As argued above, it is assumed for the purpose of this work that while individuals follow their nar-
row self-interest at a basic level, this tendency can be dampened or overturned by other factors. The 
use of a diverse body of covariates in the analytical section (including, among others, variables on 
political persuasion, education) will accommodate for these factors. For instance, individual political 
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persuasion may influence a person’s preferences in a way contrary to what his or her income or em-
ployment status alone would lead him or her to prefer. In addition, high educational attainment may 
lead to a more informed opinion and thus more differentiated (perhaps more long-term oriented) 
policy preferences. In this light, including relevant covariates into the analysis will allow for richer 
interpretations of results. While this will not solve the fundamental challenges of ambivalent survey 
questions and the inter-temporal dimension of preferences, results will nevertheless become more 
nuanced and in this sense their limitations more contextual. 
III.2 Institutions, welfare state and labour market 
III.2.1 Welfare state composition 
III.2.1.1 Spending conditions of the welfare state 
In order to understand why expenditure on old-age is a salient policy issue that may put a strain on 
intergenerational solidarity, it is worthwhile to understand the developments of welfare states’ 
spending patterns as well as their budget constraints over time. Table 8 highlights two important 
measures in this regard, welfare state size and government debt both as a share of GDP. 
The upper rows of table 8 show the development of the size of the welfare state since the early 
1980s. It can be seen that in Germany, the share constantly increased albeit only slightly, from 22 to 
26 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, Japan’s welfare state size grew vastly from 11 percent of GDP in the 
early 1980s to 23 percent in the early 2010s. While Germany’s lower expansion rate over the last 
three and a half decades lies below the OECD average, Japan having more than doubled its welfare 
state clearly lies above it. Overall, however, Germany’s welfare state is still higher than both Japan’s 
and the average value in the OECD, which showed an increase from 16 percent in the early 1980s to 
22 percent in the early 2010s. 
A major difference between Germany and Japan, seen in the lower rows, is the situation of govern-
ment debt as a share of GDP. Similar to Japan, Germany’s debt share increased over the decades, 
though in the last years it has been reduced again (albeit not seen in the five-year average data, the 
latest years do indicate slightly reduced debt ratios). The extent of the debt share increase in Japan, 
however, is much higher. In fact, it has almost doubled in 20 years, and is higher than that of any 
other OECD country and tends to increase steadily. The most important reasons behind this are vari-
ous economic stimulus packages amid years of continuously low economic growth and reconstruc-
tion efforts after the Great Tohoku Earthquake in 2011. The government debt burden appears espe-
cially important from an intergenerational perspective. At a high level of government debt, austerity 
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measures appear more likely, which would probably place a relatively stronger burden on the work-
ing-age population at the time of initiating such policies. 
Table 8: Welfare state size and government debt, five-year averages until 2010, average of available years onwards 
where data are lacking. 
 
1980-84 avg 1985-89 avg 1990-94 avg 1995-99 avg 2000-04 avg 2005-09 avg 
2010-14 
avg* 
 
Social expenditure (as a share of GDP) *data only cover 2010-‘11 
Germany 22.12 22.28 24.08 26.18 26.72 26.04 26.15 
Japan 10.92 11.26 12.02 14.82 17.30 19.40 22.60 
OECD Total 16.18 17.06 18.88 19.12 19.22 19.82 21.55 
 
Government debt (% of GDP) *data cover 2010-‘14 
Germany n.a. n.a. n.a. 60.44 62.18 69.06 83.72 
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. 133.41 161.73 186.35 231.70 
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: OECD 2017, own calculations. 
III.2.1.2 Spending on old-age 
In order to see how the age focus of government spending has evolved over the years alongside 
population ageing, Lynch’s (Lynch 2006, 2001) elderly/non-elderly spending ratio (ENSR) serves as a 
suitable basis for analysis. The ENSR relates the share of social expenditure directed towards elderly 
persons to the share directed towards non-elderly persons and is shown in table 9 (OECD 2015d).11 
The upper rows show the ENSR in a non-adjusted way, the lower rows show both parts divided by 
the respective population shares.12 
For Germany, the non-adjusted ENSR indicated that in 1980, almost twice as much was spent on old-
age as for persons at working-age. By 2011, the ratio had decreased to 1.49. Therefore, amid popula-
tion ageing, Germany’s welfare state adjusted its spending priorities in favour of young and working-
age recipients. As a proportion of GDP, expenditure directed towards elderly recipients has almost 
remained constant over three and a half decades at about 10 percent, which considering population 
ageing implies a lowering per capita expenditure on old-age. Non-elderly spending, in turn, in-
creased in the same period. This change in focus of Germany’s welfare state is also represented in 
                                                            
11
 Healthcare and education spending are taken out of the equation since their inherent age bias is either less clear than 
other spending categories or the numbers stem from different OECD datasets. In turn, most of healthcare spending is di-
rected towards the elderly while most of education spending goes towards non-elderly groups, with healthcare being more 
costly than education in both countries (OECD 2015d), which is also consistent with NTA data (see chapter II). In this sense, 
the procedure follows Tepe and Vanhuysse (2010). 
12
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the age-adjusted ENSR shown in the lower rows of table 9, indicating that the elderly bias halved 
between the early 1980s and the early 2010s. 
Japan’s development has been different from Germany’s. The non-adjusted ENSR was at 2.43 in the 
early 1980s but increased to 3.44 in the early 2010s (after a peak at even 4.05 over the previous five 
years). The above-shown expansion of Japan’s welfare state as a share of GDP is mostly explained by 
an expansion of old-age spending. Elderly expenditure as a share of GDP, comparatively low at 4.5 
percent of GDP in the early 1980s, almost tripled over three and a half decades. However, account-
ing for the age composition, Japan’s adjusted ENSR also halved just as Germany’s. Different from 
Germany, this significant fall in the adjusted ENSR is not due to a reversal of age-wise spending fo-
cuses but rather the even more rapid population ageing in Japan (see chapter II). 
Considering the OECD context, Japan stands out with its increase in the non-adjusted ENSR but is in 
line with the decrease in the adjusted ENSR. Indeed, once population compositions are accounted 
for, the directions of developments of age-wise spending focuses of industrialised economies have 
been very similar. However, Japan’s adjusted ENSR continues to be considerably higher than the 
OECD average while Germany’s is slightly below it. 
Table 9: Elderly/non-elderly spending ratio, five-year averages until 2010, average of available years onwards where 
data is lacking. 
 
1980-84 avg 1985-89 avg 1990-94 avg 1995-99 avg 2000-04 avg 2005-09 avg 
2010-14 
avg* 
 
Elderly/non-elderly spending ratio (not adjusted by population shares) *data only cover 2010-‘11 
Germany 2.06 1.87 1.38 1.43 1.51 1.52 1.49 
Japan 2.43 3.22 2.87 3.07 3.44 4.05 3.44 
OECD Total 1.66 1.32 1.09 1.15 1.13 1.18 1.20 
 
Elderly expenditure (as share of GDP) *data only cover 2010-‘11 
Germany 10.64 10.38 9.86 10.90 11.44 11.04 10.80 
Japan 4.46 5.02 5.34 6.82 8.82 10.38 11.70 
OECD Total 6.42 6.64 7.14 7.40 7.42 7.62 8.40 
 
Elderly/non-elderly spending ratio (divided by elderly and non-elderly pop. shares) *data only cover 2010-‘11 
Germany 11.66 10.76 7.78 7.67 7.24 6.15 5.74 
Japan 22.99 26.28 19.20 16.61 15.20 14.86 11.43 
OECD Total 13.80 10.58 8.07 7.92 7.34 7.17 6.92 
Source: OECD 2017, own calculations. 
III.2.1.3 Spending on new social risks 
Following Lynch’s (2006) work on age-wise spending biases of welfare states, later works adopted 
the concept for other spending areas (e.g. Tepe and Vanhuysse 2010). For the purpose of this work, 
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the respective indicator of a spending bias for new social risks is of particular interest.13 One reason 
is that under the assumption of resource scarcity, spending on old-age may be considered by the 
public to stand in competition with other spending areas with increasing needs. As discussed above, 
one of those areas with increasing need are new social risks. Another reason is that those affected 
by new social risks tend to be more prone to old-age poverty too. 
Table 10 shows the developments of new social risk spending patterns. In general, it can be seen 
that across years and countries, spending for new social risks is very low compared to spending on 
old-age. Turning to Germany first, the new social risk spending ratio (NSRSR) has increased signifi-
cantly over time from 0.13 to 0.20. Hence, over time, the share of the welfare state spent for new 
social risks compared to other spending areas has risen by half between the early 1980s and the ear-
ly 2010s. Also as a share of GDP, new social risk expenditure increased in Germany, standing at 1.52 
percent in the early 1980s and at 3.05 percent in the early 2010s. The age-adjusted NSRSR also in-
creased considerably from 0.16 to 0.26. An important explanation is the shrinking population share 
of the working-age population, which, other things being equal, leads to an increase in the adjusted 
ratio. 
                                                            
13
 The basic way of calculating the NSRSR follows Tepe and Vanhuysse (2010) though they do not adjust for the size of pop-
ulation groups according to age. Consequentially, the formulas used here, for country i in year t, are as follows 
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Table 10: New social risk spending ratio, five-year averages until 2010, average of available years onwards where data is 
lacking. 
 
1980-84 avg 1985-89 avg 1990-94 avg 1995-99 avg 2000-04 avg 
2005-09 
avg 
2010-14 
avg* 
 
New social risk spending ratio (adjusted by non-elderly population share) *data only cover 2010-‘11 
Germany 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.20 
Japan 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12 
OECD Total 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 
 
New social risk expenditure (as share of GDP) *data only cover 2010-‘11 
Germany 1.52 2.26 3.36 3.30 3.34 2.90 3.05 
Japan 0.48 0.40 0.82 0.84 1.00 1.12 1.60 
OECD Total 1.58 1.50 2.32 2.44 2.52 2.56 2.80 
 
New social risk spending ratio (NSR spending divided by non-elderly population share) *data only cover 2010-‘11 
Germany 0.16 0.19 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.26 
Japan 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 
OECD Total 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 
Source: OECD 2017, own calculations. 
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Similarly for Japan, the non-adjusted NSRSR increased between the early 1980s and early 2010s, and 
it lay substantially below that of Germany at any point in time. In an OECD context, however, both 
countries have fallen below the average of industrialised countries during most years (with the ex-
ception of Germany in the 1990s, which were the years after reunification). Japan’s low share is 
therefore considerable. On the other hand, as a share of GDP spending for new social risks increased 
more than threefold in three and a half decades. This has lead Japan’s adjusted NSRSR to increase by 
two thirds between the early 1980s and the early 2010s. In this regard, Japan’s expansion is in line 
with the OECD average as is Germany’s. On the other hand, Germany’s ratio is at the level of the 
OECD average while Japan’s ranks substantially lower. Hence, while both countries’ welfare state 
spending biases for new social risks increased over time, there is still considerably more expenditure 
in this field in Germany than in Japan. 
III.2.2 Welfare regimes and labour markets 
III.2.2.1 Welfare regimes and labour markets 
An important reason why governments are experiencing population ageing and dualisation in differ-
ent ways are different institutional backgrounds and policy reforms undertaken in these contexts. 
This is not only the case concerning public spending focuses on certain age groups but also regards 
the division into insiders and outsiders in terms of social and old-age security coverage, the level of 
benefit entitlements, and job security. In both Germany and Japan, the share of fixed-term and oth-
er forms of non-regular employment (labour market outsiders) has increased substantially in recent 
years: 37.4 percent of the Japanese labour force is now in non-regular employment, and 22 percent 
in Germany respectively (OECD 2014, 2015a; Statistics Bureau Japan 2014; Statistisches Bundesamt 
2014). Despite policy reforms, those without a regular job or with discontinuous work biographies 
are disadvantaged in both the welfare state and pension systems (Emmenegger et al. 2012b; 
Hinrichs 2012; Peng and Wong 2010). Dualisation is therefore not only a barrier to new entrants to 
the labour market (Streeck 2011), but may also pave the way for future old-age poverty 
(Emmenegger et al. 2012a; Esping-Andersen and Sarasa 2002; Hinrichs 2012; Peng and Wong 2010; 
Takayama 2014).  
Departing from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”14, recent works have 
examined the effects of dualisation across welfare regimes (Chauvel and Schröder 2014; 
                                                            
14
 Esping-Andersen (1990) identified three types of regimes: firstly, the liberal or Anglo-Saxon type which is characterised 
by low levels of decommodification or high reliance on the market for social services and a priority for private welfare 
spending. Secondly, the social-democratic or Scandinavian type that has a high level of decommodification and strong soli-
darity owed to comparatively generous universal benefits to provide for equality. Thirdly, the conservative or Continental 
type that is banking on the state’s role as a subsidiary to the traditional family, while the degree of decommodification is 
moderate and the function of social services is to maintain previous living standards. 
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Häusermann, Silja; Schwander 2012). It is shown that income gaps between insiders and outsiders 
are highest in continental and liberal regimes, whereas among OECD countries in 2000 they ranged 
from 25 to 40 percent less pre-tax income for outsiders. In continental states, this gap continues to 
be relatively large after tax and upon social security provision (Häusermann, Silja; Schwander 2012). 
Häusermann and Schwander find that: “[I]t is mainly the pension systems that are responsible for 
the dualising effect of taxes and transfers. People who worked in outsider-jobs during their active 
life are considerably worse off than people who worked in insider occupations. […] [I]nstitutional 
dualisation through the pension regime is and will remain strongest in continental Europe and low-
est in the Liberal countries” (2012, 41–42). Chauvel and Schröder (2014) include the familialistic re-
gime type in a similar analysis and find that the path dependency of being disadvantaged at younger 
age to a similar state at old age is especially strong in continental and familialistic regimes. In this 
light, the remainder of this subsection will discuss welfare regimes and labour market in the two 
countries. Accordingly, pension systems will be discussed in the following subsection. 
III.2.2.2 Welfare regimes and labour markets in Germany 
One of the archetypes of the continental type in Esping-Andersen’s original model has been Germa-
ny. With its origin in industrial relations where unions would bargain for the protection of workers, it 
has traditionally favoured labour market insiders over outsiders, whereas outsiders originally were 
mostly non-employed persons such as (female) spouses. With the welfare state seeking to maintain 
social status and living standards in the case of need, however, there has also been an in-built disad-
vantage for non-regular and low-income workers. Those with lower income would accordingly have 
lower entitlements and those with a non-regular working contract typically have to bear a higher 
burden of social security contributions. In response to the oil crisis in the 1970s, (West) Germany’s 
traditional and mostly male-breadwinner-style dualisation expanded into all spheres of society. A 
gradual increase in female employment, the expansion of tertiary education, de-industrialisation and 
the expansion of service jobs, which are typically less unionised, have amplified the trend (Silja 
Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Thelen 2014; Marques and Salavisa 2017; Heinrich 2013; Palier 
and Thelen 2010). 
In the 1980s and 90s, in order not to fall behind in terms of competitiveness amid globalisation, 
(West) Germany’s industrial partners in the export-oriented sectors such as manufacturers of cars 
and machine tools, struck deals to reduce their workforces and increase productivity (or the work-
load) of those remaining (Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 2014). This practise spilled over to other 
industries and was widely realised by means of early retirement (Palier and Thelen 2010). In the 
meantime, restrictions on the use of agency workers were relaxed with their maximum working pe-
riod being raised from three months (since 1972) to twelve in 1997. By means of reforms in 1985 
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and 1996, fixed-term contracts, for the advertising of which employers had had to provide special 
justification, were legalised for the duration of up to 24 months also without special circumstances 
on the employer’s side in place (Palier and Thelen 2010; Heinrich 2013). 
Around the 2000s, fiscally burdened by reunification of East and West in 1990, Germany’s social 
democratic-green coalition government further liberalised its labour market and increased the share 
of non-regular jobs (part-time, temporary, freelance), matching with the above definition of outsid-
ers. The restrictions for fixed-term jobs, already relaxed in 1997, was completely abolished in 2003. 
In the meantime, the provision of unemployment benefits was shortened and for most recipients 
reduced. From 1999, so-called mini jobs have been actively promoted by the government by ex-
empting them from income tax up to 400 Euro per month as well as imposing on the employer to 
pay the worker’s contribution to the social insurance fund. Previously, such mini jobs, which are 
usually part-time and low skill activities, had mostly been done by students or spouses who would 
not rely on these jobs as a primary income source. By 2005, the amount of such mini jobs had in-
creased more than tripled from 2 million in 1999 (Palier and Thelen 2010; Heinrich 2013). The share 
of involuntary non-regular employment has strongly increased since (Thelen 2014). In the course of 
the so-called Hartz IV reform, unemployed benefits were for most cases lowered as well as their 
maximum pay-out periods shortened (Hassel 2011; Hemerijck and Eichhorst 2009). 
Overall, the divide between labour market insiders and outsiders was deepened as the degree of 
protection of the latter was further lowered (Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders, and Naczyk 2012). On aver-
age, labour market outsiders have a 39 percent lower income compared with insiders (full-time em-
ployees), a gap which is further increased once pension and social security benefits are included 
(Silja Häusermann and Schwander 2012). The insider-outsider is also strongly marked by region, with 
East Germany showing a significantly higher share of persons receiving unemployment benefits 
(Palier and Thelen 2010). Another fault line of this divide is age, with younger persons more often 
being outsiders (Hinrichs 2012; Emmenegger et al. 2012b). Recalling the earlier discussion of the in-
sider outsider model, labour market outsiders are – even compared to labour market insiders, which 
are also pension outsiders – at an additional disadvantage because of their lower entitlements to 
social benefits and pensions. 
III.2.2.3 Welfare regimes and labour markets in Japan 
As for Japan’s welfare regime, there has been disagreement in terms of classification. While Esping-
Andersen (1997) categorised Japan as a hybrid case between more familialistic Southern European 
regimes and the liberal type, Goodman et.al (1998) took a Confucian interpretation because of its 
long-time residual government spending and high occurrence of three-generation households, high 
III Analysis 1: intergenerational societal solidarity 
56 
household savings and a male-breadwinner family model. Rooted in the crucial role corporate wel-
fare plays in terms of social security provision, there is an in-built discrimination of outsiders as non-
regular jobs usually come without social benefits. With predominantly high rates of economic 
growth over decades until a severe economic crisis starting 1990, the Japanese welfare state ex-
panded, though with a strong focus on pensions, health and care, mostly benefitting old-age recipi-
ents. 
Following the recession in the early 1990s and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the welfare state 
was successively cut back and the labour market liberalised to allow for a large non-regular employ-
ment sector. This increased and broadened Japan’s traditional labour market dualism (Lechevalier 
2014; Peng 2010; Heinrich 2013). Until those reforms, the standard for male workers had been, at 
least in larger companies, lifelong employment with seniority pay (Ogawa, Matsukara, and Chawla 
2011; Statistics Bureau Japan 2014; Lechevalier 2014). Amid continuous economic growth with low 
income inequality, the disadvantages for the still lower number of outsiders had not emerged as a 
large-scale social issue (Peng 2012). However, the liberalisation policies responding to the economic 
crisis from 1990 onwards protected only a core of workers, especially in large export-oriented com-
panies (Lechevalier 2014; Peng 2010; Rueda 2014). 
In cooperation with the private sector, layoffs were largely avoided but instead a core of workers 
protected and new employment regulations introduced. At the end of the 1990s, structural changes 
were introduced leading to the Labour Standard Law Reform in 1998, which established a discre-
tionary work system and weakened the influence of labour unions. In 1999, the Worker Dispatching 
Law followed, which eased regulations on dispatch work (and was especially meant to activate a 
cheap workforce among the young and the old), as well as revisions of the Labour Standard Law, 
which eased regulations on dismissals. In 2003, the Worker Dispatching Law further eased regula-
tions on dispatch work. In the same wave of reforms, incentives for old persons to stay in employ-
ment were introduced, mostly in the form of income allowances. In 2004, short-term employment 
was allowed for 26 high-skill professions (Peng 2010; Wada 2017; Nishiyama 2017). Many other jobs, 
which would later especially affect new entrants to the labour market, were turned into outsider 
jobs (Peng 2012). As part of the 2013 growth strategy of the Abe administration, which had taken 
office in 2012 and revised this strategy in 2015, the residual labour market shall be successively ex-
tended according to the business cycle (Cabinet Office 2013b). 
Though the welfare state introduced programs tailored to outsiders, dualism persists: unionisation 
rates are considerably lower among outsiders and so are rates of social protection in terms of pen-
sions, health insurance and employment insurance (Peng 2012). On average, the income gap be-
tween outsiders and insiders is 45 percent for men and 31 percent for women (OECD 2015b). Such 
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non-regular jobs, in turn, are more prevalent among young persons and less frequent at older ages 
(S. S. Lee 2011; Peng 2012; Peng and Wong 2010). Since also in Japan, dualisation is strongly marked 
by age, there are more “doubly disadvantaged” individuals today than there were in the past when 
earlier cohorts were at working age. 
III.2.3 Pension systems 
III.2.3.1 Pension systems 
Demographic developments may force governments, in the name of system sustainability, to reform 
and adjust their pension systems. This, in turn, changes the distribution between young and old and 
often disadvantages certain birth cohorts compared to others. This subsection discusses fundamen-
tal characteristics of pension systems in Germany and Japan as well as reforms and adjustments that 
have been carried out in the light of the above-discussed. 
III.2.3.2 Pension system in Germany 
Germany’s statutory public pension has a single tier earnings-related pay-as-you-go system. For 
those not reaching an existential minimum, there is a means-tested social assistance scheme. Since 
2002, a private and tax-subsidised system, called “Riester-Rente”, constitutes the second pillar, 
which is meant to incentivise private saving and unburden the public pension system (OECD 2015c; 
Hinrichs 2012). For full payment of the earnings-related public pension, 45 years of contribution are 
required, though it is payable upon shorter contribution periods and lower pay-outs or later with 
additional entitlements. The pensionable age is currently being raised from 65 to 67 years, while re-
tirement at age 63 is possible upon 45 years of contribution (von der Heide 2014). Those in non-
regular employment or with discontinuous work biographies are disadvantaged since they are often 
not fully covered by the system, receive lower premiums because of lower income or are penalised 
for phases outside the system (Hinrichs 2012; Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders, and Naczyk 2012). 
Germany’s net replacement for the average worker today is around 50 percent (OECD 2015c) and 
benefits are being adjusted according to a combination of old-age dependency ratio and gross wage 
growth. The fall in the net replacement rate over time, however, has been significant, as it was once 
designed to stand at 70 percent though this target has become ever more unrealistic for younger 
cohorts. The net replacement rate is especially low, at 19.3 percent of previous income, for those 
with reliance on the means-tested social assistance scheme. These individuals tend to be labour 
market outsiders and their number is expected to increase in the face of the reform over the last 
years (Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders, and Naczyk 2012). Over time, replacement rates have fallen with 
almost every birth cohort (Geyer and Steiner 2014). Geyer and Steiner (2014) estimate that pension 
reforms in 1992, which aimed at prolonging working life and reducing the generosity of the pension 
III Analysis 1: intergenerational societal solidarity 
58 
system, reduced entitlement for the 1937-1941 birth cohorts by just 0.1 percentage points but re-
duced those of the 1967-1971 cohorts by 14 percentage points. In general, pension reforms in re-
cent decades, whose aim it was to ensure the system’s sustainability, have put later birth cohorts at 
a disadvantage (Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, and Wilke 2003). 
This general problem is aggravated if life expectancy is taken into account. Upon retirement at age 
65, the average retiree was expected to live for another 19.4 years in 2014, which is close to the 
OECD average of 19.3 more years. Effective retirement, on average, comes about three years before 
reaching the official retirement age. However, this value has been increasing gradually upon the last 
pension reforms (OECD 2015c). Peglow and Fenge (2013) estimate that between 2010 and 2060, 
assuming a sustainable pension system, net replacement rates will further fall by 10.7 percentage 
points, while contribution rates will increase by 5.5 percentage points and public subsidies by 5 per-
centage points. In any case, Germany’s previous pension system adjustments made in the name of 
sustainability, amid the demographic developments, are likely to be followed by more reforms, put-
ting future and current working generations at a further disadvantage (Geyer and Steiner 2014; 
Peglow and Fenge 2013). 
III.2.3.3 Pension system in Japan 
Japan’s public pension system has two tiers, a basic flat-rate scheme and an earnings-related em-
ployees’ pension scheme. To be eligible for the basic scheme, an individual had to contribute for 25 
years, though this has been reduced to a minimum of 10 years and discounted pay-outs by April 
2017. A full basic pension requires 40 years of contribution, payable at age 65, as the retirement age 
is currently being raised from 62 to 65 years. The earnings-related scheme has a contribution ceiling 
of 152 percent of the average worker’s earnings, which in 2015 were defined at 620,000 Yen per 
month (OECD 2015c). In general, while early retirement is possible but penalised by lower entitle-
ments, later retirement is incentivised by additional entitlements for every additional month worked. 
Unemployed or those under the income threshold are not required to contribute to the scheme, 
though this reduces entitlements. It is possible, however, to make up for uninsured phases pay con-
tributions at a later stage (OECD 2015c). 
Labour market outsiders, hence those in part-time, temporary or freelance jobs, generally have 
much lower entitlements and also a lower coverage rate than labour market insiders. Though a so-
cial security reform in 2012 has included part-time workers with at least 20 hours per week, other 
conditions for eligibility such as earnings and contract duration exclude the vast majority of non-
regular workers (Takayama 2012). The net replacement rate for a worker with average income cur-
rently stands at 40.4 percent (OECD 2015c). The earnings-related pay-out is indexed to net average 
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earnings until age 67, after which it is only price indexed, typically resulting in lower benefits 
(Takayama 2012). Because of previous pension reforms that have increased contribution rates and 
reduced benefits, benefits fall short of contributions for cohorts born after 1965 (Horioka, Suzuki, 
and Hatta 2007). Cohorts born from 1985 onward are projected to get pay-outs that will yield only 
80 percent of the amount they will have contributed (Takayama 2014). 
System sustainability is a concern even more than in Germany also because life expectancy upon 
retirement at age 65 was 21.9 more years in 2014, which may be one reason why effective retire-
ment in Japan already today comes on average about five years after reaching the official retirement 
age (OECD 2015c). With the old-age dependency ratio projected to rise further, according to Japan’s 
Institute for Population Study and Social Security Research even to 80 percent until 2060 (ISSP 2012), 
further reforms will be necessary in the name of system sustainability (Braun and Joines 2015; Kitao 
2015). Kitao (2015) estimates that for a sustainable pension system, other things being equal, the 
consumption tax would have to be raised from the current 8 percent to 48 percent, or otherwise be 
raised to 28 percent in combination with the pensionable age being raised by five years within fifty 
years and benefits were lowered by 20 percent. Against this background, Okumura and Usui (2014) 
find that younger cohorts also have lower expectations regarding pension pay-outs than do older 
cohorts. 
III.3 Research questions, hypotheses, data, variables, and methods 
III.3.1 Research Questions 
In this chapter on intergenerational societal solidarity, it has so far been discussed under what mate-
rial and institutional conditions persons may have certain preferences regarding the role of the wel-
fare state on intergenerational policies. In the face of demographic ageing and all the above-
discussed challenges that come with it, it shall be further investigated how preferences for more 
government on pensions have developed over time, how this differs across age and cohort, and 
what are the differences between Germany and Japan. 
With these research questions in mind, hypotheses are generated below, after which the data 
sources are explained and discussed. 
III.3.2 Hypotheses 
It has been shown in this chapter that both the welfare state, including spending for pensions and 
new social risks, as well as the labour market, has changed strongly over the past decades in both 
countries. While Japan has experienced a significant total and relative expansion in expenditure for 
old-age, Germany has adjusted its welfare state in favour of young and working-age groups. Rising 
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poverty shares and dualisation, mostly affecting young persons, is a trend that has been observable 
in both countries, and dualism has been allowed and partly even been championed by policies in 
either country. Government debt has become a pressing issue in Japan but less so in Germany. 
These developments are expected to have an impact on the preferences for or against government 
spending on old-age. Against the background of the above, the following hypotheses shall be worked 
with for the regression analysis: 
1) Hypothesis 1.1: Because developments over the past two (and more) decades have differed 
substantially between the two countries, an overall different trend in the preference for 
more government expenditure on old age can be expected. While for Germany, the popula-
tion’s overall preference for old-age spending is not expected to have significantly fallen; this 
is expected to have occurred in Japan. 
2) Hypothesis 1.2: There is also expected to be an age effect. Judging from the different wel-
fare state spending patterns, however, preferences across age are expected to be different 
between the two countries. Against the background of the above, rising age is not expected 
to be associated with a higher probability to prefer more government spending on old age in 
Germany. In Japan, in contrast, rising age is expected to be associated with a higher proba-
bility to prefer increases in old-age expenditure. 
3) Hypothesis 1.3: Considering the developments of labour markets, pension systems and the 
welfare state as a whole over the last decades, something of the sort of a political genera-
tion may have emerged. A common challenge and a common source of discontent appears 
to be especially present in Japan, considering high government debt, high occurrence of du-
alism on the labour market and a probably unsustainable pension system. Therefore, a co-
hort effect is expected to be present in Japan (with later birth cohorts showing less support 
for government expenditure on old-age). 
4) Hypothesis 1.4: Against the background of dualisation, there is also expected to be an out-
sider effect. Specifically, outsiders are expected to prefer more spending on old-age more 
often than insiders. The reason is that tax-wise they would carry less of the fiscal burden 
than insiders but profit relatively more from it. This effect is expected to be present in both 
countries. 
5) Hypothesis 1.5: In the face of demographic ageing, as discussed above, the welfare regimes 
of both Germany and Japan are putting non-regular labourers at working-age today at a 
double disadvantage because they are both outsiders on the labour market and in terms of 
pensions. Therefore, younger labour market outsiders are expected to show a higher prefer-
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ence for an increase in government spending on old-age compared to labour market outsid-
ers at higher working-age. This is effect is expected to be present in both countries. 
III.3.3 Data sources and data used 
III.3.3.1 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is an international cross-sectional study investigat-
ing various attitudes among individuals aged 15 years or above (ISSP 2018). It is carried out annually 
with changing topics (such as gender roles, role of government, social inequality, religion, and oth-
ers) and newly selected individuals every time a survey is being conducted while topics are being 
repeated in a more or less regular fashion. The survey topic “Role of Government”, which is of inter-
est for this work, has been carried out since 1985 and includes waves for the years 1985, 1990, 1996, 
2006, and 2016.15 While Germany is a co-founding country of ISSP, Japan only joined for the 1996 
wave so that only the last three waves are worked with here. 
Upon pooling the 1996, 2006, and 2016 datasets, there were initially 10,841 observations. Missing 
values on the age variable as well as the dependent variable, as well as “can’t choose” responses 
(see below), have been dropped. Deleting these missing values has left the sample with 10,269 ob-
servations. 
III.3.3.2 World Values Survey (WVS) 
The World Values Survey (WVS) is an international survey that has been conducted since 1981 in 
around 100 countries using a common questionnaire and covering attitudes on a range of topics 
(WVS 2014). The latest round, wave 6, was conducted between 2010 and 2014 and includes for the 
first time rather detailed questions on intergenerational relations. Hence, for a lack of data availabil-
ity, a development over time of intergenerational relations cannot yet be shown but only one single 
point in time. Since the questions of the survey nevertheless offer valuable insights that ISSP does 
not allow for, WVS shall be used here by means of descriptive statistics. In wave 6 of WVS, the sam-
ple size includes 2,046 cases for Germany and 2,443 cases for Japan. Below, the variable operational-
isation is briefly explained, after which statistics will be shown. 
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 At the time of finalising this work, the 2016 wave were not yet harmonised across countries so that this had to be carried 
out individually. 
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III.3.4 Variables 
III.3.4.1 ISSP 
III.3.4.1.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the question whether or not respondents would prefer an increase in 
government spending on old-age and retirement. In the 1996, 2006, and 2016 waves, this question 
has been asked with identical formulation and answer categories: “Listed below are various areas of 
government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spend-
ing in each area. Remember that if you say “much more”, it might require a tax increase to pay for 
it.”16 One of these areas being “Old age pensions”, the respondent can choose out of the answer 
categories “spend much more”, “spend more”, “spend the same as now”, “spend less”, “spend much 
less”, “can’t choose”, the last of which has been deleted (GESIS 1999, 2008, 2017; NHK 2018). This 
variable has been dichotomised into “spend the same or less” (0) and “spend more” (1). A major 
reason for this dichotomisation is the otherwise low sample size in some of the answer categories. 
For instance, very few observations are found for the category “spend much less”. Instead of com-
bining the “spend the same as now” category with the two categories indicating demands for more 
spending, it has been put together with those for less spending. The reasoning behind this is that 
while demanding more spending may require a tax increase to finance this, demanding the same 
spending level or a decrease does not come with such implications, other things being equal. Hence, 
the dependent variable used in the remainder of this chapter conceptually investigates whether re-
spondents would prefer a spending increase to finance retirement and old-age programmes, which 
would possibly require a tax rise, or not. 
III.3.4.1.2 Independent variables 
III.3.4.1.2.1 Characteristics of respondent 
The main independent variable is the respondent’s age, which has been grouped into ten-year inter-
vals of years of age, consisting of “15-24”, “25-34”, “35-44”, “45-54”, “55-64”, “65-74”, and 75+.” In 
order to separate age effects from cohort effects, birth cohort is considered, which is accordingly 
divided in ten-year intervals of years of birth, consisting of “1991-2000”, “1981-90, “1971-80”, 
“1961-70”, “1951-60”, “1941-50”, “1931-40”, and “1900-30.” Since for the 2006 survey, the year of 
birth was not asked, imputations had to be carried. Here, the difference of the age at the point in 
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 As will be seen in chapter IV, survey questions and categories are also presented in the original language there. This step 
is refrained from in the case of ISSP and WVS. The reason is that upon using ISSP and WVS files respectively, these are al-
ready harmonised while in the case of SHARE and JSTAR (the surveys used in chapter IV), harmonisation had to be carried 
out by the author of this dissertation before analysis could start. Hence, a discussion of survey questions and categories in 
local country languages did not seem necessary here. 
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time of surveying and the year of survey have been taken to be equal to the year of birth. This can 
only be an approximation, however, since the birthdays of the respondents are not known.17 
An important socioeconomic determinant is employment status. Here, the aforementioned insider-
outsider logic is applied. The categories are “insider”, “outsider”, 18  “retiree”, “housemak-
er/disabled/other”, “student/apprentice”, and “no info/missing.” Since the variables on employment 
status have changed across waves, some adjustments were necessary, which have been discussed 
with the respective domestic surveying institutions. An insider here is defined as someone working 
in full-time employment with more than 34 hours per week (for those individuals from the 1996 and 
2006 samples; though in Germany in 1996 the amount of weekly work hours was not asked so that 
here, insiders are taken to be equal to full-time employment), or someone being active on the la-
bour market who works more than 35 hours per week and does not have a term-limited contract 
(2016, Germany), or someone who is either full-time employed or working for a family business over 
more than 34 hours per week or self-employed and has employees (2016, Japan). Outsiders, in turn, 
are defined as those either working not in full-time employment or working no more than 34 hours 
per week or being unemployed (1996, 2006), or those who are active on the labour market with 
term-limited contracts or work for less than 34 hours per week (2016, Germany), or those who work 
no more than 34 hours per week or are self-employed with no employees or are working for a family 
business for less than 34 hours per week (2016, Japan). 
The employment status of the respondent’s current life partner is also accounted for. Due to data 
constraints, this variable does not include the spouse’s/partner’s weekly work hours. Except for this, 
the logic of the variable on employment status of the respondent is mostly applied amounting to the 
following categories: “no partner”, “partner insider”, “partner outsider”, “partner retiree”, “partner 
housemaker/disabled/student/other”, and “no info/missing on partner.” The reason for grouping 
“housemaker/disabled/other” together with “student”, different from the variable on the employ-
ment status of the respondents (where both are separate categories) is the otherwise very low sam-
ple size of “partner student.” 
Another important socioeconomic indicator is educational attainment. Here, categorisation is abid-
ing by the ISCED 1997 framework as much as possible (OECD 1999). The three categories include “no 
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 The 2006 survey for Germany was carried out from 18 March to 21 August of 2006 and that for Japan was done between 
18 and 26 November of the same year (GESIS 2008). 
18
 For a more refined categorisation, Schwander and Häusermann (2009) suggest to define outsiders by their employment 
history and type of job instead of employment status. While this is hard to execute with the available data, notably be-
cause of its fundamentally cross-sectional nature, in the multivariate analysis it will be worked with interactions in order to 
refine outsiderness. For instance, once employment status is interacted with educational attainment, a distinction of high-
skill and low-skill outsiders is possible, which already provides valuable insights. Another interaction that will be employed 
is employment status and gender, given the strongly gendered dimension of dualism in both countries. 
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more than (mid-level) than secondary school“, “higher secondary/other”, and “academic.” In the 
case of Germany, the first (lowest) of these three categories includes all those respondents with no 
school degree, a degree that is not a professional degree (“kein beruflicher Ausbildungsabschluss”), 
or a professional degree that is no higher than semi-skilled labour (“Teilfacharbeiterabschluss”). For 
Japan, this category includes all those respondents who have or have not graduated from lower or 
upper secondary school completed but do not hold a high school degree. The second (middle) cate-
gory, for Germany, includes all those respondents with middle school or high school degree, and for 
Japan includes those with a high school diploma allowing university entry. The third (highest catego-
ry), for either Germany of Japan, includes all those who hold an academic (college-equivalent or uni-
versity) degree. 
One variable that tends to correlate with employment status and educational attainment is income. 
The reason for considering it here despite such correlation is that it can be expected to add im-
portant information to the analysis. Because of correlation, however, it will only be added in a final 
step. The income information from the two countries and three points in time has been made com-
parable by standardising it to monthly family household income units and converting these into US-
Dollar in purchasing power parity of the respective year using the OECD database for conversions 
(OECD 2018a). On this basis, six income categories have been created:”0-1000”, “1001-2000”, 
“2001-3000”, “3001-4000”, “4001-5000”, “5001-6000”, “more than 6000”, and “no info/missing.” 
Two more variables that are considered here are gender and living arrangement. Gender is binary, 
divided into “male” and “female.” Living arrangement is more complicated since the respective vari-
ables have changed across survey years. One way of grouping these differing variables and catego-
ries so to allow for cross-survey comparison has been the following ordering of living arrangements: 
“single”, “two adults”, “one or two adults with children”, “more than two adults (with or without 
children)”, and “other/no info/missing.” 
Two further variables, which may have an effect on policy preferences, are an individual’s interest in 
politics and an individual’s self-placement regarding political affiliations/persuasion. Regarding polit-
ical interest, respondents were asked how interested they are in politics, and answers in the original 
questionnaires include: “very interested”, “fairly interested”, “somewhat interested”, “not very in-
terested”, “not at all interested”, and “can’t choose.” To deal with sample size problems, these cate-
gories have been grouped into: “very or fairly interested”, “somewhat interested”, “not or not at all 
interested”, and “missing/can’t choose.” 
Bearing in mind the discussion of political generations above, individual interest in politics as well as 
political persuasion may be important determinants, albeit these might only be partly exogenous as 
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party (affiliation) preferences and policy preferences may be more or less strongly connected. Re-
garding political persuasion, respondents were asked where they would place themselves on a ten-
point scale according to their personal political persuasion if the lowest value on the scale means far 
left and the highest value means far right (2016, Germany), or which of the following category they 
would describe themselves with: “Far left etc.”, “Left, centre left”, “Centre, liberal”, “Right, con-
servative”, “Far right etc.”, “Other, no specific”, ”No party, no preference” (1996, 2006, and 2016 in 
Japan). Responses have been divided into the following categories: “centre left/left/far left” (1-4, or 
“Far left etc.” or “Left, centre left” respectively), “centre/liberal” (5-6, or “Centre, liberal” respective-
ly), “centre right/conservative/far right” (7-10, or , “Right, conservative”, “Far right etc.” respective-
ly), “no preference/don't know/don't vote” (<0, or “Other, no specific”, ”No party, no preference” 
respectively), and “missing.” 
III.3.4.1.2.2 Other attitudinal variables 
In order to understand attitudes and policy preferences as thoroughly as possible, it is important to 
consider more attitude-related questions than only the dependent variable. In this endeavour, 
equivalent questions relating to other social policy fields have been added as well as one question 
that is conceptually different but relates to the same policy field. This latter question asks whether 
respondents think that it should be the government’s responsibility “to provide a decent standard of 
living for the old.” Answer categories include, unchanged from the original questionnaires: “definite-
ly”, “probably”, “probably not”, “definitely not”, and “don't know/missing.” Other variables depict-
ing more specific policy preferences follow the same logic as the dependent variable and ask wheth-
er the respondent would prefer the government to spend “much more”, “more”, “the same”, “less, 
“much less” or “can’t choose” on certain social policy fields. The responses regarding each of these 
policy fields have been turned into a respective variable. These include: health coverage, unem-
ployment benefits, and education. Answer categories include, equally for each variable: “spend the 
same or less”, ”spend more or much more”, and “missing.” These variables, however, are only 
shown in a descriptive way and not included in the multivariate analysis. 
III.3.4.1.2.3 Other variables 
An important variable when investigating developments over time is the year of survey. As follows 
from the above, there are three points in time, 1996, 2016, and 2016. Another crucial variable, this 
work being of comparative nature, is country, consisting of Germany and Japan. Germany, however, 
is further divided into West and East because of its long political division and traced demographic, 
economic and political differences. Another important reason for considering West and East sepa-
rately for multivariate analysis is that in the ISSP samples East Germany is oversampled. By including 
a distinction by area this problem is accounted for. 
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III.3.4.2 WVS 
III.3.4.2.1 Dependent variables 
Two questions in WVS are of interest for the purpose of this work, all of which ask respondents 
about their attitudes towards intergenerational relations in the face of demographic ageing: The first 
one states: “Older people get more than their fair share from the government”, and then asks to 
what extent the respondent agrees or disagrees, consisting of the original answer categories: 
“Strongly agree”, “Agree”, “Disagree”, and “Strongly disagree” or one could indicate to have no opin-
ion or prefer not to answer. Since the extreme categories have low frequencies of occurrence, cate-
gories of this variable have been recoded into: “don't know, no answer”, “elderly are advantaged”, 
and “elderly are not advantaged.” 
In a similar way, the second variable of interest is the statement: “Older people are a burden on so-
ciety”, and again, respondent had the same answer categories to choose from. This variable’s cate-
gories were recoded into: “don't know, no answer”, “elderly are a burden”, “elderly are not a bur-
den.” 
III.3.4.2.2 Independent variables 
The age variable, as in ISSP, has been divided in ten-year intervals. Since in the WVS the youngest 
respondents are 17 (not 15 like in ISSP), the categories are as follows: “17-24”, “25-34”, “35-44”, 
“45-54”, “55-64”, “65-74”, and “75+.” With regard to employment status, categories have been op-
erationalized in a way that resembles those in ISSP to the highest degree possible: it distinguishes 
labour market “insider”, ”outsiders“, ”retirees“, ”housewives-other”, “students”, 
ing.“ Bearing in mind Rueda’s (2005) definition for labour market outsiders, this group is operational-
ised as all unemployed persons, self-employed persons with a household income not higher than the 
bottom seven decimals in their respective country, or part-time employees whose household in-
come is not at least within the top three income decimals. Full-time employees in the lowest three 
income decimals are also defined as outsiders. Insiders, in turn, are all full-time employees with a 
household income above the three bottom decimals, as well as part-time employees or self-
employed with a household income within the top three decimals. Housewives are those who de-
clare their occupational status as housewives as well as married female part-time employees whose 
household income is not in the top three income decimals. The country variable, different from ISSP, 
does not distinguish between West and East Germany and therefore only consists of Germany and 
Japan. 
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III.3.5 Method and analytical strategy 
As mentioned above, those questions in the World Values Survey that are of particular interest when 
investigating intergenerational solidarity in terms of attitudes have so far only been asked in the lat-
est wave. Since intergenerational solidarity is here conceptually understood as an inter-temporal 
entity, no multivariate regression analysis is applied to the WVS data (because the data do not allow 
analysing a development over time). Instead, these data will be used as an auxiliary source to better 
understand the latest state of affairs of intergenerational solidarity regarding the allocation of gov-
ernment resources. 
In turn, data of the International Social Survey Programme allow for an analysis of development of 
intergenerational relations over the last 20 years (1996, 2006, and 2016). The focus of analysis shall 
therefore be based on this data source. The dependent variable being dichotomous and the pooled 
dataset, though consisting of three points in time, not consisting of repeatedly asked individuals 
(hence each individual only appears once in the whole sample); a logistic regression logic is applied 
to the data. 
III.4 Descriptive statistics, multivariate analysis 
III.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
III.4.1.1 Attitudes towards old people (World Values Survey) 
Figures 17 and 18 show responses to two questions on intergenerational relations across age groups 
in Germany and Japan. In figure 17, answers are shown to the question whether respondents agree 
to the statement that "Older people get more than their fair share from the government." Respons-
es vary strongly across the two countries but in both countries, responses also vary across age 
groups. In Germany, while in every age group an overwhelming majority does not think that the el-
derly get more than their fair share from the government, the share of those who do think so is 
highest among the lowest age group and lowest among the oldest. 8.5 percent of those aged 17-24 
years agreed to the statement but only 2.9 percent of those aged 75+. Compared to Germany, one 
major difference in Japan is the very high share of "don't know" answers, which varies between 32.1 
and 46.7 percent and is highest among the youngest.19 In turn, even without eliminating these an-
swers, the share of those agreeing that the elderly get more than their fair share is considerably 
higher in Japan than in Germany in any age group. The lowest shares of positive responses (18.7 per-
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 High shares of "don't know" responses and modest responses in general have been found among Asian respondents in 
other studies and have been explained largely by cultural factors (see: Harzing 2006). 
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cent) occur among those at pension age (though not the very oldest) and the highest shares are 
found among those at working-age, especially those aged 35-44 (29.1 percent). 
Figure 18 shows responses to the statement "Older people are a burden on society." Responses here 
paint a rather different picture. In both countries, it is those aged 75+ who have the lowest propor-
tion of answering that the elderly are not a burden (62.9 in Germany and 61.9 percent in Japan re-
spectively). Also in both countries, the age group with the second-lowest shares are the 17-24 year 
olds (72.9 percent in Germany and 70.7 percent in Japan). In Germany, however, shares of "don't 
know" answers are low, which is not the case for Japan (there they range between 15.7 and 23.2 
percent). Ceteris paribus, the share of those stating that the elderly are a burden on society are 
higher in Germany than Japan in every age group. This is important to bear in mind considering the 
responses above to the statement that "Older people get more than their fair share from the gov-
ernment": though more persons in Japan agreed there, fewer persons in Japan think that the elderly 
are a burden per se. Hence, the stark differences above appear to be caused by policy rather than 
values, which is in line with the previous discussion in this chapter. In Germany, in turn, intergenera-
tional solidarity appears stronger, judging on the basis this data. Again, this also appears to be con-
sistent with the discussion above. 
Figure 17: Responses to the statement “Older people get more than their fair share from the government”, by country 
and age group. 
 
Source: WVS (2014), own calculations. 
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Figure 18: Responses to the statement “Older people are a burden on society”, by country and age group. 
 
Source: WVS (2014), own calculations. 
Figures 19 and 20 show responses to the two questions discussed above but instead of age, results 
for Germany and Japan are shown by employment status. Figure 19 showcases answers to the ques-
tion whether respondents agree to the statement that "Older people get more than their fair share 
from the government." As above, the share of "don't know" answers in Japan is high across catego-
ries while it is very low in Germany. In Germany, negative answers (stating that the elderly do not 
get more than their fair share from the government) are highest among retirees (95 percent), fol-
lowed by students (94.3 percent). Insiders, outsiders, and housewives all show values around 91 
percent. In Japan, by far the highest share of negative answers occurs among retirees (48.9 percent) 
and the lowest shares are seen among insiders (32.7) and outsiders (33.8). Consequently, while 
there is a considerably higher overall share in Japan thinking that the elderly get more than their fair 
share compared to Germany, there do not appear to be strong differences according to labour mar-
ket insiders and outsiders in either country. Rather, there is an observable (age-based) difference 
between younger and older respondents. 
This image appears again in figure 20, which shows responses to the statement "Older people are a 
burden on society." The highest shares of agreement occur among retirees (24.6 percent in Germany, 
and 9.6 percent in Japan where a further 17 percent answered "don't know"). In Japan, slightly more 
outsiders (5 percent) than insiders (3.6 percent) agree to the statement, while this difference is even 
smaller in Germany (21 percent among insiders and 20.7 percent among outsiders). 
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Figure 19: Responses to the statement “Older people get more than their fair share from the government”, by country 
and employment status. 
 
Source: WVS (2014), own calculations. 
Figure 20: Responses to the statement “Older people are a burden on society”, by country and employment status. 
 
Source: WVS (2014), own calculations. 
Responses to these questions from the World Values Survey, therefore, show three things: firstly, 
there are considerable differences between Germany and Japan regarding resource distribution be-
tween the elderly and the rest of society and these differences are in line with the developments of 
welfare state spending patterns and pension systems discussed above. Secondly, while there ap-
pears to be little disagreement in Germany regarding either question, there is a clear divide in Japan: 
age groups do not disagree regarding the statement that "Older people are a burden on society" (a 
vast majority thinks they are not), but there is disagreement regarding the statement that "Older 
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people get more than their fair share from the government." Thirdly, considering the very different 
levels of agreeing to the statement about the "fair share", in neither country there is strong differ-
ences between labour market insiders and labour market outsiders. Regarding age, in turn, there are 
differences in both countries. The tendency is that those persons who are currently receiving pen-
sions consider this share less often to be "more than fair" compared to those who are not receiving 
it (yet). 
III.4.1.2 Attitudes towards the role of government (International Social Survey Programme) 
III.4.1.2.1 Attitudes towards the government’s role to care for old persons 
Figures 21 to 23 show the responses to the question whether it should be the government's respon-
sibility to provide for a certain living standard for the old by country, age group and year of survey. 
This question allows conclusions about a society's position towards the welfare state in more gen-
eral, regardless of current engagement in public policy. In figure 21, showcasing the responses for 
West Germany, it can be seen that across age groups and year about half responded "definitely." 
Adding those responding "probably", between around 90 and almost 100 percent in every age group 
and year think that the government has a responsibility to provide a certain standard of living for the 
old. Across years, however, the proportion of those responding "definitely" tends to be higher 
among the oldest age groups. 
Figure 22 shows the same question for East Germany. While a similar pattern can be seen, there are 
stronger differences by age groups among those answering "definitely" to the question about the 
government's responsibility towards old people. It can also be seen that the youngest age group has 
a very high share of answering "definitely" in 2016, indeed among the highest of all age groups, 
compared to the youngest in earlier years. In general, however, 90 percent or more in any year and 
age group answer that it is either "definitely" or "probably" the government's responsibility to pro-
vide for a certain standard of living for the old. 
Figure 23 shows the responses in Japan, which differ considerably from those in West and East Ger-
many. Though also in Japan a vast majority across age groups and years of survey respond with "def-
initely" or "probably", these accumulated shares vary from almost 90 percent (65-74 year olds in 
1996 and 2006) to only two thirds (25-45 year olds in 2016). Meanwhile, the shares of those answer-
ing "probably not" increased over the years of survey. In 1996, this share only reached 10 percent 
among the 25-34 year olds while in 2016 this share was higher than 10 percent in every age group 
(and highest among the 45-54 year olds, hence the same birth cohort that already had a 10 percent 
share of responding "probably not" in 1996). In general, there has been a broad majority thinking 
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that the government does have a responsibility to provide for a certain living standard for the old, 
this proportion has been lower in Japan than in Germany and it has decreased over time. 
Figure 21: Attitudes to the question whether it should be the government's responsibility to provide for a certain living 
standard for the elderly, West Germany, by age group and year. 
 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
Figure 22: Attitudes to the question whether it should be the government's responsibility to provide for a certain living 
standard for the old, East Germany, by age group and year. 
 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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Figure 23: Attitudes to the question whether it should be the government's responsibility to provide for a certain living 
standard for the elderly, Japan, by age group and year. 
 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
III.4.1.2.2 Preferences regarding government expenditure in policy fields other than old-age 
Figures 24 to 26 show responses to questions related to the dependent variable across country and 
year of survey. Analogous to the question constituting the dependent variable, these questions ask 
whether the respondent would like to see either "more" or "much more" spending on a certain poli-
cy field or "the same", "less", or "much less." As above, response patterns to these questions give 
insight regarding the role of the welfare state in general. 
Figure 24 shows responses on the question whether more or less resources should be spent on 
health coverage. As shown above with NTA data (see chapter II), health expenditure mostly, but not 
exclusively, benefits elderly individuals. While across year and country, a majority would like to see 
more spending, the development over time differs. In both West and East Germany, the share of 
those demanding more spending increased over years and in 2016 reached more than 70 and almost 
80 percent respectively. In turn, the share of those demanding more government spending on health 
decreased from 67 percent in 1996 to around 53 percent in 2016 in Japan. This development is in 
line with preferences regarding government expenditure on pensions and the ENSR shown above. 
Responses regarding government spending on unemployment benefits, which are typically benefit-
ing working-age individuals, are shown in figure25. While West Germany shows constant but rather 
low levels of around 30 percent preferring more spending, East Germany has shown a decrease of 
those demanding more spending albeit from a higher level, declining from 55 percent in 1996 to 39 
percent in 2016. In Japan, the proportion of those demanding more spending for the unemployed 
decreased from 32 to 20 percent between 1996 and 2016 (while there is almost 10 percent of miss-
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ing values across years; excluding these would yield higher shares of those demanding more spend-
ing). These decreases in the general preference for more support for the jobless come amid increas-
ing pressures on the labour market in both countries. 
Figure 26 shows responses on whether more or less resources should be spent on education, which 
are mostly benefiting individuals at young-age. West and East Germany show similar development 
with the preference for a spending increase rising from 50 to 84 percent and 57 to 91 percent be-
tween 1996 and 2016 respectively. In Japan, there is also an increase in the share of those demand-
ing more spending on education but it is less pronounced and only reaches lower levels. In 1996, 48 
percent preferred a spending increase and in 2016 this share stood at 56 percent. 
In general, it is shown that demands for more government spending across social policy fields have 
been more common in Germany than in Japan across the 20 years between 1996 and 2016. Howev-
er, it is also shown that in Japan, the preference for more spending in those fields primarily benefit-
ing young individuals has increased while the preference for more spending in fields benefiting 
mostly old-age individuals has decreased. In Germany, in contrast, there has been an increasing 
preference for more spending across social policy fields, regardless of whether the primary recipi-
ents are of old or young age. 
Figure 24: Preferences regarding government spending on health coverage, by country and year. 
 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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Figure 25: Preferences regarding government spending on unemployment benefits, by country and year. 
 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
Figure 26: Preferences regarding government spending on education, by country and year. 
 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
III.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
III.4.2.1 Summary statistics 
In the remainder of this section, the summary statistics will first be presented, after which descrip-
tive statistics are presented by age and cohort. Following these two steps, results of the multivariate 
analysis will be discussed. Tables 11 and 12 show the summary statistics of the variables used for 
multivariate analysis. Regarding the dependent variable, the question whether the government 
should spend less, the same or more on old-age, the majority prefers more spending across coun-
tries. Overall, this share is slightly higher in Japan (53 percent) than in West Germany (52 percent), 
but it is the highest in East Germany (61 percent). How such shares vary according to year of survey,  
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age group, cohort and socioeconomic characteristics will be scrutinised below. 
Regarding the other variables shown in table 11, it has to be noted that with respect to employment 
status, retirees are underrepresented in Japan. The reason for this is that women aged 65 years and 
above in Japan tend to self-select into the category of housemakers instead of retiree, which is not 
the case for West and East Germany (this is also alluded at by the relatively higher share of house-
makers in Japan). Rather than speculating over which women to code as retirees, it has been decid-
ed to respect individuals’ self-selection and keep it in their respective categories. 
Another notable difference regards educational attainment. Japan’s share of individuals in the low-
est category is substantially lower than in West and East Germany while that of those in the highest 
Table 11: Summary statistics; period, age, cohort, and some socioeconomic characteristics, column percent. 
Variable Category West Germa-
ny 
East Germa-
ny 
Japan 
Opinion regarding government spending on old-age 
pensions 
Spend same or less 48.41 38.68 46.63 
Spend more 51.59 61.32 53.37 
Year of survey 1996 51.43 50.14 31.39 
 2006 24.24 23.84 30.15 
 2016 24.33 26.02 38.46 
Age group of respondent 15-24 9.93 7.95 10.04 
25-34 17.76 15.06 11.8 
35-44 18.23 18.02 16.91 
45-54 18.00 17.93 17.16 
55-64 17.12 18.35 18.59 
65-74 12.54 14.56 16.64 
75+ 6.42 8.13 8.85 
Birth cohort group of respondent 1900-30 9.07 10.21 8.01 
 1931-40 13.72 15.06 13.83 
 1941-50 15.56 17.24 19.30 
 1951-60 18.48 20.47 17.70 
 1961-70 21.86 18.35 15.56 
 1971-80 12.99 10.49 15.16 
 1981-90 5.85 6.89 7.09 
 1991-2000 2.47 1.29 3.36 
Educational attainment of respondent no more than (mid. sec) 61.97 61.83 24.22 
 higher seconda./vocat. 23.67 24.63 50.31 
 academic 12.13 11.92 23.92 
 other/missing 2.22 1.62 1.54 
Employment status insider 43.54 43.72 43.82 
outsider 16.60 18.90 14.07 
retiree 22.15 29.02 6.58 
housemaker/disabled/o 12.15 4.30 26.25 
student/apprentice 5.03 3.65 5.79 
no info/missing 0.52 0.42 3.49 
Income category (monthly, household, USD and PPP) 0-1000 3.29 6.01 8.90 
1001-2000 12.54 21.67 14.67 
2001-3000 17.6 22.69 15.94 
3001-4000 16.98 16.73 11.77 
4001-5000 10.79 10.17 8.90 
5001-6000 7.05 3.74 8.96 
more than 6000 10.98 3.84 12.37 
no info/missing 20.77 15.16 18.48 
Total number of observations  4410 2164 3695 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
III Analysis 1: intergenerational societal solidarity 
77 
category is higher. One reason is Germany’s dual education systems which makes many individuals 
fall into the middle category. In Japan, in turn, there is no such formalised system in place but in-
stead, those with low schooling education tend to get their training on the job. As noted above, the 
ISCED 1997 framework (OECD 1999) has been relied on for categorisation. These cross-national dif-
ferences also appear in chapter IV where a different data source is used. In other words, strong dif-
ferences on the education variable are not unique to ISSP. 
Table 12 shows the second part of summary statistics. Here, notable differences across countries can 
be seen on the political variables, interest in politics and political persuasion. Regarding interest in 
politics, West and East Germany do not differ strongly with around 30 percent claiming to be very or 
fairly interested and between 25 and 28 percent saying to be not very or not at all interested. In Ja-
pan, only one fifth is very or fairly interested and 29 percent is not very or not at all interested. Re-
garding political persuasion, though this is a highly culturally contingent question, the differences are 
even stronger. In West and East Germany respectively, 32 and 37 percent claim to be left of the cen-
tre while in Japan only 7 percent position themselves on the left. In turn, 33 percent of respondents 
in Japan consider themselves right of the centre, which in West and East Germany only 24 and 19 
percent do respectively. In addition, more than one fourth of Japanese respondents claim to have no 
Table 12: Summary statistics, gender; family and politics related socioeconomic characteristics, column percent. 
Variable Category West 
Germany 
East Ger-
many 
Japan 
Opinion regarding government spending on old-age 
pensions 
Spend same or less 48.41 38.68 46.63 
Spend more 51.59 61.32 53.37 
Interested in politics? very or fairly interested 30.00 28.56 20.68 
 somewhat interested 43.56 42.01 48.66 
 not very or not at al 24.99 28.05 28.99 
 missing 1.45 1.39 1.68 
Political persuasion centre left/left/far left 32.06 36.83 6.74 
 centre/liberal 18.34 14.93 15.53 
 cntr. right/conserv./right 23.99 19.36 33.18 
 no preference/don't know 11.72 11.55 27.44 
 missing 13.88 17.33 17.10 
Gender male 50.41 48.61 49.07 
 female 49.59 51.39 50.93 
Living arrangement single 18.44 16.96 7.09 
 2 adults 35.51 39.19 22.33 
 1-2 adults w. children 27.80 24.68 14.02 
 >2 adults w/o childr. 17.57 18.58 55.43 
other/no info/missing 0.68 0.60 1.14 
Employment status of partner no partner 38.87 38.35 31.42 
 insider 25.71 29.07 32.37 
 outsider 10.48 9.57 6.33 
 retiree 9.68 14.09 5.12 
 housem./disabled/stu./o. 14.60 8.13 21.57 
 no info/missing 0.66 0.79 3.19 
Total number of observations  4410 2164 3695 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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political preference, which is only the case of 12 percent in East and West Germany. These differ-
ences shall be borne in mind for multivariate analysis. 
III.4.2.2 Separating preferences on old-age expenditure by age and cohort 
Table 13 shows the share of positive responses on the dependent variable by age group, year and 
country. Implicitly, age effects and cohort effects are both showcased because of the ten-year rang-
es regarding both age groups (rows) and years of survey (columns). Changes across age within one 
birth cohort can be seen by reading the table diagonally downwards from left to right (to facilitate 
reading, each cohort is shaded with the same respective tone of grey across years). Overall changes 
over time (for a whole population with all age groups), in turn, can be seen in the respective lowest 
row (to be read horizontally from left to right). 
Table 13: Percentage of persons preferring more or much more government spending on pensions and old-age by age 
group and birth cohort. 
West Germany 
 1996 (n=2268) 2006 (n=1069) 2016 (n=1073) 
age group birth cohort “spend more“ birth cohort “spend more“ birth cohort “spend more“ 
15-24 1971-80 0.47 1981-90 0.59 1991-2000 0.78 
25-34 1961-70 0.44 1971-80 0.53 1981-90 0.69 
35-44 1951-60 0.41 1961-70 0.49 1971-80 0.67 
45-54 1941-50 0.38 1951-60 0.47 1961-70 0.66 
55-64 1931-40 0.51 1941-50 0.44 1951-60 0.64 
65-74 1921-30 0.46 1931-40 0.58 1941-50 0.64 
75+ 1900-20 0.52 1900-30 0.57 1900-40 0.61 
Total  0.44  0.51  0.67 
       
East Germany 
 1996 (n=1085) 2006 (n=516) 2016 (n=563) 
age group birth cohort “spend more“ birth cohort “spend more“ birth cohort “spend more“ 
15-24 1971-80 0.44 1981-90 0.50 1991-2000 0.86 
25-34 1961-70 0.50 1971-80 0.43 1981-90 0.72 
35-44 1951-60 0.55 1961-70 0.48 1971-80 0.72 
45-54 1941-50 0.56 1951-60 0.39 1961-70 0.72 
55-64 1931-40 0.70 1941-50 0.54 1951-60 0.75 
65-74 1921-30 0.69 1931-40 0.70 1941-50 0.74 
75+ 1900-20 0.80 1900-30 0.64 1900-40 0.70 
Total  0.60  0.52  0.73 
       
Japan 
 1996 (n=1160) 2006 (n=1114) 2016 (n=1421) 
age group birth cohort “spend more“ birth cohort “spend more“ birth cohort “spend more“ 
15-24 1971-80 0.61 1981-90 0.50 1991-2000 0.39 
25-34 1961-70 0.58 1971-80 0.46 1981-90 0.33 
35-44 1951-60 0.52 1961-70 0.47 1971-80 0.34 
45-54 1941-50 0.61 1951-60 0.53 1961-70 0.42 
55-64 1931-40 0.60 1941-50 0.66 1951-60 0.50 
65-74 1921-30 0.67 1931-40 0.67 1941-50 0.58 
75+ 1900-20 0.58 1900-30 0.59 1900-40 0.56 
Total 0.59 0.56 0.46 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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For West Germany, it can be seen that in general the share of those responding positively (preferring 
more or much more government spending on pensions, even if this requires a tax increase) is in-
creasing with age. Every cohort has shown increasing likelihoods of positive responses over the three 
years of survey at every age. At the same time, however, there are differences across cohorts. In 
general, for instance, younger birth cohorts tend to show a higher share of positive responses. One 
interpretation of this cohort effect is that while poverty shares have increased across age groups and 
over the past three decades (see chapter II), this share has increased especially among younger age 
groups. Younger individuals may be worried that their poverty shares would be transferred into old-
age in the absence of an engaging welfare state. Another reason may be the liberalising pension re-
forms in the early 2000s (also discussed above), which have provoked a greater desire for more ex-
penditure. In addition, West Germany shows a period effect with increasing likelihoods of positive 
responses over the three years of survey (shown in the lower row indicated by “Total”), which ap-
pears to support this interpretation. East Germany shows a slightly different picture. The trend over 
the three years of survey also shows a general trend of increasing likelihoods of positive responses 
with increasing age across and within cohorts though the more considerable increases happened 
between 2006 and 2016 (rather than between 1996 and 2006). Overall as well, the period effect is 
considerable and appears to be stronger than that in West Germany. Also, in 2016, but not in 2006, 
positive response likelihoods in East Germany are higher than in West Germany for every age group. 
Thus, in both areas of Germany, a changing age gradient over time can be seen. While in 1996 it 
tended to be the older age groups who preferred higher government expenditure on pensions, in 
2016 it was the youngest age groups with the highest shares of positive responses. 
For Japan, the picture is different from that in Germany. Within cohorts, the share of responses 
tends to have decreased, and the extent of the decrease tends to be higher among younger birth 
cohorts (read diagonally downwards from left to right, within the same shade of grey). A period ef-
fect can also be seen in Japan (see lowest row from left to right). While there were little differences 
across age groups in 1996 (the 75+ year olds had a slightly lower share of positive responses than 
the 15-24 year olds but the same share as the 25-34 year olds; read vertically within one year), a 
clearer difference across age groups emerged in 2006 and increased further in 2016. In the survey of 
2016, only 39 percent of the 15-24 year olds preferred more or much more government spending on 
old-age while 56 percent of the 75+ year olds did. Among the younger cohorts, hence, there is a 
lower share of positive responses even as they have been ageing. 
This difference between Germany and Japan is in line with the development of the elderly/non-
elderly spending ratio (ENSR) over the same period. While that of Germany has decreased and 
younger birth cohorts more often demand more spending, the ENSR has strongly increased in Japan 
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and younger birth cohorts more often demand less spending. In turn, poverty shares have increased 
among young age groups in both countries. One interpretation of why young respondents in Japan 
nevertheless prefer less pension expenditure more often is the heavy government debt burden in 
Japan (see above in this chapter). In this logic, Japanese respondents may tend to regard a spending 
increase on pensions as financially unsustainable and thus consider it to their disadvantage rather 
than to their advantage. Under these circumstances, public support for intergenerational policies 
appears to have weakened considerably in Japan while it has strengthened in Germany. This descrip-
tive observation will be scrutinised in multivariate regression techniques at the end of this chapter. 
III.4.3 Results of multivariate analysis 
III.4.3.1 Testing for period, age and cohort effects 
Table 14 shows the results of the pooled logistic regression models. In order to see in which way the 
effects of each variable alter depending on other variables, a stepwise modelling approach is taken 
here.20 Model 1a shows that preferences for government spending have increased over the survey 
years. Compared to 1996, which serves as reference category, there is a significant change to 2016. 
However, the coefficient for 2006 is not statistically significantly different from 1996. Model 1a also 
shows that compared to West Germany, the odds of agreeing to more government spending is ele-
vated by almost 50 percent for respondents in East Germany. This appears to be consistent with the 
insider-outsider theory discussed above as East Germany is especially hard-hit by dualisation. How-
ever, there are no statistically significant differences between Japan and West Germany. Model 1b, 
which additionally includes age, shows a strong age gradient with those age groups younger than 55 
years showing significantly lower support for more old-age government spending than those aged 
65-74 (reference category). 
For model 1c, two key socioeconomic variables have been included, employment status and educa-
tional attainment. Compared to labour market insiders (reference category), labour market outsid-
ers and retirees show odds that are significantly elevated by 23 percent and 38 percent respectively. 
Regarding educational attainment, compared to academics (reference category), those with lower 
educational levels show significantly higher odds of preferring an increase in government spending 
on old-age. Both these outcomes are significant with the insider-outsider theory discussed above. 
                                                            
20
 For logistic regression, stepwise modelling does not come without problems as its characteristics are not the same as 
those of linear regression. The interpretation of parameters across models with different independent variables is there-
fore not straightforwardly possible in the same way (see for example: Mood 2010). This caveat has to be borne in mind 
here. However, since some of the variables used here may be collinear it is still advisable to only add them in separate 
steps in order to be able to see the strength of the models without certain variables. In turn, interpretation of the results 
shall tend to focus on the respective last models including the most variables (except where a strongly collinear variable is 
added in the last step, as is the case regarding the interpretation of age effects once cohort is added to the model. Here, 
the age effect will be interpreted before including cohort). 
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Also notable in model 1c is that Japan now has significantly higher odds than West Germany (refer-
ence category), in fact by 25 percent. 
For model 1d, the two political variables have been added. Regarding interested in politics, it shows 
that compared to those respondents who consider themselves to be very interested (reference cat-
egory), those who are somewhat interested and not very or not at all interested have odds that are 
26 and 49 percent higher respectively. Regarding political affiliation, in turn, only those with no pref-
erence (and those with missing values on this variable) appear to have significantly elevated odds 
compared to those who consider themselves to be centre/liberal (reference category). 
In model 1e household income is added as a categorical variable. While the above variable remain 
mostly unchanged (though significant level difference of Japan versus the reference variable West 
Germany somewhat decreases), it shows that income is an important predictor. Even including em-
ployment status and educational attainment, support for more government spending on old-age is 
lower with higher income. Compared to those respondents living in a household of monthly earning 
between 3001 and 4000 US-Dollar, those earning considerably less than that (0-2000) show signifi-
cantly higher odds while those earning more than that show significantly lower odds. This, again, is 
consistent with the insider-outsider theory. 
Model 1f also accounts for birth cohort. In this step, the variable for period (year of survey) has been 
left out in order to avoid the so-called APC problem that occurs once the three collinear variables 
age, period and cohort are included in the same model (see for example: Fienberg 2013). The result 
is that the cohort variable with all groups that were born later than 1941-50 (reference category) has 
elevated odds, ranging from 22 percent (1951-60, significant at the 95 percent level) to 120 percent 
(1981-90). The 1991-2000 birth cohort shows much higher odds, which is mostly explained by its low 
sample size.21 The age variable, in turn, does not lose significance but instead, some variables gain 
significance: compared to those aged 65-74 (reference category), all younger age groups now have 
significantly lower odds of preferring more government expenditure on old-age. The country varia-
ble remains unchanged by including the cohort variable. However, in order to better understand the 
effects of these variables, it is important to analyse them separately for both countries, Germany 
and Japan, which is being done below. 
                                                            
21
 The 1991-2000 birth cohort includes 261 observations, 158 of which prefer more spending (86 of 109 respondents in 
West Germany and 25 of 28 respondents in East Germany). This is a much higher share than among the other birth cohorts, 
while the sample size is only about 40 percent of the second-smallest cohort (1981-99). In addition, only the 2016 survey 
includes individuals born 1991-2000, which was a wave that already shows significantly elevated odds (for Germany), as 
shown in the regression tables. 
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Table 14: Model 1a-f, pooled data, logistic regression results, dependent variable: preference for government spending 
on old-age pensions, odds ratios. 
  Model  
1a 
Model  
1b 
Model  
1c 
Model  
1d 
Model  
1e 
Model  
1f 
Variable Category OR OR OR OR OR OR 
Survey year (ref.: 1996) 2006 1.08 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.00  
 2016 1.32*** 1.27*** 1.52*** 1.58*** 1.57***  
Country (ref.: West Germany) East Germany 1.48*** 1.47*** 1.47*** 1.46*** 1.35*** 1.37*** 
 Japan 1.03 1.00 1.25*** 1.18*** 1.10 1.09 
Age category (ref.: 65-74) 15-24  0.76*** 0.86 0.79** 0.80* 0.32*** 
 25-34  0.64*** 0.78*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.37*** 
 35-44  0.60*** 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.44*** 
 45-54  0.66*** 0.83** 0.80** 0.82** 0.61*** 
 55-64  0.90 1.07 1.06 1.07 0.93 
 75+  0.93 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.98 
Employment status  
(ref.: insider) 
Outsider   1.23*** 1.22*** 1.15** 1.16** 
Retiree   1.38*** 1.34*** 1.25** 1.30*** 
 Housemaker/dis./oth.   1.16** 1.16** 1.10 1.12 
 Student/apprentice   0.90 0.92 0.91 0.84 
 No info/missing   1.13 1.10 1.07 1.11 
Educ. attainment  
(ref.: academic) 
mid. Sec. or less   2.13*** 2.01*** 1.77*** 1.68*** 
higher second./vocat.   1.68*** 1.60*** 1.45*** 1.45*** 
 No info/missing   1.95*** 1.89*** 1.74*** 1.83*** 
Interested in politics (ref.: very) Somewhat    1.26*** 1.23*** 1.24*** 
 Not much/not at all    1.49*** 1.43*** 1.44*** 
 No info/missing.    1.19 1.15 1.16 
Political persuasion  
(ref.: centre/lib.) 
Centre left – far left    1.05 1.04 1.01 
Centr. right – far right    0.89* 0.89* 0.86** 
 No preference/d.k.    1.18** 1.16* 1.08 
 Missing    0.80*** 0.80*** 0.78*** 
Income category  
(ref.: 3001-4000) 
(monthly family inc., 
in USD and PPP) 
0-1000     1.25** 1.23* 
1001-2000     1.30*** 1.28*** 
2001-3000     1.10 1.09 
4001-5000     0.85* 0.87* 
5001-6000     0.80** 0.81** 
 >6001     0.66*** 0.67*** 
 No info/missing     0.94 0.94 
Cohort group (ref.: 1941-50) 1991-2000      3.57*** 
 1981-90      2.20*** 
 1971-80      1.88*** 
 1961-70      1.41*** 
 1951-60      1.22** 
 1931-40      0.93 
 1900-30      0.83 
Constant  0.98 1.33*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.55*** 0.73** 
Number of observations  10269 10269 10269 10269 10269 10269 
Controlled for: living arrangement, gender, partner’s employment status 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 15 shows regression results only for Germany. As in the pooled models 1a-f, the country varia-
ble is strongly significant with respondents in East Germany showing 47 percent higher odds of pre-
ferring more government spending on old-age than West Germany (reference category), and this 
area effect remains significant across all models for Germany. In model 2a, which in addition to the 
country/area control only includes the variables year (period) and age, it can be seen that the strong 
period effect shown in the pooled models is even stronger. As expected in hypothesis 1.1, there is 
thus no decrease. Specifically, accounting for the variables in model 2a, respondents in the 2016 sur-
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vey have 124 percent higher odds of preferring more government spending on old-age compared to 
those from the 1996 survey (reference category). 2006, in turn, is not significant. In other words, 
there is a considerable increase in overall support for intergenerational policies towards old-age in 
Germany in recent years. One interpretation is that the effects of the liberalising pension reforms 
are fully felt now, with more private retirement saving actively promoted by the government, which 
comes at a time of higher precariousness among young age in recent years. At the same time, the 
relatively strong economic growth and solid government finances of the last years may contribute to 
a notion that the government would indeed be able to finance more spending on old-age (though 
this latter part is not included in the estimation models). For age, in turn, it can be seen that younger 
age groups (except for those aged 15-24) show significantly lower odds than the reference category 
(65-74). 
Model 2b includes employment status and educational attainment in addition to those already in-
cluded in model 2a. Labour market outsiders have 33 percent higher odds than insiders (reference 
category). This tendency is as expected by the insider-outsider logic: higher government expenditure 
on pensions would put a tax burden on the whole society but it would be especially outsiders, not 
insiders, who would stand to gain from it. This is consistent with hypothesis 1.4. In addition, those 
with lower educational attainment show 221 (less than higher secondary school degree) and 82 (less 
than academic) percent higher odds of preferring more old-age expenditure than those with high 
education levels (academic, reference category). Upon the inclusion of these two variables, the age 
variable is no longer significant. 
In model 2c, political variables are added. While this step does not alter the significance of the other 
variables considerably, both show high significance levels by themselves. Regarding interest in politi-
cal affairs those who are somewhat interested or not interested have 29 and 70 percent higher odds 
than respondents who are very interested in politics (reference category). Regarding political per-
suasion, self-identifying as left of centre shows 37 percent higher odds than being centre/liberal 
(reference category) while being right of centre does not significantly differ from those politically at 
the centre. Having no preferences, in turn, differs from the reference category in a similar way as 
being left (39 percent higher odds). 
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The income category, included in model 2d, is significant in the expected way: those with higher in-
comes than the reference category (3001-4000 US-Dollars per month) tend to have significantly 
lower odds of preferring more government spending on old-age. In turn, the age variable remains 
non-significant, which is in line with hypothesis 1.2 (no age effect for Germany). 
In model 2e, (birth) cohort is added to the model. Here, it can be seen that younger birth cohorts 
tend to have higher odds of preferring more government spending on old-age compared to those 
born in 1941-50 (reference category). The latest birth cohorts have very high odds, which is mostly 
Table 15: Model 2a-e, Germany, logistic regression results, dependent variable: preference for government spending on 
old-age pensions, odds ratios. 
  Model  
2a 
Model  
2b 
Model  
2c 
Model  
2d 
Model  
2e 
  OR OR OR OR OR 
Survey year (ref.: 1996) 2006 1.08 1.10 1.11 0.96  
 2016 2.24*** 3.63*** 4.03*** 3.78***  
East vs. West (ref.: West Germany) East Germany 1.47*** 1.47*** 1.43*** 1.31*** 1.37*** 
Age category (ref.: 65-74) 15-24 0.89 1.01 0.94 0.94 0.11*** 
 25-34 0.75*** 0.94 0.87 0.85 0.19*** 
 35-44 0.73*** 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.32*** 
 45-54 0.67*** 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.50*** 
 55-64 0.94 1.08 1.09 1.09 0.90 
 75+ 1.03 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.18 
Employment status (ref.: insider) Outsider  1.33*** 1.32*** 1.25** 1.27*** 
 Retiree  1.25* 1.24* 1.17 1.54*** 
 Housemaker/dis./oth.  1.27** 1.22* 1.16 1.10 
 Student/apprentice  1.01 1.03 1.01 0.77 
 No info/missing  1.14 1.09 1.05 1.22* 
Educ. attainment (ref.: academic) no more than (mid. sec)  3.21*** 2.80*** 2.44*** 2.09*** 
 higher secondary/vocat.  1.82*** 1.74*** 1.57*** 1.75*** 
 No info/missing  2.47*** 2.38*** 2.11*** 2.64*** 
Interested in politics (ref.: very) Somewhat   1.29*** 1.26*** 1.26*** 
 Not much/not at all   1.79*** 1.70*** 1.74*** 
 No info/missing.   1.24 1.21 1.25 
Political persuasion (ref.: centre/lib.) Centre left – far left   1.37*** 1.35*** 1.15* 
 Centr. right – far right   1.18* 1.17* 0.97 
 No preference/d.k.   1.39*** 1.36*** 1.14 
 Missing   1.32*** 1.33*** 1.05 
Income category (ref.: 3001-4000) 0-1000    1.15 0.97 
(monthly family inc., in USD and PPP) 1001-2000    1.32*** 1.16 
 2001-3000    1.02 0.98 
 4001-5000    0.80** 0.86 
 5001-6000    0.78* 0.81* 
 >6001    0.62*** 0.68*** 
 No info/missing    0.80** 0.78*** 
Cohort group (ref.: 1941-50) 1991-2000     34.11*** 
 1981-90     8.59*** 
 1971-80     4.69*** 
 1961-70     2.50*** 
 1951-60     1.59*** 
 1931-40     0.87 
 1900-30     0.69** 
Constant  1.06 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.52*** 
Number of observations  6574 6574 6574 6574 6574 
Controlled for: living arrangement, gender, partner’s employment status 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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due to the relatively low sample size of these categories and the fact that these latest cohorts only 
joined the survey in the latest year(s) that generally show a higher tendency of support (see com-
ment in the pooled models above). Hence, while there is a cohort effect in Germany, this does not 
contradict with hypothesis 1.3 (expecting there to be no tendency of later birth cohorts showing less 
support for higher old-age expenditure compared to earlier cohorts). 
Results for Japan are shown in table 16. In model 3a, only including year (period) and age, this can 
already be seen in the year variable. In contrast to Germany, where respondents in the 2016 showed 
higher support for increases in old-age expenditure compared to those in 1996 (reference category), 
this effect is also significant in Japan but in the opposite direction. Compared to respondents from 
1996, those in 2016 have 47 percent lower odds of preferring more old-age expenditure. One expla-
nation may be the fiscal burden that Japan has assumed within the ten years between 2006 and 
2016, during which Japan experienced the Global Financial Crisis from 2008, the Great Tohoku 
Earthquake in 2011, and continuously low economic growth. An important policy response to these 
challenges have been increased government spending. The decreased overall support for more gov-
ernment spending on old-age is consistent with hypothesis 1.1. In addition, there is a strong age gra-
dient with younger age groups showing less support for higher old-age expenditure compared to 
those aged 65-74 (reference category). 
In model 3b, employment status and educational attainment are added. It shows that there appears 
to be no outsider effect in Japan, which stands in contrast to Germany where an outsider effect is 
strong. The education variable, in turn, shows significantly higher odds (by 58 percent) of those with 
less than a higher secondary school degree compared to those with an academic degree (reference 
category). 
Model 3c, including interest in political affairs and political persuasion, does not alter the signifi-
cance of the above-discussed variables of the previous models. In turn, neither of the newly added 
variables shows significant results at the 95 percent level, which stands in contrast to Germany 
(where those self-identifying as politically left of centre have higher odds than those at the centre, 
while those being very interested in politics show significantly lower support for more old-age ex-
penditure compared to those being somewhat or not interested). 
In model 3d, income is added, and as in Germany, higher income is associated with lower support for 
increases in old-age expenditure. With the variables included here, employment status is still not 
significant. Consequently, there is no support for hypothesis 1.4 (labour market outsiders showing 
more support for increases in old-age expenditure compared to labour market insiders). In turn, the 
age variable continues to be significant. Compared to respondents aged 65-74 (reference category),  
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those respondents aged less than 55 years all show significantly lower odds of support, ranging from 
a 26 percent (45-54) to a 40 percent decrease (15-24). This evidence supports hypothesis 1.2 
(younger age groups having a lower tendency to support increases in old-age expenditure compared 
to older ones in Japan). 
Model 3e includes cohort (instead of year/period). Firstly, it can be seen that some of the age effect 
disappears (especially for the relatively less young age groups). In addition, later birth cohorts show 
strong levels of significance. Compared to those born in 1941-50 (reference category), those groups 
Table 16: Model 3a-e, Japan, logistic regression results, dependent variable: preference for government spending on old-
age pensions, odds ratios. 
  Model  
3a 
Model  
3b 
Model  
3c 
Model  
3d 
Model  
3e 
  OR OR OR OR OR 
Survey year (ref.: 1996) 2006 0.85* 0.90 0.91 0.93  
 2016 0.53*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.60***  
Age category (ref.: 65-74) 15-24 0.55*** 0.63** 0.59*** 0.60*** 2.46*** 
 25-34 0.45*** 0.56*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 1.68** 
 35-44 0.43*** 0.55*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 1.10 
 45-54 0.58*** 0.74** 0.71** 0.74** 1.12 
 55-64 0.77** 0.89 0.88 0.89 1.07 
 75+ 0.80 0.72** 0.74** 0.74** 0.68** 
Employment status (ref.: insider) Outsider  1.03 1.02 0.98 0.97 
 Retiree  1.11 1.10 1.05 1.11 
 Housemaker/dis./oth.  1.14 1.13 1.10 1.05 
 Student/apprentice  0.75 0.76 0.80 1.03 
 No info/missing  1.04 1.04 1.00 0.86 
Educ. attainment (ref.: academic) no more than (mid. sec)  1.58*** 1.56*** 1.41*** 1.46*** 
 higher secondary/vocat.  1.13 1.12 1.06 1.05 
 No info/missing  0.83 0.85 0.82 0.81 
Interested in politics (ref.: very) Somewhat   1.24** 1.21** 1.20** 
 Not much/not at all   1.18 1.14 1.14 
 No info/missing   1.23 1.16 1.21 
Political persuasion (ref.: centre/lib.) Centre left – far left   1.17 1.15 1.12 
 Centr. right – far right   0.95 0.95 0.94 
 No preference/d.k.   1.09 1.07 1.09 
 Missing.   1.08 1.06 1.02 
Income category (ref.: 3001-4000) 0-1000    1.57*** 1.56*** 
(monthly family inc., in USD and PPP) 1001-2000    1.34** 1.31** 
 2001-3000    1.32** 1.30** 
 4001-5000    1.03 1.01 
 5001-6000    1.13 1.15 
 >6001    0.92 0.89 
 No info/missing    1.28* 1.23 
Cohort group (ref.: 1941-50) 1991-2000     0.15*** 
 1981-90     0.20*** 
 1971-80     0.42*** 
 1961-70     0.56*** 
 1951-60     0.79* 
 1931-40     1.01 
 1900-30     1.16 
Constant  2.43*** 1.35 1.27 1.20 0.92 
Number of observations  3695 3695 3695 3695 3695 
Controlled for: living arrangement, gender, partner’s employment status  
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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born later than 1960 all show significantly lower support for higher old-age spending. The 1961-70 
cohort shows 44 percent lower odds, the 1971-80 cohort shows 58 percent lower odds (both com-
pared to those born 1941-50). Those born in 1981-90 and 1991-2000 (though these have only been 
in the survey once and twice respectively) even show 80 and 85 percent lower odds. These later co-
horts (especially those from 1971 and later) joined the labour market in times when dualisation has 
hit especially hard (more so among later cohorts) and who according to above-mentioned estima-
tions are most likely to get significantly less pension benefits than earlier cohorts. To what extent 
they can be called a “political generation”, however, it remains unclear because, as mentioned 
above, the outcome variable does not, at least to the whole Japanese population, appear to be asso-
ciated with any sort of political interest or persuasion. A cohort effect, in turn, can clearly be ob-
served, which is consistent with hypothesis 1.3.  
To inquire deeper into the possible effects that dualism may have on intergenerational solidarity the 
following subsection will show results of interaction of relevant variables in this regard. 
III.4.3.2 Testing for outsider effects 
While effects of period, age and cohort have been shown above and are in line with the respective 
hypotheses, there are still missing or unexpected results regarding the effects of (labour market) 
dualism. Figure 27 shows plotted interaction results of the variables (here, only those categories of 
interest are shown; in turn, for the applied control variables see annotations below the graphs). Not 
differentiating by year, it can be seen that for Germany (left), outsiders show higher support than 
insiders at most ages (except for 25-34). In Japan (right), differences are much smaller and indeed 
not significant.22 Once differences within outsiders are compared across age groups, the expected 
age gradient of younger outsiders showing more support for increases in old-age spending com-
pared to older outsiders is not observable.23 Thus, there appears to be no support for hypothesis 1.5. 
                                                            
22
 To confirm significance levels, additional logistic regressions have been applied where the reference categories are set 
accordingly to be able to make a judgment at the 95 percent levels of confidence. See appendix for output tables. 
23
 See appendix for significance levels. 
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Figure 27: Interaction of age group and employment status for Germany (left) and Japan (right), dependent variable: 
preference for government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
  
Controlled for: year, educational attainment, living arrangement, gender, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
In figure 28, interaction effects of employment status and year are shown in order to check whether 
there is an outsider effect that has developed or disappeared over time. In Germany (left), as could 
already be seen in the regression table, support for more government spending on old-age increased 
across employment types, indeed they converged to very high levels of support. In 1996, in contrast, 
there was a difference with outsiders supporting spending more often than insiders. Things have 
taken a different turn in Japan, however, where between 1996 and 2016 support for more spending 
declined among insiders and outsiders but increased among retirees. Support is lowest among (la-
bour market) insiders, highest among retirees (or pension insiders), although the difference between 
labour market insiders and outsiders are not significant. 
Figure 28: Interaction of year and employment for Germany (left) and Japan (right), dependent variable: preference for 
government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
  
Controlled for: age group, educational attainment, living arrangement, gender, partner's employment status, political in-
terest, political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
In figures 29 (Germany) and 30 (Japan), the effects of interactions between gender and employment 
status are shown (not differentiated by year). It is evident that for Germany is that there is an out-
sider effect for men but not for women: male insiders show significantly less support for more 
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spending than do outsiders (though once differentiating by year, this effect disappeared in 2016; see 
appendix) and retirees. Among women, insiders and outsiders do not differ among each other, 
though both show less support than female retirees. In Japan, in turn, there are no significant differ-
ences (also not once the output is separated by years; see appendix). 
Figure 29: Interaction of gender and employment status for Germany, dependent variable: preference for government 
spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: year, age group, educational attainment, living arrangement, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
Figure 30: Interaction of gender and employment status for Japan, dependent variable: preference for government 
spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: year, age group, educational attainment, living arrangement, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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Figures 31 (Germany) and 32 (Japan) show one more interaction regarding dualism, educational at-
tainment and employment status (not distinguishing by years), which is aimed at differentiating in-
siders and outsiders according to their levels of skills. For Germany, a clear difference can be seen, 
showing that there is an outsider effect at the lowest education level (outsiders supporting more 
spending more often than insiders), though this effect vanishes with rising levels of education. In 
other words, at higher levels of education, the preferences of insiders and outsiders (and even pen-
sioners) tend to converge (also, the effect disappeared in 2016 once results are differentiated by 
year; see appendix). 
In Japan, with all years together, differences between insiders and outsiders do not differ significant-
ly across levels of educational attainment. Differentiating by years (see appendix) does not alter this 
result. 
Figure 31: Interaction of educational attainment and employment status for Germany, dependent variable: preference 
for government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: year, age group, educational attainment, living arrangement, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
III Analysis 1: intergenerational societal solidarity 
91 
Figure 32: Interaction of educational attainment and employment status for Japan, dependent variable: preference for 
government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: year, age group, educational attainment, living arrangement, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
Considering this, there are mixed findings regarding the (labour market) outsider effect across both 
time and countries. While such effects are observable in Germany (for younger outsiders, for outsid-
er men, and for low-skilled outsiders), these effects mostly disappear in the latest wave survey year 
(2016) once results are differentiated by year. In other words, there used to be various forms of out-
sider effects in Germany but according to the latest available data, there are no longer. In Japan, in 
contrast, which shows strong age effects, there are no outsider effects observable and this finding 
does not alter across years. Consequently, for both countries, hypothesis 1.4 (labour market outsid-
ers showing more support for government spending than labour market insiders) and hypothesis 1.5 
(young labour market outsiders showing higher support than outsiders at older age groups) cannot 
be supported here.  
III.5 Discussion 
This chapter has investigated intergenerational solidarity on the societal level mainly in terms of 
preferences for government spending on intergenerational policies, such as pensions and old-age 
support. Using policy preferences as an outcome variable, the two theoretical pillars of this chapter 
III Analysis 1: intergenerational societal solidarity 
92 
have been Rueda’s (2005) insider-outsider theory and the related literature on dualisation on the 
one hand and Mannheim’s (1964) concept of “political generations” and related literature on the 
other hand. On these grounds, it has been tested in what way preferences in Germany and Japan 
have developed over time, across age and cohort as well as socioeconomic characteristics. 
Against the background of the above, the following conclusions can be drawn. According to hypoth-
esis 1.1, it was expected that overall support for more government spending on old-age did not de-
crease over time in Germany, while it did decrease in Japan. Indeed, while overall support in Germa-
ny rose over the years observed here, it fell in Japan. Hypothesis 1.1 can therefore be supported. 
With hypothesis 1.2, it was expected that the effect of age on the outcome variable differs between 
the two countries. Specifically, it was expected that there is more support for higher government 
spending on old-age among older age groups in Japan, while this effect could not be observed in 
Germany. This has been observed: Japan shows a strong age effect with younger groups opposing 
higher spending more often, which cannot be observed in Germany. In fact, Germany shows re-
versed preference patterns with younger age groups more often supporting spending increases. 
Thus, hypothesis 1.2 is also supported. 
Following hypothesis 1.2, hypothesis 1.3 expected there to be a cohort effect as well. For Japan, a 
“political generation” among younger cohorts was expected to oppose spending increases more of-
ten. For Germany, such an effect was not expected. Again, this picture has been observed in the data 
so that hypothesis 1.3 is also supported. 
Regarding hypothesis 1.4, however, the data shows less support. While there is an overall outsider 
effect in Germany (labour market outsiders showing more supporting for increases in government 
spending on old-age compared to labour market insiders), this effect has disappeared over time and 
was no longer significant in 2016 (though it was in 1996 and 2006). For Japan, this effect was not 
significant in any year. In adittion, subgroups of outsiders who are especially exposed to new social 
risks, such as the low-skilled or women, do not show significantly different results in Japan (and in 
Germany they only did in the first two years surveyed but not in the third; in addition, gender 
showed the reverse direction). Thus, since it is one of the objectives of this work to discuss devel-
opments over time as an analysis of the consequences of demographic ageing (and the expected 
results, wherever they appeared, vanished in 2016), hypothesis 1.4 cannot be supported. Hypothesis 
1.5 expected there to be an additional effect among young outsiders. This, as with hypothesis 1.4, 
cannot be supported by the data. 
The developments discussed and the results obtained in this chapter may show some general pat-
terns, which would be worth verifying across countries. In the face of ageing, Germany and Japan 
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have, with their very similar demographic challenges, responded in parts quite differently on a policy 
level. Similarities include the dualisation trend in the labour market, the liberalisation of pension sys-
tems, and the institutional penalty thereby imposed on labour market outsiders. Regarding the 
structure of the welfare state, however, countries have been diverging: Germany’s old-age bias de-
creased over time while that of Japan increased (though once adjusted for population composition 
at least the direction of development is similar, Japan still has a much stronger old-age bias). As a 
result, support for more spending on old-age strongly decreased in Japan (although poverty levels 
are still highest among old-age individuals, as shown above) while it increased in Germany. In Japan, 
where government debt levels (albeit partly due to other reasons) increased strongly over the last 
decades (and especially over the last years), public support for old-age spending decreased especial-
ly among younger members of society. 
For Japan, the observable cohort effect hints in many ways at the emergence of a “political genera-
tion” according to Mannheim: a common source of discontent may be an unsustainable pension sys-
tem that will give the later cohorts of today few benefits (indeed, as mentioned above, the young of 
today will probably receive less benefits from the pension system than they will have contributed to 
it once they reach retirement age) and at the same time levels of government debt so high that addi-
tional reforms may be required in the name of fiscal renewal. On the other hand, as partly shown 
above in terms of the variables on political interest and political persuasion, preferences on old-age 
expenditure in Japan are not correlated with either interest in politics or a certain side of the politi-
cal spectrum. In other words, the issue of old-age expenditure does not seem to be a topic dividing 
society across political fault lines (it even does so less than in Germany, where support for more old-
age expenditure is associated with being politically left). 
The fact that it is older groups who prefer more spending more often while it is younger groups op-
posing this more often – and that in addition there is no significant difference across employment 
status – offers one conclusion: in Japan today, government spending on pensions is a largely rational 
policy issue in the sense that it is almost an established fact that the later cohorts of today will be 
considerably worse off than today’s elderly (cohorts). Under such circumstances, it is at most of sec-
ondary importance whether one is a labour market insider or outsider (though these two groups are 
in fact treated very differently by Japan’s welfare regime), because what really divides society on this 
issue is age (or cohort). 
In Germany, in stark contrast to Japan, support for old-age expenditure has increased especially 
among young persons over time, though the 2016 survey showed a rise in support in the whole of 
society. One reason may be the increasing risks of old-age poverty among today’s younger (and mid-
dle-) age groups. Hence, while (especially younger) respondents in Germany are facing an unsustain-
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able pension system (as discussed above), the more common response (compared to Japan) is that 
spending on pensions should rise rather than fall. One explanation of this difference compared to 
Japan is the relatively solid fiscal position in Germany considering recently falling government debt 
levels, which stands in strong contrast to Japan. In turn, as shown by WVS data, the share of re-
spondents with the opinion that “Old people get more than their fair share from the government” is 
very low in Germany, which cannot be said of Japan. 
Intergenerational solidarity on the societal level, as measured in the way of this chapter, has lately 
been strengthening in Germany, but it has been weakening in Japan where public support for inter-
generational policies directed towards old-age has been decreasing (especially among those who are 
not old). In the next chapter of this work, it will be tested how intergenerational solidarity is deter-
mined on the family level, which may serve as a bulwark against a possible generational conflict on a 
societal level. 
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IV Analysis 2: intergenerational family solidarity 
IV.1 Theory 
IV.1.1 Theory of saving and giving 
IV.1.1.1 Life cycle hypothesis models 
It has been widely acknowledged and shown in the previous chapter that the income and consump-
tion patterns of individuals over the life course can be divided in three phases. At young age, a typi-
cal person consumes more than he or she generates in income, while at working age income ex-
ceeds consumption, which again changes into a deficit at old age (Ogawa et al. 2012; Kluge 2009; R. 
Lee 2003a). The macroeconomic consequences thereof, which can either be an accumulation or de-
crease of societal wealth, were first analysed in the simplistic form of the “life cycle hypothesis” 
(Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). Modigliani (1988) summed it up as follows: 
“According to this hypothesis, the planned consumption path reflects the allocation of life resources to 
consumption over the life span. At least in the absence of bequests, this implies that there will tend to 
be saving resulting in transitory accumulation of wealth when current income is above, and/or current 
consumption below, average. There will be dissaving, financed from the transitory accumulation, in the 
opposite case“ (Modigliani 1988, 16). 
Extensions of this model include overlapping generations, enabling analysis of the saving, dissaving 
and transfer behaviour across generations while these are simultaneously alive (Heijdra and Romp 
2008; Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos 2011; Mudrazija 2014; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). An ob-
vious merit of such models is the applicability to country cases with ageing populations, by which it 
can be seen how the conditions for the intergenerational sharing of resources may vary depending 
on institutional differences such as welfare regimes. Mudrazija (2014) considers a model of three 
phases, in which one generation ages from being young to being old, preceded and succeeded by 
other generations who are meanwhile being born, age or die. A crucial element, already found in 
Modigliani and Brumberg’s (1954) original model and evidenced by NTA data above (see chapter II), 
is the hump-shaped pattern of transfer giving: young and old generations are net receivers of trans-
fers while those at working age are net givers. The two basic assumptions for this model are that 
firstly, the primary reason for receiving transfers is need and secondly, the primary purpose of those 
transfers received is consumption, which is consistent with previous works on the motivations of 
giving by Becker (1974), Barro (1974) or Kohli and Künemund (2005). In his work, Mudrazija (2014) 
finds that though fundamental transfer patterns are similar across countries, the specifics, such as 
the age of transition from one life course phase to the next or the extent of deficit and surplus, vary 
depending on a country’s welfare and family regime. However, the analysis is confined to three 
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common European welfare state types based on Esping-Andersen (1990): the social-democratic, the 
conservative and the traditional (elsewhere called Mediterranean, Southern European or familialist) 
type (Mudrazija 2014, 251).24 In all those countries that are part of the analysis, the likelihood to 
make downward transfers (from old to young) uniformly decreases with age, and the trend is 
strongest in traditional or familialist welfare regimes (see below for a definition). It is the least strong 
in social democratic countries, and conservative regimes fall in the middle of the two extreme types. 
Though Mudrazija’s work shows how the giving and receiving of transfers differs along the life 
course and across regime types, non-European welfare and family regimes, such as Asian countries, 
are disregarded. This work shall expand the conceptual work by considering the case of Japan. It 
shall also go beyond the too simplistic assumption that the only reason for transfers is need, which is 
discussed below. 
IV.1.1.2 Theory of transfer giving 
IV.1.1.2.1 Egoism and reciprocity 
There has been extensive research on the prevalence and determinants of inter vivos. Many studies 
have approached the topic by drawing on a rational choice approach. Apart from economic factors, 
individuals are assumed to derive utility from giving. These studies differ in terms of the mechanisms 
of giving by which individuals are assumed derive utility, ranging from a mere distinction of egoism 
and altruism (Horioka 2014; Hamaaki, Hori, and Murata 2016; Horioka et al. 2000), to concepts in-
cluding an in-between category such as indirect reciprocity (Arrondel and Masson 2001), and mani-
fold categorisations with more subtle differentiation between the extremes, such as social prestige, 
feelings of duty or social pressure (Kohli and Künemund 2003; Schokkaert 2006). Generally in the 
literature, egoism as a driver to make a transfer is marked by the expectation to receive a transfer 
back, be it in cash or kind. In contrast, altruistic individuals derive pleasure or utility from the act of 
giving itself or the pleasure of others. Indirect reciprocity lies in between these two extremes in that 
persons with this motivation seek to maintain a culture of giving. Thereby, he or she who gives is not 
expecting to necessarily receive something back from the same person but instead to keep alive the 
custom of making intergenerational transfers as such. This is especially important in settings where 
more than two generations are involved. It is straightforward to show how the consequences of 
population ageing and the individualisation in living arrangements may differ according to different 
types of utility from making a transfer. For example, if parents and their adult children live far apart 
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 Mudrazija here erroneously quotes Esping-Andersen’s seminal “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990) for hav-
ing coined the types social democratic, conservative, and traditional. In Esping-Andersen’s original typology, however, the 
“three worlds” refer to the types social democratic, conservative, and liberal. The traditional welfare regime was only later 
introduced (see for example: Rhodes 1996). 
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and providing care to the elderly parents is therefore impracticable for the adult children, then a 
parent with egoistic or reciprocal considerations would likely refrain from providing financial support 
since there would be no prospectus of getting something in return. In contrast, egoistically or recip-
rocally motivated adult children who hope to receive financial support from their parents might opt 
to live near their parents’ home in order to be able to provide care. Horioka et.al (2016) find evi-
dence for such latter behaviour in Japan. Horioka (2014) compares Chinese and Japanese parents 
with Indian and American ones and shows that the former have more selfish motivations than the 
latter. In an altruistic setting and even under the assumption of indirect reciprocity, living arrange-
ments in a family and especially the distance between the individuals would not tend to affect trans-
fer behaviour as strongly as egoism or direct reciprocity would. Albertini and Kohli (2017) find evi-
dence for altruism among European childless elderly who are a strong source of charity giving (the 
authors use data of the first three SHARE waves and, beyond substantive charity giving, also find ev-
idence of other voluntary transfers). Arrondel and Masson (2001) find indirect reciprocity in a French 
sample with three generational settings (it is shown that upon having received a transfer, individuals 
often give “back” to the next generation rather than to the one the transfer came from). 
IV.1.1.2.2 Kinds of transfers 
As alluded to above, in order to understand how differences in socioeconomic circumstances, family 
structures, or policies will likely be associated with intrafamilial intergenerational sharing, adopting a 
basic rational choice logic is helpful, which shall thus be done here. However, not only different 
types of utility from making transfers need to be considered but also different types of transfers 
themselves. This is relevant since where certain material (or motivational/utility) grounds for making 
one kind of transfer are not given, they can be or are substituted by other types of transfers. 
Private transfers, hence those that are not organised through the state or the market, can be made 
inter vivos or in the form of bequests. While the latter are usually larger in size, the former tend to 
be more important to the receiver since they can be consumed immediately and not only upon 
death of the donor (Kohli and Künemund 2003). This work shall therefore, and for reasons of data 
availability, focus on inter vivos transfers.25 Such transfers, carried out between living individuals, are 
also more diverse than bequests in that they can be made in either cash or kind, such as in the form 
of care services or co-residence incorporating various forms of help among the co-residents (Kohli 
and Künemund 2003; Mudrazija 2016; Albuquerque 2014; Albertini and Kohli 2017). As shown above 
(see chapter II), elderly individuals are net givers of private financial transfers until high old age. 
Transfers in kind, not accounted for in NTA, tend to flow downwards as well as upwards (Kohli and 
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 In the case of the data for Japan that will be worked with, inter vivos and bequest cannot always be clearly distinguished. 
This will be explained further below. 
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Künemund 2003; Albertini and Kohli 2017; Mudrazija 2016; Albuquerque 2014). For example, elderly 
parents provide childcare to grandchildren while adult children provide eldercare to their parents. 
While this dimension of non-financial transfers will be considered on a descriptive basis in this chap-
ter, it will not be at the centre of analysis for reasons of data availability. Non-financial transfers will, 
however, be considered in the broader context of intergenerational solidarity and therefore be rele-
vant for the generation of hypotheses regarding financial transfers, as will be shown below. 
IV.1.1.2.3 Capability to give, need to receive 
Exclusively focusing on the motivations to make transfers, however, may undermine the importance 
of the individual situation of the donor and the recipient respectively. Leaning on an established 
body of literature stressing the (financial or physical) need of the recipient (Villanueva, Demange, 
and Hochguertel 2005; Künemund, Motel-Klingebiel, and Kohli 2005; McGarry and Schoeni 1995; 
Silverstein et al. 2002), Mudrazija (2016) takes material needs, and implicitly also the capability to 
give, into account in his modelling of the interplay between public and private transfers. Assuming 
that hence the driving force of private transfers is not just egoism or reciprocity but also the need of 
the recipient and/or the capability of the donor, hypotheses regarding the crowding in and crowding 
out of private transfers in light of the presence or absence of public transfers can be made. In a 
three-generational setting, Mudrazija (2016) argues from a life course perspective that children and 
young adults often face high costs to finance events such as university entry, moving out from the 
parental household or marriage. In contrast, the (middle-age) working population, often parents to 
this younger generation, is mostly generating surplus income, which to a large extent is redistributed 
to both the older and the younger generation through the public sector. The old generation, who are 
in many cases the parents of the working-age population and grandparents of the younger genera-
tion, has accumulated private savings and is simultaneously receiving pensions and other income 
through the public sector. Until they become frail and need private care as well as costly healthcare 
services, the elderly therefore, on average, have spare resources to spend. Since the need for such 
resources is often strong among the younger generation, and the working-age population is already 
providing its share to both old and young, the able old generation becomes a net donor of transfers 
downwards. In other words, public transfers to the elderly may crowd out private transfers to the 
elderly but at the same time they crowd in private transfers to the younger generation. Comparing 
13 European countries based on individual-level data from the second wave of SHARE and country-
level data mostly from the OECD, Mudrazija (2016) finds evidence for these proclaimed tendencies 
(it is shown that where public transfers to elderly persons are higher, private transfers to the elderly 
tend to be relatively lower but in turn, private transfers from these benefitted elderly to younger 
generations are relatively higher. 
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Mudrazija’s (2016) model, however, does not consider how living arrangements may affect transfer 
giving, nor does it explicitly mention the increasing precariousness among young and also working-
age adults (chapters II and III), which makes downward transfers from the elderly more important 
but also more likely not to be high enough. A related element and also one that is disregarded by 
Mudrazija (2016) are socioeconomic differences. It is straightforward to assume, also in line with the 
life cycle hypothesis (see above), that high-income and high-wealth individuals would be more likely 
to make private transfers because they are in a position to do so. Whether this indeed happens, and 
if so to what extent it does, will be tested at the end of this chapter. It shall also be tested to what 
extent living arrangements are associated with how families fulfil their role of a guarantor of actual 
intergenerational solidarity. 
IV.1.1.2.4 Social status reproduction 
Bringing together the material situation of donor and recipient respectively on the one hand and the 
utility from making a transfer on the other, there is another mechanism to explain transfer giving. In 
the context of increasing dualisation of the labour market over time (see chapter III) and thereby 
explained increased poverty among younger adults, differences in living standards between genera-
tions may emerge. Indeed, specific cohorts may be more affected than others by certain broader 
economic and/or policy changes when these happen around the time of labour market entry of 
those cohorts. In such a context of intergenerational differences in living standards, parents may be 
inclined to support their adult children or grandchildren not simply because they are financially in a 
position to do so or because the potential recipients are in acute need of support for some reason. 
Giving also does not need to be motivated by egoism, reciprocity or altruism. Instead, parents may 
worry about downward social mobility of their offspring and to prevent this from happening, they 
make transfers. Albertini and Radl (2012) call this approach to downward intergenerational transfers 
“social status reproduction.” 
This approach considers parents’ intrafamilial transfers as an investment into the socioeconomic sta-
tus of their offspring. Stemming from Breen and Goldthorpe’s (1997) model of educational attain-
ment, one assumption is that members of a certain social class, characterised by educational status, 
will have aspirations towards the educational attainment of their children. For instance, parents with 
high educational status, such as holding an academic degree, will be more likely to consider it both 
desirable or beneficial and also feasible for their children or grandchildren to obtain the same educa-
tion status than will be parents with lower educational attainment. Since it highly correlates with 
living standards, educational attainment can also be considered a proxy for an individual’s socioeco-
nomic situation in more general (Albertini and Radl 2012). Hence, not only will parents with high ed-
ucational attainment face lower marginal costs to make intrafamilial transfers, they will also be more 
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likely to make transfers because the road for their offspring to achieving the educational attainment 
of their parent(s) is longer. Therefore, parents with high educational attainment should be more like-
ly to make intrafamilial transfers to their offspring than are parents with lower educational attain-
ment. 
In a study based on the first two waves of the SHARE dataset including 11 European countries, Alber-
tini and Radl (2012) find support for their hypothesis as parents with higher educational attainment 
are more likely to make transfers and tend to transfer higher amounts. In addition, once the child 
has achieved the same educational attainment of the parent, transfer giving becomes less likely. An-
alysing financial transfers specifically intended for the education of children, Rauscher (2016) reports 
similar findings based on US data. 
IV.1.2 Intergenerational support in the welfare state context 
IV.1.2.1 Crowding in, crowding out, and specialisation 
As discussed above, the welfare state and the family can be considered to take on complimentary 
roles when it comes to the support of individuals. Rather than a mere crowding out of family trans-
fers because of the existence of public transfers, or the crowding in because of the lack of it, social 
policy can provoke a sense of specialisation of support between the two sectors. Brandt and Deindl 
(2013) find that based on the SHARE dataset, higher public expenditure on families does not neces-
sarily lead to a lower occurrence of private intrafamilial transfers. Instead, families may make differ-
ent transfers in accordance with what the government is offering. For instance, where a government 
grants high public pensions, adult children may increase their in-kind transfers to their aged parents. 
Where families receive government support in terms of extensive childcare facilities, aged parents 
may be inclined to support their adult children and grandchildren by financial means instead of 
childcare services. Various other studies have found evidence for this specialisation hypothesis indi-
cating a division of labour between the state and the family (Johansson, Sundström, and Hassing 
2003; Daatland and Herlofson 2003; Motel-Klingebiel, Tesch-Roemer, and Von Kondratowitz 2005). 
Since the specific form of family support appears to respond to the specific government support, it is 
important to understand the context of the countries that are subject to analysis. 
IV.1.2.2 Varieties of familialism and private transfers 
Building on the “Three Worlds of Welfare” of Esping-Andersen (1990), Shinkawa (2013) attempts to 
establish a typology that, different from the “Three Worlds” and Esping-Andersen’s own extensions, 
recognises how de-commodification can come with certain implications for the kind of private sup-
port in cash or kind. With a specific focus on family regimes, Shinkawa (2013) works with only two 
dimensions, “de-commodification” and a notion of “de-familialism”, which considers welfare and 
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family policies that depart from the traditional male-breadwinner bias that would otherwise persist. 
The concept of de-familialism is in that sense similar to Esping-Andersen’s, but Shinkawa uses it to 
introduce “familialism” as a whole fourth family regime type (along with the other three that Esping-
Andersen coined). Here, familialistic regimes are defined by low degrees of both de-commodification 
and de-familialism and Shinkawa finds Japan to be exemplary of this category. Germany, in turn, is 
again categorised as conservative, with a lower degree of de-familialism but higher degree of de-
commodification. The two regime types conservatism and familialism share their cultural and policy 
bias towards maintaining the male-breadwinner model, according to which women would be the 
typical provider of care and household work. Figure 33 shows Shinkawa’s categorisation schemati-
cally. 
Figure 33: Classification of Japan and Germany according to Shinkawa’s (2013) typology. 
 De-commodification 
High Low 
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Though Shinkawa does not make concrete statements on intrafamilial transfers in either cash or kind, 
the implications from his typology become clear once one considers socioeconomics, such as a dis-
tinction between low and high income households. In social democratic regimes, where most social 
benefits and care services are provided through the public sector, reliance on the family as a support 
institution would be relatively low. Therefore, the impact of socioeconomic differences would be 
relatively low. In contrast, conservatism provides various services through the public sector but also 
upholds social stratification through the principle of income and status maintenance and by tending 
to exclude those without full-time employment (or labour market outsiders, see below). The state 
serves as a support institution where the families of those with relatively high (income or socioeco-
nomic) status are more likely to receive replacement support when in need. For those individuals 
with relatively low economic status, however, the government is less generous so that the family is a 
crucial support institution for those persons. In contrast to conservative regimes, institutional ar-
rangements in liberal welfare regimes do not privilege insiders over outsiders. However, liberalism is 
characterised by its generally frugal nature of government-provided services. Therefore, stratifica-
tion implicitly goes by income or wealth, so that whoever is in a weaker financial position may have 
to rely to a larger extent on familial support. Similar to liberalism, familialism heavily relies on the 
family as a provider of support, be it transfers in cash or kind. In familialism, though, due to the low 
level of de-commodification, this applies to most individuals and not just for those excluded from 
the market due to low ability to pay. Considering the typical male-breadwinner nature of familialistic 
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regimes, however, families with low income may experience additional pressure when in need as 
they often depend on a single earner whose income and social security may not be sufficient to pro-
vide for all members. 
Comparing actual intergenerational transfers, both cash and kind, in a welfare-regime setting, Alber-
tini et.al (2007) find such patterns to be broadly consistent with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology 
once a familialistic regime type is included.26 Using wave 1 data of the Study of Ageing and Retire-
ment in Europe, they differentiate intergenerational transfers of time and money in ten countries 
that are usually categorised as conservative (or Continental European), social-democratic (or Nordic), 
or familialistic (or Southern European). One crucial finding is that, as mentioned above and in line 
with other studies (Hank and Buber 2009; Kluge 2009; Kohli 1999b, 2004, 2006; Kohli and Künemund 
2005; R. Lee 2003b; Ogawa, Mason, Chawla, and Matsukura 2010), across age and countries, there is 
a net downward flow of private transfers from old to young. Comparing regime types, and in line 
with the specialisation hypothesis, transfers occur with the relatively highest frequency but lowest 
intensity in the social-democratic countries, while the reverse is the case for familialistic countries 
and conservative regimes fall in the middle of the two. In other words, familialistic countries appear 
to (financially) support their younger or older family members less often, but when they do so, their 
support has a higher average value than that in the other regimes.27 The relatively lower frequency 
of support, though, is largely explained by high levels of coresidence, as the typical way of support-
ing one another happens within the household and often in a non-financial way that many respond-
ents may not consider a transfer when asked (Albertini, Kohli, and Vogel 2007; Albertini and Kohli 
2013; Albertini 2016). In other words, coresidence may be understood to support transfer giving, or 
even be thought of as almost a transfer/support in itself. In addition to coresidence possibly being a 
transfer already, Mason and Lee (R. Lee and Mason 2011) discuss various works with findings regard-
ing a crowding-in effect between coresidence and intrafamilial transfer giving. Combining NTA data 
partly with national surveys, they show that coresidence indeed provokes intergenerational trans-
fers in countries as culturally and economically different from each other as India, Taiwan, Japan, 
and Costa Rica. In the same monograph, Lee and Donehower (2011) summarise in a comparative 
analysis of transfers and residence patterns across countries that: 
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 Albertini, Vogel and Kohli’s paper predates that of Shinkawa, but their typological concepts resemble each other. 
Shinkawa mentions that the Mediterranean countries – which Albertini, Vogel and Kohli call the Southern European type – 
would fall into the category of “familialism.” 
27
 After wave 2, SHARE is no longer including the amounts of transfers but only the existence or absence thereof. Therefore, 
an update of such analysis based on newer date is unfortunately not possible. This data limitation, which in principle also 
regards the equivalent Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement, has to be borne in mind in the context of this work. In the 
appendix, for the available cases, transfer amounts are nevertheless shown in the appendix. 
IV Analysis 2: intergenerational family solidarity 
103 
“In countries with relatively high proportions of elderly co-residing with adult children, intra- household 
transfers to the elderly are greater, and intra-household transfers from the elderly are also greater, as 
we would expect. We also find, however, that in these same countries with high co-residence, inter-
household transfers to and from the elderly are also greater” (R. Lee and Donehower 2011, 199). 
IV.1.2.3 Social care in the welfare state 
While Lee and Donehower focus on financial transfers (despite considering coresidence as a varia-
ble), Daly and Lewis (2000) put in-kind transfers at the centre of their analysis. More than Shinkawa, 
Daly and Lewis (2000) look specifically at types of care and who provides them in different institu-
tional settings. Their term “social care”, according to their concept, “lies at the intersection of public 
and private (in the sense of both state/family and state/market provision); formal and informal; paid 
and unpaid; and provision in the form of cash and services” (Daly and Lewis 2000, p.282). Daly and 
Lewis suggested considering social care as a crucial dimension of any welfare regime since every-
thing builds upon it: paid labour outside the household, for example, is for many individuals un-
thinkable without counting on someone’s care work in the household, including cleaning, shopping, 
childrearing, eldercare and related activities and responsibilities. In an ageing society, the im-
portance of such social care increases. When thinking about gender, social care is important because 
so far, it has typically been women carrying out social care activities (Daly and Lewis 2000; Pfau-
Effinger 2005a; Estévez-Abe and Naldini 2016; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015; 
Sainsbury 2008; Crompton 2006; Boling 2015). An important reason for this gender bias in care is 
path dependency of cultural norms and the design of welfare regimes that tends to go hand-in-hand 
with it (Pfau-Effinger 2005b; Esping-Andersen 1990; Pfau-Effinger 2005a; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, 
and Lappegård 2015; Estévez-Abe and Naldini 2016). In both Germany and Japan, this path led to a 
male-breadwinner welfare and family regime, which, however, has been loosened in recent years, as 
argued above and below (see chapter III). Nevertheless, the female bias in care provision and all 
types of household work persists (Hakim 2002; Pfau-Effinger 2005a; Estévez-Abe and Naldini 2016; 
Boling 2015; Crompton 2006; Sainsbury 2008). 
When splitting social care into childcare and eldercare, Daly and Lewis (2000) find that there is varia-
tion among welfare regimes according to who is mostly responsible for carrying out those tasks: the 
public sector, the family or a voluntary sector.28 Provision through the market is not properly consid-
ered here: private responsibility, as shown in the table, can imply market provision (as is the case in 
the liberal regime for childcare) while at the same time, public responsibility might function in terms 
of cash transfers for care services that will be provided by the market (eldercare in liberalism). Nev-
ertheless, the typology provides valuable insight into the division of responsibilities, which is depict-
ed in figure 34. Familialism delegates both childcare and eldercare to the family while conservatism 
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 This term is borrowed from Daly and Lewis (2000, 282). 
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divides both childcare and eldercare between the family and the voluntary sector consisting of civil 
society organisations such as those affiliated with labour unions (for instance “Arbeiterwohlfahrt” in 
Germany) or religious communities.  
Figure 34: Care responsibilities of institutions across welfare regimes according to Daly and Lewis’ (2000) concept of 
social care.
 29
 
 Social Democr. Conservatism Liberalism Familialism 
Childcare Public Private/civil soc. Private Private 
Eldercare Public Private/civil soc. Public Private 
 
Daly and Lewis’ (Daly and Lewis 2000) empirical analysis, on which the typology is based, includes 
only European countries and does not include important family reforms of the last years. Neverthe-
less, against the background of these tendencies of different regimes, specific institutions in the two 
countries can be discussed. For the following subsections, this typology shall serve as guiding coordi-
nate when discussing institutional and policy developments in the realm of the family as a (social 
and also legal) institution as well as policies of childcare and elderly care. Thus, to understand the 
two countries’ institutional transition paths over the last years and decades, which is discussed be-
low, it shall be assumed that Germany’s (conservatism-influenced) institutions have evolved from a 
strong private/family bias and a voluntary sector that contributes to the provision of welfare (see 
below for a discussion. Those of Japan (rather familialism-inspired, as alluded to by Shinkawa; see 
above) have evolved from a stronger bias towards private (intrafamilial) provision of care services. 
IV.2 Family institutions and policies 
IV.2.1 Family institutions  
IV.2.1.1 Germany 
As is characteristic of conservative regimes, the family has traditionally assumed an important role in 
Germany. Derived from the centuries-old catholic principle of subsidiarity, the first provider of insur-
ance would be the family, the second the Christian Church30 and only third in row would come the 
responsibility of the government (Palier 2010). Equally, the focus on family or household income in-
stead of individual income when calculating benefit entitlements also shows the strength of the fam-
                                                            
29
 Daly and Lewis (2000) use a different terminology, denoting the liberal type as the Beveridgean welfare state, the con-
servative type as Bismarckian, familialism as Mediterranean and social democracy as Scandinavian. Since these terms are 
often used interchangeably and their classification of countries goes hand in hand with the classifications of other works 
that use the respective other terminology, I have chosen the terminology above in the name of consistency within this 
work. 
30
 In the face of economic development and industrialisation the voluntary/community sector of welfare providers grew, 
which would complement and partly replace the welfare role of the Church. This included labour-movement related organ-
isations and additional ones with other affiliations (see for example: Palier 2010). 
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ily as an institution. Filial obligation is legally secured by law and bears a long tradition. Ostner 
(Ostner 2010) notes that: “Until very recently, West Germany obligated husbands and wives, parents 
and children to mutually care for one another for as long as necessary, and anchored this principle in 
law” (Ostner 2010: 220). 
Already the catholic-inspired Bismarckian welfare state had put the family at its centre, a concept 
carried on in the Weimar constitution from 1918. Germany’s Nazi government, not opposing the 
catholic family values in principle, historically stood out with its pronatalist intrusion into familial 
privacy. After the Second World War and upon Germany’s division into East and West, governments 
on both sides were careful to avoid this pronatalism and its fascist connotation, and by rebuilding 
their polities, especially capitalist West Germany gave the family a crucial role in its new welfare re-
gime (Ostner 2010). Breaking with old traditions, East Germany promoted a dual-earner and largely 
gender-equal family model from early on, aiming at mobilizing a possibly large workforce and reach-
ing full employment. Upon childbirth, the mother would withdraw from the labour market only for a 
short time, after which state-provided childcare facilities would take charge of the children. In this 
way, children could be made sure to be taught Socialist ideals and work ethic while women were 
available for employment. West Germany, as noted above, promoted a marriage-based family mod-
el with complementary gender roles consisting of a male breadwinner and a female housemaker, a 
logic supported by tax allowances and moral imperatives (Bosch and Jansen 2010; Ostner 2010). 
Step by step, West Germany relaxed its preferred support of the “nuclear family model”, consisting 
of two married parents and their biological children, introducing parental leave entitlements in the 
1970s, and extending eligibility to up to three years including related pension credits in the 1980s 
(Bosch and Jansen 2010; Fleckenstein 2011; Ostner 2010). 
Upon reunification in 1990, West Germany’s legal and economic system was imposed on former East 
Germany. More than a decade and a half after reunification in 1990, Germany did, however, put the 
role of the family in the whole country on a new footing with a reform package in 2007. The parental 
leave benefit reform was designed as an incentive to realise gender-equal parental leave from the 
labour market, and thereby increasing the labour population. From 2005 onward, the government 
had started to systematically expand childcare by granting a nationwide right to a care facility spot 
to every child from age one 31 (Henninger, Wimbauer, and Dombrowski 2008; BMFSFJ 2017). These 
steps have been considered as a paradigm shift in the German welfare state, moving it, at least in 
terms of family policy, towards the more gender-equal social-democratic model (Palier 2010; 
Henninger, Wimbauer, and Dombrowski 2008). In comparison with other countries, including and 
                                                            
31
 In some federal states, especially in East Germany, however such legal entitlements had been in place already before 
(Kreyenfeld, Spieß, and Wagner 2002; Ostner 2010). 
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especially Japan, Germany’s parental leave benefit (Elterngeld) and other family benefit schemes 
such as child benefits and further packages have been found to be rather generous (Coulmas and 
Lützeler 2011). Parental leave to both sexes is encouraged, offering 67 percent of the job salary for 
twelve months, capped at 1,800€ per month, plus two more months for the other parent (Seeleib-
Kaiser and Toivonen 2011b; Palier 2010). This marked a significant increase compared to the 300€ 
per month that had been granted to parents who took parental leave previously (Kreyenfeld, 
Konietzka, and Böhm 2007).32 
Despite the shifts, which mark a clear trend towards de-familialisation, the central role of the family 
in terms of the provision of welfare continues. Beyond household income as the basis for benefit 
entitlement calculation, responsibilities of support remain: “[I]n Germany, parental obligations—
mostly cash obligations—last till the age of 25 for children in education and forever in the case of 
living-in children of any age who lack means, including the unemployed on the reformed job seeker 
benefit scheme (Arbeitslosengeld II)” (Ostner 2010, 227). Regarding old-age relatives, in turn, the 
familialistic stance has been weakened but in principle remains: “Filial obligations also persist: while 
the German 2001 pension reform abolished children‘s obligation to support their income-poor pen-
sioner parents, they must still pay for the care of their needy elderly parents” (Ostner 2010, 227). At 
the same time, such need for care tends to increase because in a population ageing as fast as Ger-
many’s the share (and total number) of the frail elderly tends to grow rapidly. Regarding the (pri-
vate) provision of care, in turn, one major challenge is that other things being equal and with the 
rising labour participation of women, who have been the typical informal care providers in the past, 
the increasing need for care may not be met with an increasing availability of caregivers. 
IV.2.1.2 Japan 
Before Japan entered the industrial era as a relative latecomer in the second half of the 19th century, 
the family was the centre of “practically all activities” (Suzuki 2013, 70), including production of val-
ue added, care of children, elderly and disabled family members as well as education.33 In line with 
Confucian beliefs, the Japanese family comes not only from a strong tradition but also from one with 
                                                            
32 West Germany had introduced a six-week parental protection regulation scheme in 1952, which was extended to eight 
weeks in 1955. From 1979, working mothers could take six months of paid parental leave. From 1986, a “childrearing vaca-
tion” (Erziehungsurlaub) of ten months with 600 Deutsche Mark per month were introduced, which until 1992 was succes-
sively raised to three years. From 1993, parental (monetary) benefits and parental leave were decoupled and benefits only 
granted up to two years. From 2001, more flexible ways of using parental vacation were introduced, enabling parents to 
receive higher benefits (900 Deutsche Mark) for a shorter period (one year instead of two) and benefits made family-
income contingent (see for example: Kreyenfeld, Konietzka, and Böhm 2007, 437). 
33
 This kinship structure, called ie-system (“ie” being Japanese for house, household or family), was established for the elite, 
the Samurai class, in the Tokugawa shogunate from the early 17
th
 century. In the Meiji period starting in the latter half of 
the 19
th
 century, which abolished Japan’s feudal system, this structure was expanded to more strata of society (see for 
example: Goodman 2005).  
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a clear hierarchy.34 Until the Second World War, the son and his wife were legally subordinate to the 
head of household in the husband’s family line (mostly but not necessarily the father), who could 
make decisions over arranged marriage and inheritance. On the institutional level, this led to a 
strong subsidiarity of family affairs where the state would largely withdraw from this field. Such an 
“East Asian” welfare model has been associated with by-law deference to filial piety, family and kin-
ship as central elements, while the state’s role was mostly restricted to being a provider of educa-
tion (Goodman, White, and Kwon 1998; Peng and Wong 2010). Still today, while many Western Eu-
ropean societies have abolished legal responsibilities within the family, Japan’s Civil Code, Article 
877, requires persons in a lineal relationship, including siblings and under some circumstances also 
third-degree relatives, to care for each other. This regulation is, according to Ogawa et.al (2012) “of-
ten invoked and enforced”, and has created and supported a family culture of “deep sensitivity to 
social approval, a strong motivation throughout life to relieve oneself of indebtedness to others, and 
absolute duties to parents” (Ogawa et al. 2012, 248). Such tendencies have, however, been weak-
ened over the last decades. In an anthropological study of changes in Japanese family patterns in the 
face of ageing, Long (2014) finds that: 
“[T]he industrialization of Japan over the course of the twentieth century undermined the stem family 
system in both urban and rural areas, as most people became more dependent for their future liveli-
hood on the educational system rather than on inheriting the family farm or business. More people 
moved away from their parents’ homes for jobs or for higher education. Corporate workers lived in 
cramped quarters and were sometimes transferred away from their home areas; rural youth migrated 
to cities for jobs” (2014, 186). 
In international comparison, and in line with other East Asian countries, Japanese family structures 
continue to be noted not only for late departure from the parental home, high occurrence of post-
marriage co-residence and co-residence at older ages, relatively high household savings in the ab-
sence of a strong welfare state (though Japan’s savings rate has strongly diminished lately, as shown 
above, and the welfares state has expanded) as well as high family expenditure on children’s educa-
tion and health of the elderly members (Raymo 2014; Peng and Wong 2010). 
                                                            
34
 Confucianism, or Neo-Confucianism, was adopted as state philosophy by the Tokugawa shogunate in the early 17
th
 cen-
tury and among other things helped shape the role of the individual in the family as well as in society (Tucker 2018). Crucial 
ingredients of Confucian social life are the five basic relationship patterns, which are located between 1) king and subject, 
2) father and son, 3) husband and wife, 4) elder brother and younger brother, and 5) the family and its outside relations. 
These links would traditionally help maintain the social order (see for example: Winfield, Mizuno, and Beaudoin 2000; Yum 
1988). Regarding hierarchies, Winfield et.al note that: “In each relationship, the younger, weaker or female members pay 
respect to the older, stronger or male members” (2000, 332). 
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During the decades-long era of almost uninterrupted and high economic growth35, the Japanese wel-
fare state did ease the burden on the family in some ways (notably in terms of spending for elder-
care and to a lesser extent on childcare, as will be discussed below), yet emphasizing the importance 
of the family as an institution in others (by welfare entrenchments such as introducing co-payments 
on healthcare). In terms of easing, as mentioned above, the universal public pension and health in-
surance programs were introduced already in 1961 (Suzuki 2013). On the other hand, in order to 
prevent a strengthening of left-wing movements, the conservative government and the corporate 
sector introduced generous programs mostly, but not exclusively, through so-called firm-specific 
welfare including life-long employment contracts with salaries high enough to sustain a whole family 
even in the working-class.36 Spouses became entitled to corporate welfare benefits, such as health 
insurance and pension schemes, as long as their annual incomes would not exceed a certain amount 
well below that of a full-time employee, disincentivising female full-time employment (Shinkawa 
2013). Such provisions were historically generous and filled, at least for labour market insider fami-
lies with a full-time prime earner, various gaps the welfare state would not touch. On the other hand, 
they also reinforced the male-breadwinner bias even through the corporate sector. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, this strongly familialistic structure was thought to be just a stepping 
stone towards eventually establishing a Western-style welfare state. When the oil crisis hit various 
rich oil-importing countries from 1973, however, the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
blamed the more generous welfare states in the West for the prolonged economic turmoil there. 
Since workers would be demanding ever higher wages with little consideration for the national 
economy, the government suggested, the welfare state should refrain from offering too much. 
Against this background, the LDP declared the “Japanese-style welfare society” in the 1970s, which 
reinforced familialism but this time, rather than being a temporary approach, thought as a perma-
nent state (Miura 2012; Peng and Wong 2010; Shinkawa 2013). Welfare retrenchments were carried 
out. On the one hand, from the 1980s, child-care as well as long-term care regulations for the elderly 
were introduced, with Japan setting a world-wide example to follow in the latter regard (Campbell 
2008). On the other hand, though, healthcare co-payments were introduced in 1982 for the elderly 
                                                            
35
 While economic growth was consistently above 4 percent in the 1970s, Japan entered a recession following the oil shock 
of 1973, after which the economy quickly bounced back to previous growth levels (World Bank 2018). Another recession 
followed in 1982. With the negotiation outcome of the G5 Plaza Accord in 1985, forcing Japan to appreciate its currency, 
the government adopted a low-interest rate policy provoking high economic growth contributing to the inflating of a spec-
ulation bubble (see for example: Fujita and Tabuchi 1997; Obstfeld 2009). In 1985-1989, the average real economic growth 
yielded 5.16 percent until the bubble burst in 1990 (see chapter II). Onwards, growth fell considerably and, in five-year 
average values, has since been oscillating between 0 and 2 percent per year. 
36 While the Employees’ Pension System was designed to cover all workers except for those in the smallest companies, the 
National Pension System was meant to include everyone not covered by an employment-related pension programme (see 
for example: Campbell 2008; also see chapter III). 
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and in 1984 for employees, in addition to a flat-rate tier of employees’ pension schemes (Shinkawa 
2013). These steps exerted financial pressure on the familial household. In the 1980s, amid ad-
vanced population ageing, an increasing female labour participation rate and still insufficient gov-
ernment support for the elderly, a “care crisis” broke out with many families overburdened by their 
increased responsibilities (Miura 2012). 
These steps have initiated an ongoing shift of the Japanese welfare state towards a more liberal re-
gime type (Shinkawa 2013). To ease the thereby induced burden placed on private households, Ja-
pan’s successive governments, mostly in the form of the conservative LDP and up until the current 
Abe administration, have tried to push for more gender equality (Raymo 2014; Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Toivonen 2011b; Shinkawa 2013). Speaking in the vocabulary of Shinkawa’s typology, there have 
been attempts to de-familialise the Japanese welfare regime. But despite increased female employ-
ment, the effects are meagre so far with a still high gender wage gap, a higher share of non-regular 
employment among females and little change in the family roles regarding who provides care 
(Raymo 2014; Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011b; OECD 2015b; Estévez-Abe and Naldini 2016). 
As in Germany, the role of the family as a provider of (intergenerational) support is increasing in Ja-
pan. In turn, to a seemingly stronger extent than in Germany, the capacity of the family in Japan to 
fulfil this role accordingly appears to be under threat. Although (full-time) labour participation 
among women is still relatively low compared to other industrialised countries, there have been no-
table increases over the past decades. At the same time, population ageing is not only more ad-
vanced than in Germany (see chapter II), but there is also more precariousness among younger per-
sons (see chapters II and III). In addition, living arrangements, which are one crucial infrastructure for 
familial support, have been changing at a higher pace and more crucially than in Germany (see chap-
ter II and this chapter). As shown above, the trend towards smaller household size and less occur-
rence of multi-generational households is posing a challenge for the family to fulfil the role of a pro-
vider of support. 
Regarding the role the family can play in terms of intergenerational support, the situation seems crit-
ical: on the hand, amid demographic ageing and increasing financial pressure on the individual, its 
importance appears to be rising. On the other, two important drivers of support, coresidence and 
the financial strength of households, appear to be weakening its potential. 
IV.2.2 Donors’ capability and recipients’ necessity 
IV.2.2.1 Capability 
As mentioned above, one important factor regarding intergenerational transfers, especially regard-
ing financial transfers, is the material capability to give. Next to income, which generally tends to 
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decrease with increasing age (see chapter II), one important factor for this is wealth such as the pos-
session of financial assets and real estate. Of course, home ownership does not in all cases imply 
that someone is leading a wealthy life. Home ownership can be considered to be dependent not only 
on the availability of financial resources but also on non-financial factors such as individual living and 
spending preferences and the opportunity costs compared to renting a dwelling. In addition, the 
value of an owned home may in some cases even be well below the price of a rental apartment so 
that renters may overall be wealthier than homeowners (Mulder and Wagner 1998; Kurz 2004; 
Andrews and Caldera Sánchez 2011). Nevertheless, home ownership shall still be considered here as 
a proxy for wealth in more general.37 The two most important reasons for this are the financial costs 
that buyers of real estate are confronted with and the capital gains that owning a house usually pro-
duces (Kurz 2004). Kurz (2004) finds that intergenerational transfers such as bequests increase the 
likelihood of transitioning into home ownership. Considering housing ownership as a proxy for 
wealth in more general, this relation can also go the other way: he or she who owns a dwelling is 
more likely to be in a position to make transfers. In turn, individuals who do not own housing may be 
more likely to be in a less favourable economic condition. 
IV.2.2.2 Germany 
Various works show that compared to other industrialised countries, home ownership rates in Ger-
many are relatively low, with around 40 percent of all households owning the dwelling they are liv-
ing in (Mathä, Porpiglia, and Ziegelmeyer 2014; Kurz 2004). In East Germany it is even lower than in 
West Germany (Kurz 2004). Analysing data ranging from 1957 to 1993, Kurz (2004) shows that, own-
ership rates of working class households have been relatively high until the 1970s, after which they 
stagnated whereas the ownership rates of households whose principal earners were service workers 
or civil servants continued to increase. Kurz argues that the main reason for the relative decline of 
working class households’ ownership rates is the deteriorated economic conditions marked by lower 
labour security starting with the oil shock in the mid1970s. Throughout the analysed period, house-
holds with self-employed principal earners had the highest rate with slightly more than 60 percent. 
Distinguishing by birth cohorts, it is found that amid a more uncertain economic environment from 
the 1970s onwards, younger cohorts have shown delayed and less frequent transitions into home 
ownership (Kurz 2004). 
Comparing 15 European countries, Lennartz, Arundel and Ronald (2015) find that in addition after 
the 2007-08 global financial crisis, home ownership rates among young adults aged 18-34 years have 
generally declined. Though specific conditions differ across countries, the two most important rea-
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 In the analytical section of this chapter, owning real estate assets will be used as an independent variable. To avoid con-
fusing owners of low-price dwellings with those of high-prices, possession of financial assets will be controlled for. 
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sons for this development are adverse labour market conditions and increased volatility of financial-
ised housing markets. In Continental European countries with a strong rental market, in turn, effects 
of the financial crisis were relatively low. In the case of Germany, while 15 percent of the 18-34 year 
old population had owned a dwelling in 2007, this value only declined by 0.9 percentage points in 
the six-year average of 2007-12. Overall, however, the authors conclude that “these are indeed not 
favourable times for younger adults to move into the owner-occupied sector” (Lennartz, Arundel, 
and Ronald 2015, 32). 
Börsch-Supan et.al (2001) noted at the turn of the millennium that though German elderly persons 
have so far shown high savings rates and thus are accumulating wealth until high age, this pattern 
might change for future cohorts. One important reason for this expectation was pension reforms 
that would shift a considerable proportion of retirement income from pay-as-you-go schemes to a 
funded pillar. Such a reform, which has by now been carried out (see chapter III), is designed to in-
crease saving at younger ages but is also likely to provoke more dissaving at higher age. Another ef-
fect of such a policy is that it marks a clearer socio-economic gradient in terms of how much can be 
saved, and later dissaved. 
Whether younger cohorts are already disadvantaged regarding disposable income at working-age, 
however, is disputed. Atonczyk, DeLeire and Fitzenberger (2010) show that Germany’s male baby 
boom cohorts received higher overall wages than those born before and after them. Boockmann and 
Steine (2006), comparing West German cohorts from 1925 to 1974, show that income returns on 
education investment have decreased over time and cohorts. Lauterbach and Sacher (2001) show 
that men born between 1955 and 1970 are more likely to be in non-regular employment or unem-
ployment than the male 1935-40 birth cohort, though the contrary is the case for women. However, 
Chauvel and Schröder (2015) find that although the baby boomer cohorts have had higher incomes 
than earlier and later birth cohorts, the differences decline once controlling for more variables. In-
cluding variables such as migration background, marital and residential status, education, and having 
children, the cohort effect (5.8 percent more income for the baby boomers) is the smallest one of all 
significant variables. According to their analysis, “after introducing controls, virtually every succes-
sive birth cohort in Germany (…) had increasing disposable incomes, similar to general rates of eco-
nomic growth” (Chauvel and Schröder 2015, 298). 
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IV.2.2.3 Japan 
Compared to Germany, Japan has a significantly higher home ownership rate, which has been at 
around 60 percent of all households (Forrest, Kennett, and Izuhara 2003).38 Forrest, Kennett and 
Izuhara (2003) show that while the home ownership rate of all age groups combined remained con-
stant between 1978 and 1998, there would have been a significant decline without those aged 60 
and above. Due to the older age groups’ overall sizes, as well as their ownership rate increase from 
over 76 to 81 percent, Japan’s overall home ownership rate did not go down in this period. Mean-
while the 35-39 years age group’s ownership rate fell from 58 to 48 percent, that of the 30-34 year 
olds went down from 44 to 29 percent, and that of the 25-29 year olds sank from 27 to 13 percent 
respectively. Forrest and Hirayama (2015) show that this trend continued at least until the end of 
the last decade. Hirayama describes this rather dramatic decline as a departure from “Japan’s own-
ership-based aged society” (2010, 176). By this, he means that home ownership is a main pillar of 
Japan’s welfare system, since households that own the dwelling they are living in face lower monthly 
expenditures, can be a crucial factor to keep families out of poverty. 
Similar to Germany, Hirayama and Ronald (2008) explain the decline in home-ownership rates 
among younger age groups with the liberalisation of the labour market, which has led to a higher 
occurrence of non-regular employment, which for the first time is no longer solely a female phe-
nomenon. In addition, Hirayama names the generally more volatile economic environment and 
“heavier burdens imposed by mortgages and diminishing government support in accessing the own-
er-occupied housing sector” (2010, 179). Against this background, Hirayama argues that: 
“The escalation of inter- and intragenerational inequalities will inevitably unravel the foundations of the 
aged society. Home ownership in contemporary Japan can thus be described as a double-edged sword. 
Owner-occupation will arguably play a more significant role in sustaining a further aged society in the 
future while at the same time property ownership inequalities are likely to affect social solidarity” (2010, 
179). 
Considering disposable income and consumption between 1981 and 2008, Lise et.al (2014) find that 
younger birth cohorts face higher inequality than older birth cohorts. The authors use data from the 
Basic Survey on Wage Structure, the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, the National Survey of 
Family Income and Expenditure, and the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, and compare intra-
cohort inequality in terms of individual wages and earnings, household income, after-tax income, 
and consumption. It is shown that between 1981 and 2008 inequality increased in every way of 
measuring, though less so in terms of after-tax income and consumption, indicating that government 
policy is alleviating the rising inequalities to some extent). Similar to projections for Germany, Curtis 
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 There are, however, notable regional variations with rural areas showing higher home-ownership rates than larger cities, 
ranging from 46 percent in Tokyo to 79 percent in the predominantly rural prefecture of Toyama (Statistics Bureau Japan 
2008). With sharply rising prices of homes in urban areas, this gap widened with the consequences of the bubble economy 
that ended in 1990 (Hirayama 2010, see for example: 2005). 
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et.al (2017) expect the savings rate in Japan to decrease further in the future. Vihriälä (2017), in turn, 
finds that stagnant consumption has led to increasing income-to-consumption ratios, which means 
that assets are becoming relatively more important in financing consumption (see chapter II). Socio-
economic differences pronounce this in an adverse way for those households with lower wealth 
and/or income, which in turn may raise the importance intergenerational transfers especially for 
these disadvantaged groups. Saito (2016) argues that because of increasing liquidity constraints of 
Japanese private households, fiscal policy is becoming more effective in steering consumption. How-
ever, since the government, considering its high debt-to-GDP ratio (see chapter III), is more likely to 
engage in austerity than fiscal expansion in the next years and even decades, private households are 
likely to face higher burdens in the future. 
IV.2.3 Government support for families 
IV.2.3.1 Overview 
It has been shown in chapter III that over time the spending patterns of the welfare state have de-
veloped into different directions. While Germany’s government expenditure has been adjusted to-
wards working-age recipients in the light of demographic ageing, Japan’s fiscal expansion has hap-
pened strongly in favour of the increasing elderly population. One important reason is Japan’s gov-
ernment spending on the basic pension (see chapter III) as well as old-age survivor support. Another 
important difference between Germany and Japan is how the government is supporting working-age 
groups, notably families. Table 17 shows the development of government spending patterns on fam-
ilies39 over the last three and a half decades. In Germany, around 3 percent of GDP has been spent 
on families in total and this value has remained rather constant since the turn of the millennium. In 
Japan, in contrast, welfare state expenditure for families has expanded by more than one third com-
pared to the early 2000s. However, the increase happened from a low level, also in international 
comparison (OECD 2018b). Despite the expansion, Japan’s family expenditure as a share of GDP is 
still only roughly half of that in Germany. In other words, Japan’s private households receive less 
government support than Germany’s so that the role of the family in Japan is by default more pro-
nounced. 
The considerable differences in the generosity of parental benefit schemes between Germany and 
Japan, with the former being more supportive, have been shown in the above sections of this chap-
ter. When considering enrolment of children in formal childcare, another crucial element of the 
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 Family benefits here refer to government-financed schemes that are explicitly directed to families. This includes child-
related cash transfers to families with children, public spending on services for families with children, and financial support 
for families provided through the tax system including tax exemptions and allowances. Social expenditure that benefits 
families but not exclusively families, such as spending on healthcare or housing, are not included (OECD 2018b). 
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state’s engagement in family affairs and the degree of de-familialisation, Germany and Japan hardly 
differ from each other. Enrolment among 0-2 year olds (or 1-3, see remarks below the table) has in-
creased to slightly below 30 percent in both countries. Among 3-5 year old children (or 4-6, see re-
marks below the table), more than 90 percent are enrolled in both countries and the share is even 
higher in Germany. Hence, though public childcare provisions do provide for some degree of de-
familialisation and take some burden off the family, this is not the case for the majority of parents of 
children aged less than three years. In addition, with formal childcare not necessarily being available 
the whole day, many parents may be forced to take over the parental role after daily childcare hours 
are over. 
Table 17: Family policy and childcare, Germany and Japan, percent. 
 
1980-84 av 1985-89 av 1990-94 av 1995-99 av 2000-04 av* 2005-09 av 2010-13 av 
 
Public expenditure on families (% of GDP) 
Ger., cash/serv. 1.83 1.50 2.08 2.04 2.05 1.92 2.14 
Ger., total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.03 2.82 2.99 
Jap., cash/serv. 0.47 0.41 0.43 0.56 0.72 0.85 1.30 
Jap., total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.16 1.36 1.57 
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Enrolment in formal childcare (% of age group)* 
Germany, 0-2 y. n.a. 6.00 16.12 11.87 18.84 28.24 27.49 
Germany, 3-5 y. n.a. 74.00 77.50 83.94 90.40 95.00 96.10 
Japan, 0-2 years n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 23.54 28.17 
Japan, 3-5 years n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 91.08 
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source (unless stated otherwise): OECD (2017c), own calculations. 
* For Germany before 2010, values are taken from Krapf and Kreyenfeld (2013, 37) and refer to enrolment shares of chil-
dren aged 1-3 and 4-6 years respectively. While data there are presented separately for West and East, shares have been 
unified here for the sake of consistency. To do so, percentages have been weighted by the population share of each area 
(West and East) and summed up. It has to be noted here that enrolment rates in East Germany have historically been higher 
than those in West Germany though West German levels have converged to those in the East over time. 
Contrasting the institutionalisation of childcare with that of eldercare, another element of de-
familialisation can be seen. Table 18 shows the share of recipients of two types of long-term care by 
age groups.40 In both countries generally, the population share of those receiving long-term care in-
creases with age. Also, while both countries show a bias towards long-term care provision at the re-
cipient’s home rather than at a care facility, both countries’ occurrence of care provision at home 
has remained constant or become slightly more common over time. The population share receiving 
long-term care at a facility, typically more costly, has stagnated or slightly declined, which is likely to 
be explained by excessive cost as the total numbers of (potential) receivers has increased amid de-
                                                            
40 For Germany, these include recipients of long-term care of all classes 1-3 (including cases of hardship). For Japan also, all 
recipients of long-term care are included (OECD 2017b). 
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mographic ageing. In the beginning of the current decade, long-term care at home has been provid-
ed to about one quarter of the 80+ year olds in Japan. Adding the 9 percent receiving care at a facili-
ty, one third of the 80+ population is receiving long-term care. For the 65+ year olds, this share 
stands at around 13 percent. Both shares are slightly higher than those in Germany: Just over 30  
percent of 80+ year olds receive long-term care, two thirds of which get it at home, and 12 percent 
of the 65+ year olds. Other than childcare, however, the share of long-term care recipients by itself 
does not as easily allow for conclusions regarding how much of a burden is in fact taken off the 
shoulders of family members. The most important reason for this is while every child requires care, 
only elderly whose health imposes significant limitations on their daily activities, need services. Nev-
ertheless, the information provided in table 18 gives an idea as to how common the phenomenon 
eldercare is and how it has been developing over time. The legal provisions for this will briefly be 
discussed in the remainder of this section. 
IV.2.3.2 Care policies in Germany 
IV.2.3.2.1 Eldercare 
Care for both children and the elderly has been commonly described as “new social risks” (Bonoli 
2007; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Taylor-Gooby 2004). New social risks, in contrast to the “old risks” 
that the male-breadwinner family loses its capability to generate labour income, are understood to 
be those risks that have long been neglected by welfare states and reforms. The lack of resources to 
provide care – time or money – is a result of notably population ageing, increasingly unstable family 
settings and labour market insecurity. These changes have given rise to the necessity to rethink care 
Table 18: Eldercare, Germany and Japan, percent. 
 
1980-84 
avg 
1985-89 
avg 
1990-94 
avg 
1995-99 
avg* 
2000-04 
avg* 
2005-09 
avg* 
2010-14 
avg 
 
Recipients of long-term care at home (% of population in age group) 
Ger., of 65+ pop. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.47 7.22 7.00 8.16 
Ger., of 80+ pop. n.a. n.a. n.a. 19.17 18.74 17.78 19.66 
Jap., of 65+ pop. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.07 9.65 n.a. 
Jap., of 80+ pop. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 21.27 24.35 n.a. 
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Recipients of long-term care at facility (% of population in age group) 
Ger., of 65+ pop. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.5 3.84 3.78 3.96 
Ger., of 80+ pop. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.07 12.50 11.94 11.44 
Jap., of 65+ pop. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.90 2.94 2.8 
Jap., of 80+ pop. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.37 8.82 7.92 
OECD Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source (unless stated otherwise): OECD (2017c), own calculations. 
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responsibilities and ease the burden on private households (Kitschelt and Rehm 2006; Miura 2012; 
Bonoli 2007; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). 
In Germany, structural reforms were carried out for both eldercare and childcare (though these 
were not part of one reform package). First came care policies for the elderly, followed by a reform 
of childcare more than a decade later. In 1994, Germany’s then governing conservative-liberal coali-
tion introduced a social insurance scheme for long-term care, replacing the previously means-tested 
and more family-based practice of social insurance by the idea of solidarity and mandatory participa-
tion in the scheme (Cuellar and Wiener 2000; Comas-Herrera et al. 2006). Almost the whole partici-
pation is insured through this pay-as-you-go social care insurance (Soziale Pflegeversicherung), 
though about 10 percent have opted out to be insured through a funded private program (Comas-
Herrera et al. 2006). Contributions are paid as a fixed percentage of labour income and benefits can 
be claimed once a person requires help of at least 90 minutes per day over at least half a year. Such 
basic benefits are not means-tested, but those services that exceed the costs of the benefit pay-
ments are (Cuellar and Wiener 2000; Comas-Herrera et al. 2006). In fact, and according with the in-
formation above of table 18, the care insurance has kept home care a priority over care in an ambu-
latory way or at a care facility. Morel (2007, 632) argues that “the reform was by no means intended 
to reduce the quantity of care provided informally.” Instead, familialism was preserved by making 
informal caregiving more attractive through benefits. Depending on the intensity of care required, 
the benefit level varies and recipients can choose between in-kind benefits, cash or a combination 
thereof, whereas cash benefits can be used to pay family carers. Upon the introduction of the insur-
ance scheme, the share of those using in-kind benefits over cash for home care decreased 84 per-
cent to 73 percent in 2001 (Morel 2007). Table 18 shows, however, that as a proportion of the total 
population of the respective age group, neither those receiving care at home has changed nor that 
of those receiving care at a professional facility. The tendency that family care is more common than 
care at an eldercare facility remains. 
By 2015, the first of three parts of a new “care strengthening law” (Pflegestärkungsgesetz) was 
passed, which was intended to improve and individualise care (von der Heide 2014). The latter two 
parts of the law, which took effect by 2017, are intended to loosen the criteria to be eligible for care, 
expand the scope of services and thereby raise contributions (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 
2016). Rather than changing the paradigm of care, the law is building on previous concepts. As such, 
it has been lauded for being “surprisingly generous” for its improved benefits, though effects remain 
to be seen (Rothgang and Kalwitzki 2015). 
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IV.2.3.2.2 Childcare 
As mentioned above, more paradigmatic shifts in care policy were made in 2005 and 2007 regarding 
childcare, decisively overhauling the previous more modest and male-breadwinner-oriented paren-
tal leave schemes. As discussed above, the 2007 family reform introduced elements that are typical 
of social-democratic welfare regimes such as gender-equal parental leave and an increase in daycare 
facilities also for children below Kindergarten age. As can be seen in table 17, this policy, upon which 
public expenditure on families relative to GDP increased by about 10%, had an effect especially on 
daycare for children aged 0-2 years. On the one hand, enrolment in formal childcare in this group 
almost doubled, but on the other hand the share of such children is still only about one fourth of the 
total population in that age group. In line with Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen (2011a), Henninger et.al 
(2008) argue that although the 2007 family reform was a push towards gender equality by introduc-
ing elements of social democracy, the benefit structure of the law was focused on activating high-
skilled women. According to the argument, the increase in gender equality has since been stratified 
by qualification with low-skilled and low-earning women not benefiting to the same extent from pa-
rental leave as do high-skilled and high-earning women: “As the level of benefit increases with the 
income level, it is above all working parents from the middle and upper income groups that benefit” 
(2008, 297). 
This element of stratification, in fact a fundamental feature of conservative regimes, is relevant for 
both childcare and eldercare. In this context, thus, de-familialisation is stronger where skills and in-
comes are higher. In addition, the previous gender bias in childcare provision tends to be addressed 
to a lesser extent for lower-skilled women because of typical gender wage gaps: since it is the case 
for most parental couples that the male partner has a higher labour income, it appears financially 
sensible especially for women with lower salaries (mostly correlated with lower skills) to take the full 
available time of parental benefit. For women with higher labour income (or skills), in turn, the in-
come difference to the (mostly male) partner can be expected to be lower and therefore the oppor-
tunity costs for either partner would be more similar. 
This tendency, not fully addressed by the reform, still manifests the traditional gender division of 
labour of childcare especially among lower-skilled women. In terms of eldercare, it is a combination 
culture and opportunity costs that maintain the same gender bias. As for culture, the German wel-
fare regime had been strongly favouring informal family-provided care for the elderly over decades, 
which is likely one reason why it has remained the most popular choice since the 1994 reform and all 
its revisions. In addition, the reason why it tends to be women rather than men providing eldercare 
is not only explainable by custom but also by wage level and employment status. As shown above, 
women on average work less hours and paid labour and even earn considerably less when they work 
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full-time, and they are also more often in non-regular employment. This lowers women’s opportuni-
ty costs, compared to men, of taking on family care for the benefits from the care insurance. There-
fore, the current conditions for families in Germany appear to create a trade-off between increasing 
gender equality and solid intergenerational solidarity: the higher skills, income and therefore oppor-
tunity costs are for women in families to provide care, the more difficult it becomes to maintain the 
current regime of intergenerational support. As long as men are not included in care and housework 
activities to an increasing extent, the “double burden” for women of labour work and care work is 
likely to go at the expense of either gender equality or of intergenerational solidarity. At least re-
garding (informal) childcare provision, one possible way to fill gaps resulting from such tension are 
elderly persons, or grandparents, that take on the role of family carers. In the next section, after a 
discussion of care policies in Japan in the following subsection and a brief discussion of attitudes to-
wards care provision, it will be shown to what extent such intergenerational solidarity is taking place 
within the family. 
IV.2.3.3 Care policies in Japan 
IV.2.3.3.1 Childcare 
An environment for crucial care reforms in the field of childcare in Japan emerged in the 1990s. Ja-
pan’s fertility boom in the late 1940s was followed by a steep decline with the total fertility rate fall-
ing from 3.65 in 1950 to 2.04 in 1957. Until 1973, total fertility remained at this level (which is the 
replacement fertility level; see chapter II), 41 after which it steadily declined further. However, this 
trend only was only publicly considered a problem in 1990. This was the year of the “1.57 shock”, 
when fertility had dropped to this value, and the government declared low fertility a policy issue 
(Atoh 2011). Atoh shows that since then, Japan has laid out various family and specifically fertility 
policies, overturning the previous hands-off approach. The “1.57 shock“ was followed by childcare 
legislation from 1992, and from 1995 three waves of the so-called “Angel Plans” aimed at the recon-
ciliation of work and family life. In addition, a parental leave system was introduced as an income-
related scheme, which marked a partial shift away from the traditional male-breadwinner model, 
offering 50 percent of the previous income during the time of parental leave (Seeleib-Kaiser and 
Toivonen 2011b). Though these are notable changes in the Japanese context, in international com-
parison, Japan's financial support for young families is still modest, also relative to Germany 
(Coulmas and Lützeler 2011; Atoh 2011). 
                                                            
41
 An exception was 1966, which in the Chinese zodiac is the year of the fire horse. According to traditional beliefs this 
would be an unlucky year for the birth of a girl. As a result in 1966, total fertility rate fell considerably and approached 1.6, 
after which it increased again until 1973 (see for example: Retherford, Ogawa, and Sakamoto 1996). 
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The modesty of Japan’s family policy can also be seen in table 17, which shows a multiplication of 
public expenditure on families over the last decades on the one hand, but still a significantly lower 
share than that of Germany. Policies such as the Angel Plans and their successive programs have, in 
turn, raised enrolment in formal childcare among those aged 0-2 to a level slightly above that of 
Germany. In 2010, the then liberal government abolished a child-related tax deduction and intro-
duced a universal child benefit for children under 15. However, amid strengthened conservative op-
position two years later, the law was changed into a means-tested benefit two years later though 
the income threshold was high enough to include a large proportion of families (Saraceno 2016). 
Maternity leave, for which only full-time employed women with labour market insider jobs are eligi-
ble, is 14 weeks, to which one additional week of paternal week can be added, though this is also 
only applicable to labour market insiders. Beyond the much shorter period of parental leave com-
pared to Germany, the possibility to take the leave also appears more difficult. As mentioned above, 
though illegal, social pressure at the workplace is often said to make both mothers and fathers re-
frain from taking the leave (Macnaughtan 2015). According to a trade union survey from 2013, one 
in four women has been a victim of so-called “maternity harassment”, or “matahara” in Japanese, 
where women intending to take a leave are criticised for their apparent lack of solidarity with their 
co-workers (Rengo 2013). Mun and Brinton (2015) show that despite legal entitlements in place, 
more than 60 percent of women who are pregnant or recently gave birth exit the workforce alto-
gether instead of taking parental leave. 
The current conservative government, in an attempt to halt the shrinking of the workforce, is trying 
to make full-time work more attractive to women, notably by promising to expand daycare facilities 
for children and by encouraging companies to promote women into management jobs.42 Macnaugh-
tan argues that these attempts are unlikely to succeed as long as the strict labour regime for men, 
which includes long hours and after-work activities with colleagues, is not also addressed 
(Macnaughtan 2015). In line with this, Saraceno (2016) and Estévez-Abe (2013) argue that Japan’s 
childcare regime is still supporting familialism rather than gender equality.43 
                                                            
42
 Holthus (2010) shows that there is a very clear rural-urban divide in terms of the availability of childcare facilities. In ur-
ban areas, there are up to several thousands of children on waiting list whereas in some rural prefectures there are no 
waiting lists at all. Weathers (2016) mentions the same tendencies.  
43
 The campaign, under which the Abe administration tried to promote female employment (Cabinet Office 2013a), 
sparked controversy because it appeared that the government was wishing for women to die. The reason was that next to 
its slogan “Towards a Japan in which women shine” (Josei ga kagayaku Nihon e), the exclamation “shine!” was often and 
prominently used in Roman letters. Read in Japanese, “shine” is the imperative form of the verb “shinu”, or “to die” (see 
for example: Hooton 2014). 
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IV.2.3.3.2 Eldercare 
In the field of eldercare, Japan’s policy development has been more radical. In 2000, the long-term 
care insurance was introduced, a universal mandatory scheme covering 90 percent of beneficiaries’ 
needs (Campbell and Ikegami 2000). Though categorisation of the level of care need is slightly differ-
ent and services can only be received in kind, not in cash, the scheme was initially inspired by Ger-
many’s social care insurance (Campbell and Ikegami 2000; Saraceno 2016). Public expenditure for 
eldercare has since increased ten-fold, and Japan’s system has been considered generous even com-
pared to other OECD countries (Peng 2002; Campbell 2002b; Estévez-Abe and Naldini 2016). The 
broad coverage of formal eldercare is pictured in table 18, though the share of those receiving care 
declined slightly in the last years amid attempts by the government to reduce public costs. For both 
kinds of care, at home and at a care facility, the share of recipients is lower in Japan than in Germany 
in either age group. As in Germany, private care companies are allowed to offer services for both 
home care and institutional care. However, since Japan is not allowing to pay out benefits to recipi-
ents in cash,44 eldercare provided by family members is less common than in Germany and hence, 
eldercare is de-familialised significantly more strongly in Japan (Campbell 2002a; Saraceno 2016). 
The difference in de-familialisation between childcare and eldercare distinguishes Japan and Germa-
ny in an important way. In terms of childcare, Japan continues to be a strongly male-breadwinner-
oriented and familialistic society, even stronger than in Germany, which at least to an extent depart-
ed from the policy emphasis on the male-breadwinner model regarding childcare. Regarding elder-
care, however, Japan’s system of universal long-term care insurance ruling out paid care of family 
members is actively de-familialistic, which is less the case for Germany. For intergenerational solidar-
ity, under the current system, the burden on the family as an institution is eased to a stronger extent 
than in Germany. This would set free time resources for working-age persons, mostly women, to 
participate more strongly in the labour market and generate income to save money for the future or 
support the education of one’s offspring. However, this potential is currently mitigated by a child-
care regime that reinforces the male-breadwinner setting. Considering rising precariousness among 
working-age persons and families, realising this potential, provided by the advantageous eldercare 
regime, is increasingly urgent for at least two reasons. One is to counter the trend of declining 
household income and savings rate, which has been ongoing since the mid-1990s. The other is filial 
obligation to support family members in need, which regardless of long-term care continues to ex-
tend beyond the closest family members and is still invoked by law (Ogawa et al. 2012). 
                                                            
44
 Upon the introduction of long-term care insurance, feminists led by activist Keiko Higuchi lobbied against the payment of 
cash benefits for family member-provided care. Their main worry was that if cash benefits were paid to families, the mon-
ey would likely be misspent while the actual care work would continue to be carried out by the daughters and daughters-
in-law (see for example: Klingholz and Vogt 2013).  
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IV.2.4 Attitudes towards childcare and eldercare  
In order to understand possible intergenerational differences regarding the provision of care, either 
for children or elderly, attitudinal data is a crucial starting point. In the 2012 wave of the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme on the topic “Family and Changing Gender Roles IV“ (ISSP 2016), 
individuals were asked for the first time about their attitudes towards the provision and financing of 
childcare as eldercare as well as more generally about their attitude towards intergenerational (up-
wards) support. Since these data is only available for one cross-section so far, it cannot be distin-
guished between age and cohort nor can a development over time be shown. Nevertheless, it is 
worthwhile to consult the data to get insight into differences across age groups at a given, not-too-
distant point in time. 
Beyond the differences in de-familialism in government expenditure according to policy field and 
country discussed above, there are also stark differences in attitudes towards the provision and fi-
nancing of social care. When confronted with the statement that “adult children are an important 
source of help for elderly parents”, there does not appear to be a strong age gradient in Germany. A 
majority agrees to the statement at both young and old age and the two middle-age groups of 30-49 
year olds and 50-64 year olds. There is a difference in gender, however, with male respondents 
agreeing more often than females throughout all age groups in Germany. With women being the 
more typical providers of care, support or help, one interpretation of this difference is that men tend 
to be generous because it would likely not be them having to provide the help they are asked about. 
In Japan, at least those women in the two middle-age groups are less likely to agree to the state-
ment than men. Notably in Japan, among those aged 16-29 and 30-49, the share of those disagree-
ing among this is almost as high as that of those agreeing. The elderly in Japan are those most likely 
to agree to the statement. 
Confronted with the question “who should provide eldercare?” Respondents in both Germany and 
Japan tend to answer that it should be the family, while the government is the second most popular 
choice, which in Germany is relatively popular among young respondents. In both Germany and Ja-
pan, respondents aged 65+ do by far more expect the family to provide the support compared to 
alternatives such as the government, NPOs or private institutions. Private institutions, in turn, are 
relatively popular among young respondents in Japan. One interpretation is that members of this 
older age group, have distinct attitudes because they were brought up in times with distinct social 
norms, whereas the current (at the time of surveying) members of younger age groups have been 
raised in times when some de-familialising reforms had already been initiated. Hence, this interpre-
tation would hint at a cohort effect. However, since cohort and age cannot be distinguished in a da-
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taset with one single cross-section, this difference may also be due to an age effect (with every co-
hort showing similar attitudes at a given age). 
When asked “who should pay for eldercare?”, there is a clear age gradient in Japan, with the young-
er respondents expecting the government to pay more often and the elderly mostly seeing this re-
sponsibility with the family. This would be consistent with the above interpretation that different 
cohorts were socialised in different times with different political environments. In Germany, most 
respondents expect the government to provide this care across all age groups, though, again, the 
share of those expecting the family to provide for eldercare is highest among elderly respondents. 
The equivalent questions about providing and financing have been asked regarding childcare. With 
respect to the question “who should provide childcare?”, in Germany, young respondents tend to 
see the responsibility with the family although about one third prefers the government as the pro-
vider of childcare. Those most often preferring the government as a provider are those aged 30-49 
and 50-64, hence those who are most likely to be currently in need of childcare. Among the elderly, 
around 40 percent prefer either the family or the government as a provider of childcare. In Germany, 
a notable difference in comparison to Japan is the relatively high popularity of NPOs as childcare 
providers, which mostly refers to the above-mentioned welfare institutions forming a strong part of 
conservative care regimes. In Japan, consistent with familialistic regimes, a large majority prefers the 
family and this share is even slightly higher among those who are under 65 years of age. Among 
young respondents, the share of those preferring the family to provide childcare is notably higher 
among females than males, though this pattern is reversed among those aged 30-49 and 50-64. 
Again, a cohort effect in the face of (albeit weakly) de-familialising policies might be an important 
reason here (though it may also be an age effect, since age and cohort cannot be distinguished here), 
as argued above. 
When asked “who should pay for childcare?”, elderly respondents in Germany see the family more 
often responsible than the younger age groups do. In Japan, a majority in all age groups considers 
the family responsible for providing the cost of childcare. Those aged 30-49 and 50-64, though, have 
a higher share of considering the government to be in charge. 
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Table 19: Attitudes towards eldercare, Germany and Japan, column percent. 
16-29 30-49 50-64 65+ 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Attitude: “Adult children are an important source of help for elderly parents.” 
Germany 2012 (n: 1,766) 
agree 0.68 0.47 0.49 0.36 0.49 0.34 0.61 0.51 
disagree 0.23 0.38 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.44 0.21 0.27 
neither 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 
don’t know 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.06 
Japan 2012 (n: 1,212) 
agree 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.34 0.44 0.40 0.54 0.60 
disagree 0.40 0.34 0.35 0.40 0.28 0.33 0.26 0.21 
neither 0.09 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.16 
don’t know 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 
 
16-29 30-49 50-64 65+ 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Attitude: "Who should provide eldercare?" 
Germany 2012 (n: 1,766) 
family 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.62 0.52 0.56 0.59 
governm. 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.17 
NPOs 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.11 
private inst. 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 
don’t know 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.10 
Japan 2012 (n: 1,212) 
family 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.51 0.57 0.46 0.65 0.60 
governm. 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.14 0.16 
NPOs 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 
private inst. 0.18 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.14 
don’t know 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 
16-29 30-49 50-64 65+ 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Attitude: "Wo should pay for eldercare?" 
Germany 2012 (n: 1,766) 
family/eld. 0.32 0.22 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.27 0.30 0.38 
governm. 0.57 0.64 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.41 
don’t know 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.21 
Japan 2012 (n: 1,212) 
family/eld. 0.31 0.30 0.45 0.33 0.41 0.35 0.55 0.49 
governm. 0.54 0.53 0.43 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.30 0.34 
don’t know 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.17 
Source: ISSP (2016), own calculations. 
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Overall, in Germany and in Japan, older age groups tend to see more responsibilities with the family, 
while among younger age groups the government is relatively more often considered to be respon-
sible. This difference may have consequences for intergenerational solidarity. When the elderly de-
mand intrafamilial support more strongly than the younger, solidarity may be challenged. How these 
attitudes translate into actual actions, however, will be subject to quantitative analysis in the re-
mainder of this chapter. 
Table 20: Attitudes towards childcare, Germany and Japan, column percent. 
 
16-29 30-49 50-64 65+ 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Attitude: "Who should provide childcare?" 
Germany 2012 (n: 1,766) 
family 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.32 0.43 0.29 0.42 0.37 
government 0.34 0.32 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.41 
NPOs 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05 
priv. inst. 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.06 
employer 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
don’t know 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.11 
Japan 2012 (n: 1,212) 
family 0.67 0.79 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.65 0.69 
governm. 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.07 
NPOs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
priv. inst. 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.15 
employer 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
don’t know 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.08 
         
16-29 30-49 50-64 65+ 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Attitude: "Who should pay for childcare?" 
Germany 2012 (n: 1,766) 
family/eld. 0.32 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.31 0.42 0.43 
governm. 0.53 0.64 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.51 0.41 
employer 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
don’t know 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.15 
Japan 2012 (n: 1,212) 
family/eld. 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.50 0.59 0.64 0.65 
governm. 0.36 0.31 0.40 0.44 0.41 0.33 0.28 0.25 
employer 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
don’t know 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 
Source: ISSP (2016), own calculations. 
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IV.3 Research questions, hypotheses, data, variables, and methods 
IV.3.1 Research questions 
In this chapter on intergenerational family solidarity, it has so far been discussed under what materi-
al and institutional conditions, and with what kind of motivations, persons may make intergenera-
tional transfers. In the face of demographic ageing and all the above-discussed challenges that come 
with it, it shall be further investigated in this chapter what the determinants driving intergeneration-
al intrafamilial solidarity are, whether these drivers have been strengthened or weakened over time, 
and whether there are institutional differences between the countries that also make a difference in 
terms of family-level solidarity. 
With these questions in mind, hypotheses are generated below, after which the data sources are 
explained and discussed. While both in-kind and in-cash transfers are discussed below, the analytical 
focus shall lie on financial transfers because of data limitations regarding in-kind transfers. Therefore, 
in-kind or service transfers shall be discussed descriptively only, only they will also be included as a 
control variable in the quantitative analysis of financial transfers. 
IV.3.2 Hypotheses 
It has been shown in this chapter that the family plays a crucial role in intergenerational solidarity in 
both countries. This regards their institutional history especially but is also kept alive through public 
policies, though the specific policies differ across countries. These differences appear to be associat-
ed with the giving and receiving of non-financial transfers as was shown above. Regarding financial 
transfers, other or additional factors may be at play. Against the background of the above, the fol-
lowing hypotheses shall be worked with for the regression analysis: 
1) Hypothesis 2.1: It has been shown above that compared to Germany, poverty rates in Japan 
are higher among younger adults and co-residence is more common, both being determi-
nants of financial transfers according to previous studies. In addition, while the elderly in Ja-
pan eventually turn into net receivers of private transfers according to NTA data, this only 
starts from around age 80 (age group which is not included here). Considering these factors 
together, elderly persons in Japan are expected to show a higher likelihood of making 
downwards financial transfers than those in Germany. It is expected, thus, that country dif-
ferences can be explained by differences in cultural and political institutions. After control-
ling for individual socioeconomic characteristics, however, these differences are expected to 
disappear. 
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2) Hypothesis 2.2: Amid dualisation and the resulting increase in inequality among working-age 
individuals, the risk of downward social mobility appears to be on the rise. Parents of higher 
social status, as measures in wealth and educational attainment, are expected to be espe-
cially worried about this. Because of this and their relatively higher capability to invest into 
their children, parents of high social status are expected to be more likely to make down-
ward financial transfers than other groups. This pattern is expected to hold for both coun-
tries. As children of wealthy individuals are probably less likely in need, controlling for chil-
dren’s economic status the effect may be even stronger once the children’s characteristics 
are accounted for. 
3) Hypothesis 2.3: In both countries, the need for care is expected to increase in years to come. 
In order to ensure a good relation to their children and thus raise the likelihood of receiving 
care from them once in need, reciprocity is expected to be a determinant of downward fi-
nancial transfers. Specifically, having previously received care and having a child living in 
close proximity, is expected to be positively correlated with providing financial transfers. 
This association is expected to hold for both countries. 
4) Hypothesis 2.4: In Japan, as shown in the previous chapter, effective retirement is consider-
ably higher than in Germany, and some parts of the pensions are also paid out only upon 
reaching age 65 (see chapter III). This delay in pension pay-out is expected to be associated 
with lower transfer giving. Hence, for Japan, but not for Germany, it is expected that the age 
group 60-64 shows a lower likelihood to make transfers compared to other age groups. 
5) Hypothesis 2.5: The economic or business cycle, as it can put stress on household finances, is 
expected to have an impact on financial transfer giving. Specifically, in survey years that fol-
lowed an economic recession, the likelihood of financial transfer giving is expected to be sig-
nificantly lower than in other years. This tendency is expected to hold for both years. 
IV.3.3 Data sources and data used 
IV.3.3.1 Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 
SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e) is a longitudinal survey on the life of el-
derly persons aged 50 years and above regarding their financial, health and social situations as well 
as their relations with other persons. Indirectly, SHARE contains information about the respondents’ 
children. The survey has been carried out since 2004 and six waves have been published so far, 
though wave 3 has a different format and is therefore not suitable for this analysis. One merit of 
SHARE is that it is designed to be internationally comparable as it forms a part of the Gateway to 
Global Aging Data platform of the Center for Economic and Social Research at the University of 
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Southern California (CESR 2018). For this work, five waves (2004, 2007, 2011, 2013, and 2015) have 
been appended, originally adding up to 17,410 observations in Germany. 
The sample has been limited to individuals aged 60 to 75 years. The reason is that by this measure, 
intergenerational transfers are most likely to take place between at most three generations. This, 
rather than allowing for four generations and a more complex dynamic between individuals, makes 
it better feasible to connect the theoretical argument with the empirical observations.45 Deleting all 
respondents younger than 60 or older than 75, the sample was reduced by 8,451 observations. Also, 
those respondents who do not have any children were deleted from the sample. The reason is that 
though this means a simplification of the discussion, since persons without children are not analysed 
in a multivariate fashion, intergenerational transfers within the family are less likely to happen at 
least towards younger generations where someone has no own children. Deleting childless respond-
ents, the sample is reduced by 1,075 observations. Deleting further the missing on main dependent 
and independent variables, the sample remains at 7,091 observations and 1,337 individuals. De-
pending on the dependent variable, downward financial transfers or downward or upward non-
financial transfers, the number of observations will vary. The reason is that the survey divides ques-
tioning into household respondents (answering questions on non-financial transfers) and financial 
respondents (answering questions on financial transfers) so that not all questions in the survey are 
answered by the same person but instead, in some cases, are split up between living partners. Vary-
ing by dependent variables, thus, the final numbers of observations are as follows: 4,865 (downward 
financial transfers), 1,910 (downward non-financial transfers), 5,676 (upward non-financial transfers). 
IV.3.3.2 Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR) 
JSTAR (RIETI 2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2017), being designed to be compatible with SHARE 
and the other surveys of the Gateway to Global Aging Data in principle has similar characteristics as 
those of SHARE. The first wave was carried out in 2007, and until now there have been waves repre-
senting four points in time (2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013). Strictly speaking, JSTAR is not nationally 
representative as data are collected at selected locations in Japan. In the first wave in 2007, five cit-
ies of Adachi, Kanazawa, Shirakawa, Sendai, and Takikawa were collected, which represented cities 
of different sizes, locations and living standards. For the 2009 wave, the cities of Tosu and Naha 
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 This step has a pragmatic, an empirical, and a conceptual reason. Pragmatically, in many datasets the oldest individuals 
at old-age are fewer in number so that fully including their age group might lead to biased statistical results. Empirically, at 
least for Japan as shown in the NTA data, transfer behaviour of the oldest elderly individuals is quite distinct from the 
younger elderly. To enable a thorough analysis, focusing on one group within the elderly seems advisable. Conceptually, 
given the sometimes-inexact wording of questions in the surveys used for this work, especially regarding in-kind transfers 
but also financial transfers, it is in parts difficult to clearly distinguish who is the beneficiary of a transfer. Once the sample 
for regression analysis is reduced to the younger elderly, some of the problems are avoided. 
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were added, and in 2011, Chohu, Hiroshima, and Tondabayashi joined. This set of ten cities was 
maintained for the 2013 data collection. 
Once all waves are appended, the original sample, as in SHARE including individuals aged 50 years 
and above, consists of 22,125 observations. Deleting those aged below 60 or above 75, the sample 
was reduced by 7,413 observations. Another 1,478 cases were deleted by not considering childless 
elderly persons. Upon deletion of missing values on main independent and dependent variables, the 
sample counts 12,585 observations and 1,082 individuals. As in the case of SHARE, the number of 
observations varies according to the dependent variable, for the same reason of questioning being 
divided into financial respondent and household respondent.46 Varying by dependent variables, thus, 
the final numbers of observations are as follows: 8,922 (downward financial transfers), 3,901 
(downward non-financial transfers), 11,083 (upward non-financial transfers). 
IV.3.4 Variables 
IV.3.4.1 Dependent variables 
IV.3.4.1.1 Financial transfers 
Regarding financial transfers, the dependent variable is “made financial transfers”. While both, 
made and received, intergenerational transfers are shown below, it will be seen that made financial 
transfers are considerably more common in both countries, which is consistent with the aggregate 
National Transfer Accounts data shown above (see chapter II). Therefore, regression analysis shall 
focus on financial transfers made by (elderly) respondents to their children or grandchildren. The 
dependent variable is binary, hence, it only gives information about the existence of a transfer but 
not its amount. The reason is that SHARE only included the amounts of transfers in waves 1 and 2. 
JSTAR includes transfer amounts, but there are mostly missing values on this variable. Apart from 
this, despite the attempt of both sides to make their respective surveys compatible, comparison is 
faced with limitations given the independent design of each survey.47 
In SHARE, two variables have been combined to construct the dependent variable for this analysis. 
The first one asks: “Not counting any shared housing or shared food, have you or your partner given 
any financial or material support to any person inside or outside this household amounting to 250 
Euro or more?” In a follow-up question, it is asked to whom such a transfer is made. For this work, 
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 In addition to this division, JSTAR suffers from a large number of missing values on the dependent variable of downward 
financial transfers. Upon consultation with the authors of the survey, these values have been deleted. 
47
 As will be shown below various questions are asked in different ways or contain different answer categories. Some ques-
tions, which do appear in one survey, are absent in the other. In addition, since the surveys contain some translation errors 
from the original Japanese version into the English version, researchers without knowledge of the Japanese language face 
additional difficulties. 
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transfers to children, step-children, children-in-law, or grandchildren are included. 48 The second 
question on financial transfers asks: “Not counting any large gifts we may have already talked 
about/since our last interview, have you or your partner given a gift or money, goods, or property 
worth more than 5,000 Euro?” Again, a follow-up question verifies the type of recipient and children, 
step-children, children-in-law, or grandchildren are included. 
Furthermore in JSTAR, two variables are combined to construct the dependent variable that is 
worked with below. The first one asks: “In the past year, did you or your spouse give money for food 
or living expenses to anyone else?”49 If the answer is yes, a follow-up question asks about the recipi-
ent. Respondents giving the answer “child/child’s spouse/grandchild” are included as financial trans-
fers here. The second question asks: “Do you expect to give someone else a gift or inheritance?”50 
Equivalently to the first question, if in the follow-up question it is specified that the recipient is a 
child/child-in-law/grandchild, this is considered a downward financial transfer for the purpose of this 
analysis. Including this variable may appear controversial since it includes inheritances as well as 
planned gifts that are not yet made. However, including this variable is advisable since in Japanese 
culture, the giving of financial transfers typically coincides with festivities and annual occasions. Fi-
nancial gifts form an important part of Japanese familial relations, and excluding this variable would 
mean to underestimate transfer giving and family solidarity.51 In turn, since the variable in the origi-
nal dataset comes together with planned inheritances, there may be a bias towards overestimating 
financial transfers in comparison with Germany where large gifts are included but not necessarily 
bequests (though also not explicitly excluded and no other variable in the dataset asks about be-
quests either). Another limitation regarding comparability is the difference regarding the cut-off 
amount of what is considered a financial transfer. In SHARE, this only starts from 250 Euro and 5,000 
Euro respectively, while in JSTAR no amounts are specified so that this matter is up to the considera-
tion of the respondent. 
The dependent variable for estimations on financial transfer, hence, includes the categories “yes” 
and “no.” With financial transfers being a dichotomous dependent variable, the sample size is re-
duced further because of filters in the datasets, which single out financial and family respondents in 
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 Specifically, this includes the following categories: child, step-child/current partner’s child, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, 
and grandchild. 
49 In the original questionnaire, the question reads: “過去1年間で、回答者（や配偶者）は他の方に食費や生活費を直
接出したことがあるか”. The hereby relevant answer categories for considering an intrafamilial intergenerational transfer 
are: “子供 ・義理の子供・孫”. 
50
 In the original questionnaire, the question reads: “遺産や生前贈与を残す予定はあるか”. The hereby relevant answer 
categories for considering an intrafamilial intergenerational transfer are: “子供 ・義理の子供・孫”. 
51
 This step was decided upon consultation with Rikiya Matsukura, generational economist at Nihon University, Tokyo. For 
further reference on Japanese elderly’s substantial saving for downward transfers, also see Horioka and Niimi (2018). 
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case more than one person per household participated in the survey. To estimate financial transfers, 
only financial respondents are included (see above). 
IV.3.4.1.2 Non-financial transfers 
IV.3.4.1.2.1 Upwards transfers, eldercare 
As discussed above, non-financial transfers my go upwards, with an elderly person being a recipient, 
and downward, which in this case means that an elderly person is making the transfer. Here, non-
financial transfers are private care services. In the relevant questions of the original questionnaires, 
as shown below, formal eldercare provided by family members is not explicitly excluded, so that in 
the case of Germany, family member-provided eldercare for cash benefits may be included in the 
answers. Upwards transfers are therefore eldercare and downwards transfers represent grandchild-
care. Again, both variables are dichotomous, and information about the extent of transfers (hours of 
care, for instance) is in both datasets very limited so that it is mostly disregarded here. 
Regarding upwards non-financial transfers, one question from SHARE is considered, which asks: 
“Thinking about the last twelve months, has any family member from outside the household, any 
friend or neighbour, given you any kind of help listed on this card?” The information to be read out 
from the mentioned card contains: “1. Personal care, i.e. a) dressing, including putting shoes on and 
socks, b) bathing or showering, c) eating e.g. cutting up your food, d) getting in or out of bed, e) us-
ing the toilet, including getting up or down. 2. Practical household help, e.g. with home repairs, gar-
dening, transportation, shopping, household chores. 3. Help with paperwork, such as filling out 
forms, settling financial or legal matters.” Respondents that answered “yes” are considered recipi-
ents of private care. There is one caveat: although a follow-up question asks who was the provider of 
such private care this information is left out for the purpose of this work. The reason is comparability, 
as this information is very limited in the care of JSTAR. 
In JSTAR, the equivalent information comes from three questions. The first one asks: “In the past 
year, have you received any of the following kinds of help from family members, relatives, friends, 
neighbors, etc.: personal physical care, help with housework, filling out documents, or listening to 
concerns and offering advice?” The second one asks: “In the past year have you received help with 
personal physical tasks such as changing clothes, bathing, eating, going to the bathroom, or other 
personal tasks involving physical contact?” Eventually, the third one asks: “In the past year, have you 
received help with household tasks, such as cooking, doing laundry, changing light bulbs, moving 
furniture, shopping, or tending the garden?”52 “Yes”-answers are considered to be care services. Be-
                                                            
52
 In the original questionnaire, the formulation reads: “介護を受けた経験” for the first question, “日常の身の回りの世
話” for the second, and “家事に関すること” for the third question. 
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cause of the scarce information on who provided these care services, however, the decision was to 
refrain from specifying the provider of care and thereby having a larger number of observations. 
The variable that has been constructed on this basis, despite these considerations and compromises, 
still has a share of missing values of around 16 percent. For the descriptive statistics shown below, 
these missing values are not considered. Since the rather high share of missing values is an addition-
al limitation to the quality of the data, no regression analysis has been carried out. Rather, only more 
general associations will be observed. The same holds for upwards non-financial transfers, as is ar-
gued below. 
IV.3.4.1.2.2 Downwards transfers, grandchildcare 
As eldercare, the measures of grandchildcare have to be considered with care as well. In JSTAR, re-
spondents are not asked whether or not they provided childcare or grandchildcare but only how 
many hours or minutes they provided on a normal business day or weekend day respectively.53 In 
SHARE, in turn, the question asks: “During the last twelve months, have you regularly or occasionally 
looked after your grandchild/your grandchildren without the presence of the parents?” The expres-
sion “without the presence of the parents” is not included in the questions of the JSTAR dataset and 
it may be an important difference limiting comparability (and hence lead to an overestimation of 
grandchildcare in JSTAR et vice versa for SHARE). In SHARE, possible answers are “yes” and “no.” If 
“yes” is answered, a next question asks about frequency with the highest frequency being “almost 
every day.” To make the two datasets as much comparable as possible, the newly constructed binary 
variable includes those responses from JSTAR that show at least one hour every day of provided 
childcare. For the 2007 wave, where relevant variable asks about the provision of grandchildcare 
together with errands like “shopping for daily needs”, the cut-off amount of hours has been set to a 
minimum of three hours. The reason for choosing three hours rather than one or two is that this way 
the share of positive responses resembles those of the other waves the most, which appears a plau-
sible approach to provide for comparability. From SHARE, the newly constructed variable includes 
those observations that answered “yes” to having regularly provided grandchildcare, and then “al-
most every day” regarding frequency in the follow-up question. All other answers are considered as 
“no” cases (no regular grandchildcare provided). For SHARE, only grandchildcare to the offspring of 
the respondent’s first three children are included here, so that there may be some degree of under-
estimation of the provision care, though most respondents do not have more than three children. 
Here, the share of missing values is even higher than in the case of received eldercare services (see 
previous subsection), accounting for two thirds of the sample (69 percent for Germany and 63 per-
                                                            
53 In the original questionnaire, the two relevant questions read: “平日に費やした一日あたりの時間: 子どもや孫の世
話 (時)” for weekdays and “休日に費やした一日あたりの時間: 子どもや孫の世話 (時)” respectively. 
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cent for Japan, even upon restricting the sample to those respondents who actually have grandchil-
dren). Nevertheless, descriptive statistics will give some valuable insights into the associations of 
providing transfers and characteristics of the donor and recipients. 
IV.3.4.2 Independent variables 
IV.3.4.2.1 Characteristics of respondent 
It is the attempt to make both surveys as much comparable as possible, which in the case of some 
variables is more straightforward than in others. Unproblematic variables include gender and marital 
status, both of which are presented in a dichotomous manner, “male” or female” and “married” or 
“not married” respectively. Regarding age group, respondents have been divided into three catego-
ries, “60-64”, “65-69”, and 70-75” respectively. On birth cohort group, there are five groups: “1935 
and older”, “1936-1940”, “1941-1945”, “1946-1950”, and “1951-1955.” The variable on educational 
attainment follows the ISCED 1997 framework (OECD 1999). Categories here are: “high school or 
less”, “vocational”, “academic”, and “other/missing.” Regarding self-reported health of the respond-
ent, three categories are included here: “Good or average”, “Not good or poor”, “don't know, no 
answer/missing.” The variable on “working status” asks if the respondent is currently working in re-
turn for monetary compensation, and it is divided into: “Yes”, “Not or temporarily not, “no infor-
mation/missing.” 
More difficult to compare directly are the two variables on wealth. “Real estate assets” is still 
straightforward as both SHARE and JSTAR ask in the questionnaire whether the respondent owns the 
house he or she is living in or whether the respondents owns other real estate. This variable is di-
chotomous with categories “yes” and “no” so that no information on the value of the owned real 
estate is provided. Regarding financial wealth, there are more notable methodological differences 
between the two surveys. In JSTAR, it is asked in four questions whether the respondent or his/her 
wife holds stocks, bonds, fixed income or other securities.”54 In SHARE, in turn, instead of being 
asked whether or not they hold financial assets, the amount is asked.55 Again for reasons of compa-
rability, it has been decided to dichotomise this variable in a “yes” or “no” format. For Germany, the 
cut-off amount above which a respondent is considered to be holding significant financial assets has 
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 In the original questionnaire, the relevant questions read: “自分名義の債券を持っているか”, “自分名義の株式を持
っているか”, “配偶者は預貯金を持っているか”, “配偶者名義の債券を持っているか”, “配偶者名義の株式を持
っているか.”  
55 The two relevant questions read as: “About how much do you and your husband/wife/partner currently have in bank 
accounts, transaction accounts, saving accounts or postal accounts?”, and: “Overall, about how much interest or dividend 
income did and your husband/wife/partner receive from your savings in bank accounts, bonds, stocks or mutual funds in 
the last year? Please give me the amount after taxes.” 
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been set at 10,000 Euro. While this is a somewhat arbitrary value, sensitivity analysis has shown that 
when half the amount is chosen, for instance, results do not change significantly (see appendix). 
IV.3.4.2.2 Characteristics of 1st and 2nd child respectively 
Indirectly through the elderly respondent, both SHARE and JSTAR provide information on the (adult) 
children of those individuals represented in the surveys. For this work, information on the first and 
second child, if applicable, of every respondent has been included. The easily comparable variables, 
following the same logic as those regarding the respondents, include: gender, marital status, and 
education. In addition, a dichotomous variable on having children is included (grandchildren to the 
respondent), consisting of the categories “none” and “one or more.” A variable on the child’s em-
ployment status includes the variables: “full-time employment”, “part-time/irregular/self-employed”, 
“in school or unemployed”, “on leave/carer/housemaker/retired/others”, and “unknown/missing.” 
To shed light on social mobility, a variable on the difference of educational attainment between the 
respondent and the child has been constructed. This includes the categories “parent's education 
higher”, “same level”, “child's education higher”, and “other/no info/missing.” 
The variable on the living proximity between the respondent and the child is more difficult because 
the surveys ask about this information in different ways. In SHARE, proximity is asked in kilometres 
of distance of the respondent’s household and the child’s.56 In JSTAR, answer categories are: “same 
house”, “same building”, “same town/village”, same prefecture”, “different prefecture”, “abroad”, 
“don’t know”, “refused to answer.”57 Here, each survey’s variable is simplified to provide for as high 
a degree of comparability as possible. The categories in the unified sample are named as: “same 
house/same building/ same house or less than 1 km away” (1), “same town/ less than 25km away” 
(2), “same prefecture/different prefecture/abroad/ 25km and more away” (3), “other/missing.” 
Two more variables on the children of the respondents include age group and birth cohort. The for-
mer is divided into the categories “0-29”, “30-39”, “40-49”, and “50+”. The latter, birth cohort, is 
grouped into “1980/younger”, “1975-1979”, “1974-1970”, “1969-1965”, “1960-1964”, “1959/older”, 
and “no info/missing” for the first child. For the second child, it is: “1985/younger”, “1980-1984”, 
“1975-1979”, “1974-1970”, “1969-1965”, “1964/older”, and “no info/missing.” 
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 Answer categories are: “In the same household”, “In the same building”, “Less than 1 kilometre away”, “Between 1 and 5 
kilometres away”, “Between 5 and 25 kilometres away”, “Between 25 and 100 kilometres away”, “Between 100 and 500 
kilometres away”, “More than 500 kilometres away.” 
57 In the original questionnaire, the answer categories read as: “同じ玄関をもつ家”, “同じ建物敷地内”, “同じ市町村内”, 
“同じ都道府県内”, “他の都道府県”, “国外”, “わからない”, “回答拒否”. 
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IV.3.4.2.3 Other variables 
Additional control variables include the year of the survey, and the country. The latter obviously 
consists of the categories “Germany” and “Japan.” The former has the years 2004, 2007, 2009, 2011, 
2013, and 2015. For Germany, however, the survey was not carried out in 2009 so that there are no 
observations for Germany in 2009. The same holds for Japan and the years of 2004 and 2015. Even-
tually, a variable indicating the business cycle has been added to the pooled sample. Taken from the 
World Bank’s database (2018), an average of annual economic growth of each country, representing 
the two years prior to any survey year in the sample, has been calculated. This factor variable is con-
sidered as an indicator for the business cycle of economic boom and bust, which may have an impact 
on transfer giving. 
IV.3.5 Method and analytical strategy 
As mentioned and explained above, because of data limitations, regression analysis is only carried 
out for financial transfers, while non-financial transfers are considered in a descriptive way. In turn, 
non-financial transfers are included as control variables in the analysis of financial transfers. In order 
to test the hypotheses, the datasets from SHARE and JSTAR have been pooled and appended so that 
single individuals are included in the sample several times at different points in time. The dependent 
variable being categorical and the nature of the data longitudinal, a logit random effects logic is ap-
plied to the data. In addition, to get a closer understanding of the association between parental 
wealth and the socioeconomic situation of the offspring, interactions are carried out. 
IV.4 Non-financial transfers 
IV.4.1 Juxtaposition of upward and downwards transfer 
Table 21 shows the occurrence of non-financial transfers in both directions, with the elderly re-
spondents receiving (upwards) and giving (downwards). Two things are important to note in the be-
ginning. Given these limitations, firstly, cross-country comparison has to be taken with great care, 
and secondly, especially grandchildcare in the Japanese sample may tend to be overestimated. Bear-
ing the above-mentioned limitations in mind, a general picture appears to be the following: grand-
childcare on a daily basis is very common in Japan, and not very common in Germany. In turn, elder-
care is hardly common in Japan but more common in Germany. This result appears to be in line with 
the discussions of family and policy institutions above. Regarding childcare, both policy provisions 
and public opinion is leaning more strongly towards the family as a key player compared to Japan. 
Regarding eldercare, the opposite is true at least on a policy level. In Japan, the welfare state is not 
allowing for family members to provide formal eldercare and cash in public benefits for it in return, 
whereas this is possible in Germany. This may be one reason why 21.6 percent of the elderly re-
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spondents in Germany state that they have been provided with eldercare but only 6.4 percent of 
respondents in Japan do so (though it is also possible that Germany’s elderly are frailer). Regarding 
the provision of grandchildcare, the picture is reversed. 63 percent of respondents in Japan state 
they have provided grandchildcare on a daily basis (though the 63 percent of missings or “don’t 
know” answers of the total sample are left out here) while only 15.8 percent of those in Germany do 
(where 69 percent of the total sample have missing values or state “don’t know”). 
Table 21: Provision of grandchildcare and receipt of private eldercare, Germany and Japan, column percent. 
 Germany: provided grandchildcare Japan: provided grandchildcare 
 Total Total 
No 84.24 37.45 
Yes 15.76 62.55 
Total 100 100 
Obs. 1,910 3,901 
 Germany: received private eldercare Japan: received private eldercare 
 Total Total 
No 78.45 93.62 
Yes 21.55 6.38 
Total 100 100 
Obs. 5,676 11,083 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), own 
calculations. 
IV.4.2 Downward transfers, intrafamilial grandchildcare 
Table 22 shows the provision or grandchildcare according to characteristics of the respondents. It 
can be seen that in both countries, it tends to be men rather than women providing grandchildcare 
and that the likelihood or provision decreases with age. In Japan, though, the age group 65-69 show 
a higher likelihood than those aged 60-64, which is probably explained by the higher effective re-
tirement age in Japan. Regarding birth cohort, currently younger cohorts show a higher likelihood of 
providing transfers, except for the youngest in Japan. This is consistent with the pattern regarding 
age groups. Differentiating transfers by year of survey (period), however, shows for Japan that the 
likelihood of providing grandchildcare has decreased over time. This may be explained by population 
ageing in general: as the share of the oldest among the elderly increases, the likelihood of providing 
transfers decreases. This effect cannot be seen in Germany so far, however. Regarding self-reported 
health of the respondent, unsurprisingly, good health is associated with a higher likelihood of giving 
non-financial transfers. 
Table 23 shows the provision of grandchildcare by characteristics of the first child. 58 Similar to self-
reported health, those respondents who have not already received non-financial transfers are more 
likely to provide grandchildcare. Unmarried children, in turn, appear to be more likely to enjoy 
grandchildcare support than those who are married in both countries. Regarding the (adult) child’s 
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 As sensitivity check, the same has been carried out regarding the second child and the results look similar. See appendix. 
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employment status, there is some difference between Germany and Japan. While in Germany, part-
time, non-regularly and self-employed children are relatively most likely to receive support, in Japan 
it is those children who are on leave or housemakers who receive support most often. One reason 
behind this might be that in Japanese families, grandchildcare providing parents tend to come from 
that adult child who is taking over the role of the housemaker. Regarding living proximity between 
the respondent and the first child, closer proximity is clearly associated with a higher likelihood of 
grandchildcare provision. However, it needs to be noted that for Japan, even those children who live 
in a different prefecture or farther away still receive grandchildcare support fairly often, which hints 
at grandchildcare being overestimated by the output from the JSTAR datasets. 
Table 22: Provision of grandchildcare by characteristics of respondent, column percent. 
 Germany: cohort of respondent Japan: cohort of respondent 
 
=<1935 1936-40 
1941-
45 
1946-
50 
1951-
55 Total =<1935 1936-40 
1941-
45 
1946-
50 
1951-
55 Total 
No 90.2 89.67 80.73 81.72 76.85 84.24 40.21 41.22 34.82 34.99 44.8 37.45 
Yes 9.8 10.33 19.27 18.28 23.15 15.76 59.79 58.78 65.18 65.01 55.2 62.55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Germany: gender of respondent Japan: gender of respondent 
 Male Female - - - Total Male Female - - - Total 
No 87.28 81.85    84.24 41.22 33.97    37.45 
Yes 12.72 18.15    15.76 58.78 66.03    62.55 
Total 100 100    100 100 100    100 
 Germany: age of respondent Japan: age of respondent 
 60-64 65-69 70-75 - - Total 60-64 65-69 70-75 - - Total 
No 79.17 82.95 88.50   84.24 35.74 31.63 44.94   37.45 
Yes 20.83 17.05 11.50   15.76 64.26 68.37 55.06   62.55 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
 Germany: year of survey Japan: year of survey 
 2004 2007 2011 2013 2015 Total 2007 2009 2011 2013 - Total 
No 85.64 84.71 88.13 81.38 84.17 84.24 31.14 36.16 38.8 43.82  37.45 
Yes 14.36 15.29 11.87 18.62 15.83 15.76 68.86 63.84 61.2 56.18  62.55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100 
 Germany: health of respondent Japan: health of respondent 
 Good Not 
good 
n.a. - - Total Good Not 
good 
n.a. - - Total 
No 82.96 85.53 85.26   84.24 36.75 40.00 45.45   37.45 
Yes 17.04 14.47 14.74   15.76 63.25 60.00 54.55   62.55 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
Obs.      1,910      3,901 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), own 
calculations. 
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Table 23: Provision of eldercare by characteristics of 1
st
 child, column percent. 
 Germany: respondent received private care Japan: respondent received private care 
 No Yes no info - - Total No Yes no info - - Total 
No 83.78 85.75 84.11   84.24 37.1 47.87 17.65   37.45 
Yes 16.22 14.25 15.89   15.76 62.9 52.13 82.35   62.55 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
 Germany: married 1
st
 child Japan: married 1
st
 child 
 Yes No  No info - - Total Yes No  - - - Total 
No 90.43 82.43 83.84   84.24 45.62 34.53    37.45 
Yes 9.57 17.57 16.16   15.76 54.38 65.47    62.55 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100    100 
 Germany: employment status 1
st
 child Japan: employment status 1
st
 child 
 Full-
time 
Non-
reg. 
School/ 
no job 
Leave/ 
carer 
No 
info 
Total Full-
time 
Non-
reg. 
School/ 
no job 
Leave/ 
carer 
No 
info 
Total 
No 84.41 81.42 88.04 85.98 86.67 84.24 37.79 38.9 40.68 33.54 44.19 37.45 
Yes 15.59 18.58 11.96 14.02 13.33 15.76 62.21 61.1 59.32 66.46 55.81 62.55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Germany: residence distance of 1
st
 child Japan: residence distance of 1
st
 child 
 <1km <25 
km 
>=25 km No info - Total Cores. Same 
town 
Same 
pref. 
No info - Total 
No 63.88 86.51 93.51 84.04  84.24 30.39 30.65 44.42 37.5  37.45 
Yes 36.12 13.49 6.49 15.96  15.76 69.61 69.35 55.58 62.5  62.55 
Total 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100  100 
Obs.      1,910      3,901 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
IV.4.3 Upward transfers, intrafamilial eldercare 
Table 24 shows upwards non-financial transfers by socio-economic characteristics of the respondent. 
What can be seen clearly is that in both countries, it is the older birth cohorts and older age groups 
who are most likely to receive eldercare. The same, to an even stronger extent, is true for self-
reported health. Hence, as much as this can be judged on by providing only descriptive statistical 
output, the clearest predictor for receiving eldercare is health rather than age. Regarding the year of 
survey (period), the same trend that was shown for Japan regarding grandchildcare provision cannot 
be seen regarding eldercare: it appears not to be the case that over time, or in the course of demo-
graphic ageing, the share of elderly respondents who receive private eldercare has been increasing 
over the last years. There may be several reasons for this, for example a change in living arrange-
ments, but descriptive analysis arguably cannot capture this. On gender, in turn, a similar pattern 
can be seen as above in both countries: women are more likely to receive eldercare. One reason 
may be their higher life expectancy compared to men, another may be direct reciprocity as it also 
women who provide grandchildcare more often. 
IV Analysis 2: intergenerational family solidarity 
138 
Table 24: Receipt of eldercare by characteristics of respondent, column percent. 
 Germany: cohort of respondent Japan: cohort of respondent 
 
=<1935 
1936-
40 
1941-
45 
1946-
50 
1951-
55 Total =<1935 
1936-
40 
1941-
45 
1946-
50 
1951-
55 Total 
No 70.99 78.91 77.31 79.34 81.74 78.57 92.46 91.44 94.9 95.77 97.44 94.17 
Yes 29.01 21.09 22.69 20.66 18.26 21.43 7.54 8.56 5.1 4.23 2.56 5.83 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Germany: gender of respondent Japan: gender of respondent 
 Male Female - - - Total Male Female - - - Total 
No 80.65 76.71    78.57 95.42 92.97    94.17 
Yes 19.35 23.29    21.43 4.58 7.03    5.83 
Total 100 100    100 100 100    100 
 Germany: age of respondent Japan: age of respondent 
 60-64 65-69 70-75 - - Total 60-64 65-69 70-75 - - Total 
No 80.91 77.26 77.53   78.57 95.66 95.01 92.28   94.17 
Yes 19.09 22.74 22.47   21.43 4.34 4.99 7.72   5.83 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
 Germany: year of survey Japan: year of survey 
 2004 2007 2011 2013 2015 Total 2007 2009 2011 2013 - Total 
No 74.62 73.94 79.78 80.5 79.69 78.57 94.06 91.28 95.18 95.64  94.17 
Yes 25.38 26.06 20.22 19.5 20.31 21.43 5.94 8.72 4.82 4.36  5.83 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100 
 Germany: health of respondent Japan: health of respondent 
 Good Not 
good 
n.a. - - Total Good Not 
good 
n.a. - - Total 
No 83.65 71.85 73.29   78.57 96.57 86.38 68.75   94.17 
Yes 16.35 28.15 26.71   21.43 3.43 13.62 31.25   5.83 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
Obs.      5,676      11,083 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Table 25: Receipt of eldercare by characteristics of 1
st
 child, column percent. 
 Germany: respondent provided grandchildcare Japan: respondent provided grandchildcare 
 No Yes no info - - Total No Yes no info - - Total 
No 75.64 78.34 80.03   78.57 93.81 95.94 93.5   94.17 
Yes 24.36 21.66 19.97   21.43 6.19 4.06 6.5   5.83 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
 Germany: married 1
st
 child Japan: married 1
st
 child 
 Yes No  No info - - Total Yes No  - - - Total 
No 79.71 77.67 79.77   78.57 94.83 93.91    94.17 
Yes 20.29 22.33 20.23   21.43 5.17 6.09    5.83 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100    100 
 Germany: employment status 1
st
 child Japan: employment status 1
st
 child 
 Full-
time 
Non-
reg. 
School/ 
no job 
Leave/ 
carer 
No 
info 
Total Full-
time 
Non-
reg. 
School/ 
no job 
Leave/ 
carer 
No 
info 
Total 
No 76.45 79.3 82.64 79.38 82.05 78.57 94.78 92.93 94.59 93.53 87.82 94.17 
Yes 23.55 20.7 17.36 20.62 17.95 21.43 5.22 7.07 5.41 6.47 12.18 5.83 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Germany: residence distance of 1
st
 child Japan: residence distance of 1
st
 child 
 <1km <25 
km 
>=25 km No info - Total Cores. Same 
town 
Same 
pref. 
No info - Total 
No 76.33 77.16 78.16 79.73  78.57 95.03 93.89 93.96 96.15  94.17 
Yes 23.67 22.84 21.84 20.27  21.43 4.97 6.11 6.04 3.85  5.83 
Total 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100  100 
Obs.      5,676      11,083 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
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Table 25 shows eldercare provision in association with characteristics of the first child.59 This result 
has to be regarded with care as it is not specified here who the provider of eldercare is (though adult 
children appear to be a likely case). In both countries, similar to the pattern of grandchildcare provi-
sion, it is those respondents who have not provided grandchildcare that are most likely to receive 
eldercare. In both countries, respondents whose first child is unmarried are more likely to receive 
care compared to those whose first child is married. Regarding employment status, parents whose 
first child is working full-time are the most likely to receive eldercare, while in Japan this applies to 
parents whose first child is working part-time, though the likelihoods do not appear to differ strongly. 
Similarly on living proximity, the difference is not marked very strongly. One reason may be that if 
the first child is living far away, another child or family member may provide eldercare. 
Major changes in living arrangements and over the years of the surveys being carried out, thus, ap-
pear to be observable more regarding downwards non-financial transfers than upwards non-
financial transfers. In other words, current trends notably in population ageing and changes in living 
arrangements appear to have an impact on the support adult children and their children receive ra-
ther than on the support elderly parents receive. This, tendency, in turn, appears to be seen more 
clearly in Japan than in Germany. 
IV.5 Financial transfers 
IV.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 26 shows the summary statistics with regard to information on the respondent. On the de-
pendent variable, downward financial transfers, missing values have been omitted since almost all of 
these are systemic missing values explained through filters in the sample according to which per 
household there is only one financial respondent (all other individuals will show missing values; the 
reason for not deleting these observations entirely is that many of those provide information on 
non-financial transfers). Leaving out these missing values, the sample is left with 4,865 observations 
for Germany and 8,922 for Japan, slightly more than 40 percent of which make transfers in Japan, 
which compares to almost 38 percent in the German sample. Regarding upwards financial transfers, 
it can be seen that, consistent with the aggregate output of NTA data, this is not a common pattern 
in either country. Hence, analysis shall focus on downward transfers. The sample being unweighted 
after the deletions mentioned above, we can yet see a rather even distribution across age groups 
with the Japanese sample being slightly older on average, which is also mirrored in the distribution 
age groups and birth cohorts. In both samples, the vast majority is married, though the distribution 
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 Again, as sensitivity analysis, the same calculations have been made for the second child. See appendix. 
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is across gender is rather balanced. A major difference regards educational attainment: in the Japa-
nese sample, more than three quarters only have a high school degree or less, which applies to only 
12 percent of the German sample. In turn, more than half of the sample in Germany has vocational  
training, which only 11 percent in the Japanese sample have. One explanation for this difference is 
the specific circumstances of the post-war cohorts in Japan, for whom university was mostly out of 
reach. This changed significantly with later cohorts as can be seen in the next two tables showing 
summary statistics on the 1st and 2nd child respectively. Regarding wealth, the Japanese sample 
Table 26: Summary statistics, characteristics of respondent, column percent. 
Variable Category Germany Japan 
Financial transfers to children or grandchildren (downwards) No 62.08 59.34 
Yes 37.92 40.66 
Financial transfers from children or grandchildren (upwards) No 96.81 70.38 
 Yes 3.17 9.71 
 Don’t know/missing 0.02 19.92 
Gender Male 50.17 47.7 
Female 49.83 52.3 
Age group of respondent 60-64 35.27 30.16 
65-69 32.19 31.39 
70-75 32.54 38.44 
Birth cohort group of respondent 1935 and older 7.46 8.78 
 1936-1940 22.77 28.41 
 1941-1945 28.35 31.52 
 1946-1950 24.25 26.24 
 1951-1955 17.16 5.05 
Marital status of respondent Married 76.55 82.75 
Not married 23.45 17.25 
Educational attainment of respondent High school or less 12.05 76.62 
 Vocational 55.87 11.17 
 Academic/high skill 31.63 11.9 
 No info/missing 0.45 0.3 
Holding financial assets? None 32.44 12.92 
Yes 60.66 86.25 
Don't know 6.91 0.83 
Owning real estate? None 65.9 33.97 
Yes 24.83 55.65 
Don't know 9.27 10.38 
Self-reported health Good or average 56.3 76.71 
Not good or poor 35.29 22.71 
 Don’t know/no answer 8.41 0.58 
Respondent currently working? Yes  17.02 44.08 
No 81.58 55.72 
No info/missing 1.4 0.2 
Respondent received private care? No 73.81 93.36 
Yes 20.95 6.14 
No info/missing 5.24 0.49 
Respondent provided grandchildcare? No 32.54 15.79 
Yes 5.53 26.43 
No info/missing 61.93 57.78 
Total number of observations  4,865 8,922 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
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shows a higher share on both financial and real estate assets, the background of which has been ex-
plained above. In the case of financial assets, one important reason is the difference between the  
two questionnaires. In the case of real estate assets, the share of home ownership has been found 
to be higher in Japan in other studies already. In a similar way, the share of elderly respondents that 
are still working for pay is considerably higher in Japan. In turn, considerably less respondents in Ja-
pan receive private eldercare, while more provide grandchildcare, as already mentioned above. 
Table 27: Summary statistics by characteristicsof 1
st
 child, column percent. 
Variable Category Germany Japan 
Gender of 1
st
 child Male 52.79 51.58 
Female 44.30 48.42 
No info/missing 2.92 0 
Age group of 1
st
 child 0-29 4.54 2.40 
30-39 31.37 35.91 
40-49 50.11 44.17 
50+ 10.50 5.08 
info/missing 3.47 12.44 
Birth cohort group of child 1980 and younger 10.01 5.51 
 1975-1979 14.08 12.81 
 1970-1974 22.12 25.53 
 1965-1969 24.25 25.73 
 1960-1964 17.76 14.20 
 1959/older 8.30 4.79 
 No info/missing 3.47 11.42 
Marital status of child Married 34.47 31.66 
Not married 55.68 68.34 
No info/missing 9.85 0 
1
st
 child having children? None 23.86 8.11 
Yes 40.41 85.34 
Don’t know/missing 35.72 6.55 
Educational attainment of child High school or less 3.86 40.29 
 Vocational 47.42 22.84 
 Academic/high skill 33.24 33.82 
 No info/missing 15.48 3.05 
Difference of education between 1
st
 child and respondent parent's education higher 12.91 6.69 
same level 46.41 46.48 
 child's education higher 24.93 43.51 
 other/no info/missing 15.75 3.32 
1
st
 child’s employment status Full-time employment 55.60 67.19 
Non-regular employment 19.16 12.55 
School or unemployed 6.76 2.93 
Leave/carer/retired/other 8.04 14.75 
No info/missing 10.44 2.58 
Living proximity of 1
st
 child? <1km/same house 13.32 22.97 
<25km/same town 20.21 25.21 
 =>25km/same country 22.86 51.38 
 No info/missing 43.62 0.45 
Total number of observations  4,865 8,922 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Table 27 and 28 show summary statistics regarding characteristics of the 1st and 2nd child respective-
ly. While the age and birth cohort distributions, as well as those regarding gender and marital status, 
are rather similar between the two countries, one m
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substantially higher in the Japanese sample. Educational expansion over the decades can be seen in 
both countries, with children having higher educational levels than their parents more often than 
not, though this tendency is stronger in Japan. A difference that remains in the educational system is  
Germany’s high share of vocational training, which is explained by the dual system of apprenticeship 
and schooling characteristics of German labour market training. Employment status patterns are 
relatively similar in Germany and Japan, though the share of full-time employment, in this sample, is 
higher in Japan. An important difference regards living proximity between respondent and child. Co-
Table 28: Summary statistics by characteristics of 2
nd
 child, column percent. 
Variable Category Germany Japan 
Gender of 1
st
 child Male 43.45 44.59 
Female 31.72 43.5 
No info/missing 24.83 11.91 
Age group of 1
st
 child 0-29 7.11 4.77 
30-39 32.11 41.52 
40-49 31.39 28.93 
50+ 4.09 1.15 
info/missing 25.3 23.63 
Birth cohort group of respondent 1985/younger 4.75 2.03 
 1980-1984 8.08 7.25 
 1975-1979 14.37 17.25 
 1974-1970 17.41 24.99 
 1965-1969 17.06 18.08 
 1964/older 13.03 8.43 
 no info/missing 25.3 21.97 
Marital status of respondent Married 22.51 33.28 
Not married 25.73 54.66 
No info/missing 51.76 12.06 
1
st
 child having children? None 20.35 40.57 
Yes 27.95 41.1 
Don’t know/missing 51.7 18.33 
Educational attainment of respondent High school or less 3.64 36.82 
 Vocational 37.12 21.45 
 Academic/high skill 24.69 27.3 
 No info/missing 34.55 14.43 
Difference of education between 1
st
 child and respondent parent's education higher 10.48 6.52 
same level 35.52 41.36 
 child's education higher 19.26 37.46 
 other/no info/missing 34.74 14.66 
1
st
 child’s employment status Full-time employment 43.06 59.06 
Non-regular employment 12.58 10.4 
School or unemployed 5.96 2.7 
Leave/carer/retired/other 5.65 14.06 
No info/missing 32.74 13.79 
Living proximity of 1
st
 child? <1km/same house 10.52 19.95 
<25km/same town 16.28 20.87 
 =>25km/same country 18.5 46.79 
 No info/missing 54.7 12.39 
Total number of observations  4,865 8,922 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
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residence or living within close proximity is more common in Japan for both the 1st and 2nd child, 
which can be expected to be associated with stronger transfer giving in Japan. 
IV.5.2 Results of multivariate analysis 
This section shows the results of regressions with the pooled and separate samples of Germany and 
Japan. As in the previous chapter, a stepwise modelling approach is taken to see how the outcome 
variables change once certain variables, which are added to the estimations. The steps of addition 
are straightforward: model 4a only includes three aggregate variables, which are the country dummy, 
the year of surveying,60 and the 2-year average economic growth before the year of survey. In addi-
tion, one individual variable fundamental to any discussion here is included, which is the age group 
of the respondent. For model 4b, individual information on the respondent has been added. These 
first two steps will help scrutinise hypothesis 2.1 (country effect: respondents in Japan showing a 
higher likelihood of transfers than those in Germany, until individual variables are included). Follow-
ing up on these two models, the variables country and age and country and year (dummy) will be 
interacted in order to further scrutinise the effects of these variables. 
Models 4a and 4b also give first hints regarding hypothesis 2.2 (social reproduction: educational at-
tainment and financial and/or real estate wealth having a positive impact on the odds of making 
downward financial transfers in either country), hypothesis 2.3 (reciprocity: those respondents who 
have received a transfer are more likely to make one; and they may make a transfer in order to re-
ceive one back), hypothesis 2.4 (age effect: younger elderly being less likely to make transfers in Ja-
pan, but not in Germany), and hypothesis 2.5 (business cycle: in years of higher economic growth 
during the previous two years, the probability of making a transfer is higher). To scrutinise them 
more closely, however, information on the 1st and 2nd child is added to the pooled sample in model 
5a. Models 5b (Germany) and 5c (Japan), in turn, show country-separate effects of the variables and 
allow rejecting or supporting the hypotheses on a country basis. In additional steps, two decisive 
variables (wealth of the respondent and employment status of the 1st child) are interacted so that 
the effect of their joint appearance can be accounted for. 
Turning to table 29, results of the pooled sample are shown. Model 4a, the most basic model, shows 
a strong country effect with respondents from the Japanese sample having 44 percent higher odds 
than those from the German sample (reference category). There is also a growth effect, which is sig-
nificant at the 99-percent level and shows that a one-unit increase in the 2-year average growth be-
                                                            
60
 For the pooled sample, the year of survey has been dichotomised into those years until 2009 (2004, 2007, 2009) and 
those after (2011, 2013, 2015). The reason is that survey years differ across country: SHARE has been carried out in 2004, 
2007, 2011, 2013, and 2015, while JSTAR has been generated in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013. By dichotomising these years 
(only for the pooled sample) it has been ensured that there are observations in both countries for every category. 
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fore the year of survey is associated with 23 percent higher odds of making a downward financial 
transfer. The age variable shows no significance, and the year dummy only does at the 90 percent 
level (with elevated odds for the years 2011-2015, though this effect might be dampened by includ-
ing the growth variable). 
Table 29: Model 4a-b, pooled data, logistic random effects regression, dependent variable: made downwards intergen-
erational financial transfer, odds ratios. 
  Model 4a Model 4b 
  OR OR 
Country (ref.: Germany) Japan 1.44*** 0.91 
Survey year dummy (ref.: 2004-2009) 2011-2015 1.10* 1.22*** 
Econ. growth (2y-avg. before survey)  1.23*** 1.24*** 
Age group respondent (ref.: 70-75) 60-64 1.03 0.87* 
 65-69 1.05 0.95 
Gender (ref.: male) Female  0.73*** 
Marital status (ref.: married) Unmarried  1.01 
Currently working (ref.: yes) No/currently not  0.97 
No info/missing  1.16 
Education (ref.: academic) High school or less   0.45*** 
Vocational  0.63*** 
 No info/missing  0.44 
Assets real est. (ref.: yes) No   0.23*** 
 Don’t know  0.56*** 
Assets financial (ref.: yes) No  0.60*** 
 Don’t know  0.66*** 
Self-reported health (ref.: very good/good) Not good/poor  0.76*** 
No info/missing  1.27 
Received upward financial transfers (ref.: no) Yes   1.72*** 
No info/missing  3.42*** 
Received private care (ref.: no) Yes   1.41*** 
 No info/missing  0.97 
Provided grandchildcare (ref.: no) Yes   0.93 
 No info/missing  0.88* 
Constant  0.33*** 1.57*** 
lnsig2u  3.43*** 2.48*** 
Number of observations  13787 13787 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
In model 4b, additionally including individual information on the respondent, the effect of the year 
dummy has become considerably stronger (the later years now show 22 elevated odds, compared to 
the early years, at the 99 percent level). In turn, the country effect has vanished, which supports hy-
pothesis 1.1. Model 4b also shows that in the pooled sample, women have 27 percent lower odds 
than men (reference category) to make downward financial transfers, and that those with lower self-
reported health show lower odds than those in good health (reference category). For hypothesis 2.2 
(social status reproduction), there is strong support in the pooled sample. Compared to those with 
an academic degree (reference category), having lower educational attainment lowers the odds of 
making a transfer by 37 percent for those with vocational training and 55 percent for those with no 
more than a high school degree. Wealth is also strongly significant: having no financial assets lowers 
the odds by 40 percent (compared to those who have financial assets, reference category), while 
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having no real estate wealth is associated with 77 percent lower odds (compared to those who own 
real estate, reference category). There is also some first support for hypothesis 2.3 (reciprocity) in 
that having received private care is associated with 41 higher odds compared to not having received 
such care (reference category), and having received upward financial transfers even increases the 
odds of making a downward transfer my 72 percent (compared to not having received an upward 
financial transfer, reference category). 
Figures 35 and 36 show plotted regression results of the interactions of country and age group (fig-
ure 35) and country and year dummy (figure 36) in predicted probabilities. It can be seen that in Ja-
pan, the youngest age group (60-64), many of whom are not yet receiving their pension and still on 
the labour market, have lower predicted probabilities of making transfers than the other age groups 
(this is also shown in model 5c including controls for characteristics of the 1st and 2nd child). In Ger-
many, in turn, no such effect can be seen. This result is further supporting hypothesis 2.4 (age effect). 
Figure 35: Interaction of country and respondent’s age group, dependent variable: made downwards intergenerational 
financial transfer, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: econ. growth, year, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate assets, finan-
cial assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grandchildcare. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Figure 36, showing the plotted interaction results of year and country, Japan indicates considerably 
lower predicted probabilities of making transfers in the years between 2004 and 2009 (which for 
Japan includes values from 2007 and 2009). This range of years includes the time of the global finan-
cial crisis from 2008, which hit Japan’s economy (and Japanese household finances) particularly hard. 
Economic effects on Germany, in turn, were relatively lower. The time between 2011 and 2013 (in-
cluding values for 2011 and 2013 for Japan), in turn, is the time of the 2011 Great Tohoku Earth-
quake, which also triggered a recession. However, this event also provoked widespread donations, 
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which may be one reason the predicted probabilities for Japan are considerably higher in this year 
range. For Germany, in turn, predicted probabilities do not differ greatly. While the first range (cov-
ering 2004 and 2007) for Germany do not include the immediate years of the global financial crisis, 
the years from 2011 have been marked by rather stellar economic growth for Germany. As expected, 
transfers appear to have remained largely unchanged. This result supports hypothesis 2.5 (business 
cycle effect). 
Figure 36: Interaction of country and year (dummy), dependent variable: made downwards intergenerational financial 
transfer, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: econ. growth, age group, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate assets, 
financial assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grandchildcare. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Table 30 shows regression results of models 5a-c, which include information on the respondent’s 1st 
and 2nd child. While only the output for the 1st child is shown, results for the 2nd are mostly the same. 
In the pooled model (5a), the economic growth variable is still significant with almost identical odds 
as in the previous model. This gives further support of hypothesis 2.5 (business cycle effect). The 
other variables also remain mostly unchanged. In turn, regarding information on the respondent’s 1st 
child, model 5a shows that not the 1st child having children is associated with 21 percent lower odds 
that the respondent will make a transfer (the reference category is that the 1st child has one child or 
more). In addition, there is further support for reciprocity shown in the effect of the 1st child’s living 
proximity: the nearer the child lives the higher the odds are that the parent will make a downward 
financial transfer. For instance, compared to those parents whose 1st child live within 1 km distance 
(reference category), those respondents whose 1st child lives in the same town or within 25 km dis-
tance have 23 percent lower odds of making a downward financial transfer. This supports hypothesis 
2.3 (reciprocity) because those children who live far away are less likely to provide non-financial 
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transfers to their parents. Regarding the child’s employment status, only those parents whose 1st 
child is in education or unemployment have higher odds to make a transfer. 
Table 30: Model 5a-c, pooled and separated country data, logistic random effects regression, dependent variable: made 
downwards intergenerational financial transfer, odds ratios. 
  Model 5a  
(pool) 
Model 5b  
(GER) 
Model 5c  
(JP) 
  OR OR OR 
Country (ref.: Germany) Japan 0.80*   
Survey year (ref.: 2007) 2004  0.95  
(model 5a: year dummy, ref: 2004-2009;  
category shown right: 2011-2015) 
2009   0.80** 
2011 1.23*** 0.44*** 0.92 
 2013  1.76*** 0.88 
 2015  1.01  
Econ. growth (2y-avg. before survey)  1.22***   
Age group respondent (ref.: 70-75) 60-64 0.85* 1.11 0.68*** 
 65-69 0.93 1.13 0.85* 
Gender (ref.: male) Female 0.72*** 0.81** 0.65*** 
Marital status (ref.: married) Unmarried 1.04 0.72*** 1.45*** 
Currently working (ref.: yes) No/currently not 0.95 0.92 0.96 
 No info/missing 1.06 1.29 0.61 
Education (ref.: academic) High school or less 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.57* 
Vocational 0.58*** 0.69** 0.74 
 No info/missing 0.08* 0.00 0.43 
Assets real estate (ref.: yes) No 0.23*** 0.54*** 0.07*** 
 Don’t know 0.65** 0.82 0.44** 
Assets financial (ref.: no) Yes  0.60*** 0.53*** 0.61*** 
 Don’t know 0.66*** 0.47*** 0.80* 
Self-reported health (ref.: very good/good) Not good/poor 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.81** 
No info/missing 1.10 0.96 0.33** 
Received upward financial transfers (ref.: no) Yes  1.68*** 2.83*** 1.40*** 
No info/missing 3.42*** 0.00 3.28*** 
Received private care (ref.: no) Yes  1.42*** 1.54*** 1.39** 
 No info/missing 1.33 1.34 0.91 
Provided grandchildcare (ref.: no) Yes  0.94 0.84 0.97 
 No info/missing 0.88* 0.79 0.86* 
1
st
 child’s gender (ref.: male) Female 1.00 1.01 0.93 
 Don’t know/missing 1.13 5.60* - 
1
st
 child married (ref.: yes) No 0.94 0.98 0.96 
 Don’t know/missing 1.30 1.17 - 
1
st
 child has children (ref.: yes) No 0.79** 0.88 0.72** 
 Don’t know/missing 0.54*** 0.60** 0.53** 
1
st
 child’s living proximity (ref.: <1km/same house) <25km/same town 0.77*** 0.96 0.72*** 
=>25km/same country 0.71*** 0.95 0.66*** 
No info/missing 0.73** 1.01 0.80 
1
st
 child’s empl. status (ref.: full-time emp.) Non-regular 1.13 1.22* 1.10 
School/ unempl. 1.43** 1.48** 1.35 
On leave/ carer/other 1.14 1.18 1.18 
No info/missing 0.87 0.96 0.96 
1
st
 child’s education (ref.: academic) High school or less  0.97 1.01 0.87 
Vocational 0.98 1.04 1.07 
No info/missing 0.24 0.00 7.44 
Constant  2.74*** 2.21* 2.73** 
lnsig2u  2.41*** 1.58*** 2.71*** 
Number of obs.  13787 4865 8922 
Controlled for: age gr., children, educ.diff. (c1); age gr., gender, marital, empl. stat, children, educ. , educ.diff.(c2) 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
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Turning to the separate models (5b for Germany, 5c for Japan), some country-specific results appear. 
Firstly, the education variable shows strong effects in Germany (compared to those with an academ-
ic degree, the reference category, those with vocational training and no more than a high school de-
gree have 31 percent and 60 percent lower odds respectively) but not in Japan. In turn, real estate 
assets and financial assets are strongly and highly associated with making transfers in either country: 
in Germany, having no real estate assets lowers the odds of making a downward financial transfer by 
46 percent (compared to those with real estate assets, reference category), while in Japan the ab-
sence of real estate assets is even associated with a 97 percent decrease in the odds. Having no con-
siderable amount of financial assets (compared to those who do, which is the reference category) 
the odds of making a transfer are 47 percent lower in Germany and 39 percent lower in Japan. These 
results give strong support of hypothesis 2.2 (social status reproduction). The positive effects of hav-
ing received private care or upward financial transfers are present in either country, which lends 
support to hypothesis 2.3 (reciprocity). 
Turning to the country-specific effects of the characteristics of the 1st child, living proximity of the 
(1st) child is significant in Japan but not in Germany. In Japan, compared to those respondents whose 
1st child lives in the same building, the odds of those whose 1st child only lives in the same town are 
18 percent lower. Parents whose 1st child live in the same prefecture or country even have 44 per-
cent lower odds of making a downward financial transfer. No such effect can be observed in Germa-
ny. Considering the different policy settings regarding eldercare (Germany allows for family mem-
bers to provide eldercare and receive the benefits in return, while Japan only allows for professional 
non-family providers of formal care), the significant levels of Japan can be interpreted as direct reci-
procity: since family members get no government incentive to take care of their elderly relatives, 
they are being incentivised by the elderly in terms of downward financial transfers. In this sense, 
further support of hypothesis 2.4 (reciprocity) is seen here. In turn, the variable on the 1st child’s 
employment status is not significant in Japan, but it is in Germany: those parents whose children are 
in education or unemployment have 48 percent higher odds of making a transfer compared to those 
whose 1st child is in full-time employment (reference category). Hence, need-based transfer giving 
appears to be present in Germany, but it cannot be observed in Japan. 
To further test the association of the respondent’s as well as the 1st child’s socioeconomic position, 
two interactions are undertaken with the same control variables as in models 5b (Germany) and 5c 
(Japan). Figures 37 and 38 show plotted regression results of interactions between financial wealth 
of the respondent and the employment status of the 1st child (figure 37 for Germany, figure 38 for 
Japan), while figures 39 and 40 show results of respective interactions between real estate wealth of 
IV Analysis 2: intergenerational family solidarity 
149 
the respondent and employment status of the 1st child (figure 39 for Germany, figure 40 for Japan), 
all of which are shown in predicted probabilities. 
In Germany’s case, neither interaction shows observable differences in the predicted probabilities. In 
other words, in combination it does not make a difference whether in a parent-child dyad the parent 
is wealthy or not, or whether the 1st child is in employment or not. This result does not change 
whether parental wealth is operationalised as real estate or financial assets. Without such interac-
tions, however, parental wealth and child’s financial needs both are associated with higher odds 
(compared to the respective reference categories) of a downward financial transfer occurring. 
Figure 37: Interaction of having financial assets and 1
st
 child’s employment status, Germany, dependent variable: made 
downwards intergenerational financial transfer, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: country, econ. growth, year, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate 
assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grandchildcare. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
In Japan, a different picture can be seen: figures 38 and 40 show that in either model, parental 
wealth comes with higher predicted probabilities regardless of the employment status of the 1st 
child. Once parental wealth is provided (either real estate or financial), respondents whose children 
are in education or employment have higher predicted probabilities to make transfers. This is re-
markable since as mentioned above, no transfer amount is included in this estimation but instead, it 
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is only about whether or not a transfer of any amount is made.61 As a comparison between Germany 
and Japan, it can be said that firstly, both countries show support of hypothesis 2.2 (social status 
reproduction). In addition, making downward financial transfers in Japan appears to be more condi-
tional on parental wealth than in Germany. 
Figure 38: Interaction of having financial assets and 1
st
 child’s employment status, Japan, dependent variable: made 
downwards intergenerational financial transfer, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: country, econ. growth, year, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate 
assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grandchildcare. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
                                                          
61
 When a random effects logistic regression is applied, comparing the combinations of categories in the interacted varia-
bles for significant differences, the picture looks slightly different: for Germany, among those respondents with financial 
(or equally real estate) wealth, those whose 1
st
 child is in school or unemployment have significantly higher odds of making 
a transfer than those whose child is in full-time employment (reference category: presence of financial/real estate wealth 
of the respondent and full-time employment of the 1
st
 child). Among those parents without financial (or equally real estate 
wealth), it makes no significant difference what the employment status of the 1
st
 child is. Those respondents without (fi-
nancial or real estate) wealth, in turn, have lower odds of making a transfer compared to those than those with wealth in 
any combination of employment status of the 1
st
 child. In Japan, the results show no significant difference among either 
those respondents with or without financial or real estate wealth as to what the employment status of the 1
st
 child is. In 
turn, as shown above in table 30, it does make a significant difference whether or not the respondent has real estate or 
financial wealth respectively (thus comparing having wealth or not without an interaction with the child’s employment 
status). The significance levels are shown in the appendix. 
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Figure 39: Interaction of having real estate assets and 1
st
 child’s employment status, Germany, dependent variable: 
made downwards intergenerational financial transfer, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: country, econ. growth, year, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate 
assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grandchildcare. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Figure 40: Interaction of having real estate assets and 1
st
 child’s employment status, Japan, dependent variable: made 
downwards intergenerational financial transfer, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: country, econ. growth, year, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate 
assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grandchildcare. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
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IV.6 Discussion 
This chapter has analysed intergenerational level on the family level. Following a discussion of rele-
vant theories and the developments of the immediately relevant social, economic and political insti-
tutions within each country as well as differences between them, quantitative analysis has been car-
ried out. Due to data limitations, the discussion of non-financial transfers could only be made on a 
descriptive level. Random effects Logit modelling has been applied to financial transfers. 
Overall, it has been shown that family solidarity is strong in both countries. Within the scope ana-
lysed here, financial transfers occur mostly downwards, from the elderly to their adult children. 
While upward financial transfers also happen, they are not common. Regarding non-financial trans-
fers, eldercare appears to be more common in Germany and grandchildcare occurs more often in 
Japan. Bearing all data limitations in mind (regarding both the above-mentioned difficulties in opera-
tionalising variables and the lack of information on transfer amounts), it appears that within the 
family, overall, downward transfers occur more often in Japan than in Germany as both downward 
financial and non-financial transfers are found more often. Upward transfers, in turn, happen more 
often in Germany when it is non-financial but more often in Japan when it is financial. This higher 
occurrence of downward transfers in Japan compared to Germany is interesting against the back-
ground of the analysis in the previous chapter on intergenerational solidarity on the societal level as 
well as the structure of the welfare state in each country. In Japan, there appears to be more tension 
between generations on a societal level, but also more downward support across generations in the 
family. 
One interpretation of this pattern is that elderly persons know about their relatively favourable posi-
tion and want to share this with their relatives. Another, more cynical interpretation would be that 
in order to secure the relatively generous support through the welfare state, the elderly give a share 
of it back to younger age groups as a form of appeasement. This latter interpretation, which follows 
a rational choice logic, appears less plausible than the former once one considers the still higher 
poverty share among the elderly compared to younger adults (see chapter II). While the poverty in-
crease in Japan over the least years has been the highest among young adults, the form of sharing 
within the family that has been observed here appears to be solidary, and not strategic, in fact. To 
investigate this more closely, however, further analysis, and more data, would be necessary. 
Regarding solidarity specifically, it could be shown that it tends to be women providing grandchild-
care while it tends to be men providing financial transfers. In turn, women are more likely to receive 
eldercare. In both Germany and Japan, it tends to be the older elderly and especially those who are 
not in good health who receive eldercare more often. Also, the probability of receiving eldercare is 
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higher if the (1st) child is not married. This may hint at reciprocity as respondents are also more likely 
to provide grandchildcare if the (1st) child is not married. Another important factor appears to be 
close living proximity. The closer the respondent and the (1st) child live together, the more likely is 
grandchildcare. In Japan, the group most likely to provide grandchildcare is not the youngest as in 
Germany, but the age group 65-69. It is the same group that is also most likely to provide downward 
financial transfers in Japan. One important reason is likely the longer labour life in Japan. 
On downward financial transfers, it has been found that in both countries there is strong evidence 
for reciprocity, which in the case of Japan (but not in Germany) includes living proximity of parent 
and child. The business cycle appears to be of importance as well. Amid dualisation and rising ine-
quality within (working-age) generations, there has also been found strong evidence for social status 
reproduction in both Germany and Japan. Those parents who are wealthy (with real estate and/or 
financial assets) are more likely to make transfers and once an interaction of parental wealth and the 
child’s labour market position was carried out, the effect still remained significant. In the presence of 
parental wealth, only those children in unemployment or schooling are more likely to receive private 
downward financial transfers compared to those children in full-time employment. Those in non-
regular employment, in turn, receive no preferential treatment although they are strongly disadvan-
taged on the labour market in both countries.62 Especially in Japan, compared to the presence of 
parental wealth, any child’s labour market position in combination with the absence of parental 
wealth comes with a significantly lower likelihood of transfers. In other words, whether or not a fi-
nancial transfer is made appears to depend more strongly on the parent’s situation than the (1st) 
child’s. 
Against this background, the foundation of the family of a network of support, which overall appears 
to be strong in both countries, is facing some considerable challenges. Though the available data for 
the analysis in this chapter only covers time ranges of 11 (Germany) and 6 years (Japan) respectively, 
which does not allow for far-reaching conclusions, the combination with the descriptive statistics 
provided further above at least allows pointing to some such challenges ahead. In an environment 
where (real estate and financial) wealth (especially in Japan) appears to be the most important indi-
cator for financial transfers, it is a worrying outlook (especially for Japan) that currently younger 
birth cohorts appear to have less wealth compared to their predecessors. This may hint at a lower 
likelihood of downward (financial) transfers in the future. In addition, living proximity between par-
ents and children, which is significant in Japan for financial transfers and important for both coun-
                                                            
62
 Unfortunately, both SHARE and JSTAR lack information on the spouse/partner of the respondent’s child. The spouse of a 
respondent’s child, who is in non-regular employment, may be a labour market insider in full-time employment. In such 
cases, it is not straightforward to interpret the child’s labour market status as an indicator for low social status and a possi-
bly precarious financial situation. 
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tries for non-financial transfers, has been changing towards fewer three-generational households 
and lower proximity over the last decades (see chapter II). If this trend continues, this may have an 
adverse effect on transfer giving (possibly financial and most likely non-financial). Such an effect 
would likely be felt more strongly in Japan where firstly, grandchildcare (and non-financial transfers) 
is more common and co-residence in living in close proximity has been more typical. 
The family as a network of support has been shown to be of crucial importance in both countries. In 
the light of demographic ageing and increasing need for support, individuals help each other across 
generations in both financial and non-financial ways. The family, hence, seems to be capable of car-
rying the considerable burden that comes about amid population ageing. Especially regarding finan-
cial transfers, however, such support comes with a challenge. Financial solidarity takes place more 
often where the parents dispose of wealth, in other words, it takes place considerably less often if 
the elderly parents are not wealthy. Since the social status of parents tends to be strongly associated 
with the social status of their children, financial family solidarity appears to exclude those who 
would need support the most urgently: adult children who are not successful on the labour market 
and also have parents that are not wealthy. This socioeconomic dimension of family solidarity is a 
challenge to social solidarity as a whole. In a scenario where the welfare state is on the retreat and 
the burden on the private household is becoming heavier, which considering the demographic de-
velopments in both countries appears likely to happen, a further familialisation of intergenerational 
solidarity comes as a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it integrates generations and indeed 
eases the increasingly heavy burden on public finances (especially on a family level). On the other 
hand, however, it may contribute to increasing intragenerational inequality as some important in-
tergenerational support is not available to all strata of society. This constellation, in turn, may affect 
solidarity across the whole of society. 
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V Conclusions 
V.1 Summary and discussion of main findings 
V.1.1 General summary 
This study has investigated how intergenerational solidarity evolves in the light of demographic age-
ing, accounting for institutional, economic and political influences. As has been discussed in the in-
troduction, no consensus has been reached on whether and to what extent population ageing is as-
sociated with intergenerational conflict. One reason for the lack of agreement has been different 
working definitions of the terms conflict and solidarity, another has been the often one-dimensional 
analysis of the topic. In an attempt to make a substantive contribution to this strand of literature, 
intergenerational solidarity here has been considered in a two-dimensional sphere consisting of the 
societal and the family level. This analysis has employed data from attitudinal surveys from Japan 
and Germany (ISSP, SHARE and JSTAR) in order to include the crucial element of demographic ageing 
and the evolution of intergenerational relations being a dynamic process over time. 
In the subsections below, results for the two country cases of this study, Germany and Japan, will be 
discussed, after which these findings will be placed in the context of the two-by-two matrix that was 
proposed at the end of chapter II. As alluded to in the introduction, the findings of this study are or 
will be relevant for a much broader set of countries. If the 20th century was the era of population 
explosion, the 21st century will be that of demographic ageing. With more than half of the world’s 
population living in countries of below-replacement level fertility today, and the projection of this 
share rising to more than two thirds by 2040-2050 (UN 2017), the vast majority of the world will face 
challenges similar to those of ageing societies such as Germany and Japan today. Understanding 
these cases, thus, contributes to understanding the intersection between demographic ageing on 
the one hand and political, economic and social life on the other. 
V.1.2 The case of Germany 
As has been shown at length in this study, Germany’s population is projected to continue its process 
of demographic ageing. As the share of old-age dependents is rising, dualisation on the labour mar-
ket has been becoming continuously more apparent while at the same time the pension system has 
turned out to be financially unsustainable. While the government’s age-wise spending composition 
is today favouring old-age recipients, this tendency has been weakened over time. Hence, in the face 
of demographic ageing, Germany’s welfare state has adjusted its priorities towards non-old age 
groups. Though the welfare state has become more liberal in terms of both the pension system (no-
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tably by incentivising private saving and raising retirement age for most types of workers) and the 
labour market, spending on new social risks and families has been increased over time. Over the last 
years, Germany experienced rather stellar economic growth and the government has lately tended 
towards consolidation in fiscal terms. 
In this broader political and economic context, intergenerational solidarity, in fact, has strengthened. 
On the societal level, across age groups and social strata (here measured as employment status, ex-
tracted from WVS) only a small minority thinks that “Older people get more than their fair share 
from the government.” Based on ISSP data, considerably more than half of the population prefer 
more government spending on old-age. Despite the financially unsustainable pension system (or be-
cause of it) the share of those preferring more old-age expenditure has increased over the past 20 
years (from 1996 to 2016). Lately, compared to earlier waves of ISSP, it has been young age groups 
who show most support of more old-age expenditure. 
Regarding (labour market) insiders and outsiders, Germany has shown a (implicit) preference-wise 
coalition between outsiders and retirees, while their antagonists are (labour market) insiders: out-
siders and pensions show significantly more support for higher old-age spending compared to insid-
ers. This finding suggests outsiders tend to associate increased old-age expenditure with something 
they would stand to gain from in net terms (equal to retirees), while for insiders the costs (of a high-
er tax burden and so on) would outweigh possible benefits. Ironically in this sense, other things be-
ing equal, more precarisation (or stronger and more widespread dualisation) would appear to 
strengthen overall intergenerational solidarity. At the same time, however, an amplified intragener-
ational conflict would likely be a result of such a tendency. 
However, only considering the latest results of Germany (the changes from the ISSP wave of 2006 to 
that of 2016) insider-outsider effects disappeared. In fact, preferences for more old-age spending 
have risen across age groups and social strata. Certainly, a decrease in intragenerational inequality 
cannot be the reason for this preference convergence because no such convergence in incomes has 
taken place (rather the contrary has happened amid dualisation). In contrast, one explanation for 
this convergence is that in the context of both relatively solid public finances and stellar economic 
growth over the last years, as well as the prospect of (otherwise) increasing old-age poverty, there 
just appears to be a more general social consensus over the desirability of strong intergenerational 
policies (towards old-age). In addition, Germany has in the past successively lowered the level of 
pension payouts while private saving has been encouraged, both of which tends to pose a financial 
burden to private households (see chapter IV). 
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On the family level as well, findings for Germany show strong intergenerational solidarity. In general, 
as shown in terms of NTA data, the elderly are net receivers of public transfers but net donors of 
private transfers (in financial terms). In addition (based on the SHARE datasets), more than one third 
of the elderly aged 60-75 with grandchildren in Germany indicate to have made downward financial 
transfers in the previous one year. Almost one fourth of elderly respondents (with grandchildren, 
aged 60-75) indicate to have regularly provided grandchildcare. In turn, 15 percent have received 
private eldercare. Regarding these findings, no tendencies of decline of downward financial transfers 
can be shown. Rather, the opposite appears to be the case (though some of the increase in more 
recent years appears to be explained by macroeconomic circumstances such as economic growth). 
While intergenerational solidarity on the family level appears strong and robust, a clear socioeco-
nomic gradient can be seen. Not only mechanisms of reciprocity but also social status reproduction 
can be observed. Rather than on the living conditions of the child, whether or not downward finan-
cial transfers occur is determined by the parents’ socioeconomic status. Wealthy respondents have 
significantly higher odds of making transfers than those who do not own real estate or financial as-
sets. In other words, while the family is a network of support that its members can often rely on, 
some types of members can only do so to a lesser extent than others. For those persons who are 
disadvantaged by the welfare state (for example as outsiders) and do not have wealthy family mem-
bers (or none at all) the family as an institution does not appear to be as strong a network of support. 
This latter point of social stratification in terms of family solidarity is a challenge that Germany is fac-
ing today and likely will be in the future. Considering the overall strong support for more govern-
ment spending on the societal level, however, Germany at least has favourable conditions to enact 
supportive policies to address this problem. In addition, the need for intergenerational policies is 
also growing because of the increasing number of childless and/or single elderly who cannot draw 
on the family as a network of support to the same extent as those elderly persons with children 
(and/or a spouse) can. 
V.1.3 The case of Japan 
Compared to Germany, Japan’s population has been ageing even faster and is projected to continue 
to do so. Confronted with the challenge of a quickly growing population of elderly dependants, Ja-
pan’s welfare state has over the last decades expanded on a major scale, most of the resources of 
which have been dedicated to old-age expenditure. At the same time, Japan’s labour regulations 
have been loosened and spending programmes on families and new social risks have, despite in-
creases over time, remained considerably more modest than respective schemes in Germany. In the 
meantime, and partly provoked by government policy, Japan has experienced considerable tenden-
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cies of dualisation. As in Germany, the growing population of (labour market) outsiders is strongly 
disadvantaged by the welfare regime with lower incomes and lower expected pension payouts. 
Since the burst of a speculation bubble in the early 1990s, Japan’s economic growth has mostly been 
below the government’s expectations and especially in the last years, government debt has risen to 
levels previously unseen. 
In this context, intergenerational solidarity on the societal level has been weakened over time. Based 
on WVS data, a considerable part of the Japanese population thinks that “Older people get more 
than their fair share from the government.” And while based on ISSP data slightly more than half of 
all respondents prefer increases in government spending on old-age (when one considers the aver-
age of all waves together), this share has consistently fallen over time and stood at only 46 percent 
in the 2016 wave. This is a trend that points to the opposite direction compared to Germany. 
In addition, a clear age effect has emerged in Japan. While preferences were considerably more simi-
lar in 1996 and also 2006, a strong cleavage is found in the 2016 wave. There is also a strong cohort 
effect with later birth cohorts showing significantly less support for further increases in old-age gov-
ernment spending compared to earlier cohorts. This notably regards those birth cohorts who en-
tered the labour market after the burst of the speculation bubble in the early 1990s and thus were 
fully exposed to an increasingly dualistic labour market. 
In the sense of Mannheim’s concept, these persons who entered the labour market in the post-
bubble era thus show important characteristics of a political generation: they have a common source 
of discontent (an unstable labour market and an unsustainable pension system paired with govern-
ment debt levels so high that there appears to be little room for manoeuvring for the government) 
and, compared to other groups of society, form a common interest regarding intergenerational poli-
cies. Among those birth cohorts born between 1971 and 2000, support levels for more government 
spending on old-age range between 33 (1981-1990) and 39 percent (1991-2000). Conversely, gov-
ernment spending on old-age does not appear to be a policy issue that is associated with certain po-
litical persuasions. The variable of political persuasion (considering oneself as left, centre, right, or 
nothing) is not significant in Japan (whereas it is in Germany, with left-of-centre individuals showing 
more support for increases in government spending on old-age). 
In a similar light, as the absence of such a “political gradient”, also no outsider effect can be ob-
served in Japan. Hence there is no significant difference between (labour market) insiders and out-
siders regarding their preferences on increases of old-age expenditure. This is remarkable since, 
similarly to Germany, outsiders in Japan are strongly disadvantaged by the welfare regime at both 
levels, intragenerational as well as intergenerational. One interpretation of this finding is that the 
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intergenerational disagreement is so strong that labour market outsiders and insiders appear to find 
it equally unfavourable to raise old-age government expenditure (although, as shown in chapter II, 
the elderly still have the highest poverty risk in Japan, and later birth cohorts will likely face similar 
problems). 
On the family level, this tension appears to be eased in light of strong intrafamilial solidarity. Accord-
ing to NTA data, the elderly in Japan are net receivers of public transfers but until high old-age re-
main net donors of private (downward financial) transfers. Similar to and apparently even more 
strongly than in Germany, about 40 percent of Japanese elderly respondents indicate to have made 
downward financial transfers in the respective years before surveying.63 Considerably more often 
than elderly respondents in Germany, 63 percent of those in Japan are also regularly providing 
grandchildcare. In turn, 6 percent are receiving private eldercare. 
Over time, while in Germany the shares mostly remained constant across years of surveying, the 
shares of Japanese respondents regularly providing childcare has fallen steadily from 69 percent in 
2007 to 56 percent in 2013. The share of those receiving private eldercares appears to have re-
mained constant, at low levels, between 6 and 5 percent. In other words, though the observed time 
range is rather short (to date, JSTAR has covered the years 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013), there ap-
pears to be a shift in the direction of non-financial transfers with relatively less flowing from old to 
young (grandchildcare). In terms of downward financial transfers, in turn, no significant change over 
time can be observed though the correlation with economic growth is significant (with increasing 
average growth during the two-year period before surveying the likelihood of transfers increases). 
A similarity with Germany is Japan’s clear social stratification in intergenerational solidarity on the 
family level. Regarding downward financial transfers, wealthy parents show higher odds than those 
who are not wealthy. As in Germany, mechanisms of reciprocity and social status reproduction ap-
pear crucial to intergenerational solidarity on the family level. In times of dualisation, again, this pat-
tern shows one major problem when social solidarity is left to the family: those most likely to benefit 
do not appear to be those most likely to be in need but rather those who are lucky to have family 
members with the right socioeconomic characteristics. 
In contrast to Germany, social stratification in the family sphere appears difficult to be levelled out 
on the societal level in Japan. Public support for more government spending on old-age has been 
falling and a considerable part of society thinks the elderly are already getting more than their fair 
share. Partly, this appears to be explained by the heavy old-age bias of the welfare state while the 
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need for support has also been increasing among younger age groups. For social solidarity, the de-
velopments in Japan clearly show strong challenges lying ahead: the public shows increasingly less 
excitement for supporting a growing population of elderly, while the family as an institution does 
not appear capable of supporting all members in either direction, (age-wise) upwards or downwards. 
In turn, with lower levels of wealth among later birth cohorts in Japan, the capability among the el-
derly of the future to support the rest of the family may also decrease. Though the data do not allow 
showing such an effect in a multivariate fashion today, such challenges may be approaching if the 
observed trends continue. 
V.1.4 Classification into typology of intergenerational solidarity 
V.1.4.1 Criteria for classification 
At the end of chapter II, a two-by-two matrix of intergenerational solidarity has been proposed. How 
can Germany and Japan be positioned in this matrix? For classification, an explorative approach has 
been taken,64 the results of which are shown in figure 41 and details are discussed below. 
The societal solidarity dimension includes the overall support for increases in old-age expenditure as 
well as its age gradient (based on ISSP data). The same two measures are included regarding the 
perception of intergenerational fairness and the fair share that old people are receiving from the 
government (based on WVS data). Regarding family solidarity, while both financial and non-financial 
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Figure 41: Classification of Germany and Japan into matrix of intergenerational solidarity. 
 Country classifica-
tion 
Germany Japan 
 
Societal level 
solidarity 
Overall share of persons preferring increases in old-age expenditure 55% 53% 
Age gradient in preference for increases in old-age expenditure  -8% -10% 
Overall share of disagreement to statement that “Old people get more than 
their fair share from the government” 
92% 37% 
 Age gradient of disagreement to statement that “Old people get more than 
their fair share from the government” 
-5% -12% 
 Classification strong weak 
    
 
Family level soli-
darity 
Overall occurrence of downward non-financial transfers 16% 63% 
Overall occurrence of upward non-financial transfers 21% 6% 
Overall occurrence of downward financial transfers 38% 41% 
 Classification strong strong 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
WVS (2014), ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
On preferences for old-age expenditure, West and East Germany have been grouped together (because for final classifica-
tion, regions are not considered). Regarding the two measures of age gradient, the difference between those aged less than 
65 and those aged 65+ has been calculated. Thus, negative values indicate that the respective outcome referred to is higher 
among the old-age group (compared to the non-old). 
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transfers are included, flows in both directions are only included for financial transfers.65 On both 
dimensions the average values of all available survey waves have been calculated (though for VWS 
there is only one). Thus, no development over time is considered in this matrix but rather the overall 
picture of the years analysed. 
Turning to societal solidarity first, it can be seen that over the three survey waves combined (1996, 
2006, 2016), slightly more than half of the sample in each country shows a preference for more gov-
ernment spending on old-age. Also in both countries, there is an age gradient with younger persons 
showing less support for spending increases than older persons. Regarding the questions whether 
“Older people get more than their fair share from the government”, the picture differs considerably. 
Both the age gradient (younger persons disagreeing to the statement more often) and the overall 
share of disagreement are considerably higher in Japan than in Germany. Based on these outcomes, 
with considerable disagreement regarding attitudes in Japan (across age and overall regarding the 
statement on intergenerational fairness), Japan has been classified into “weak solidarity”. Germany, 
in contrast, where differences are considerably smaller, has been classified into “strong solidarity.” 
There is further support for this classification once the development over time (regarding policy 
preferences based on ISSP) is taken into account: as shown in chapter III, the tendency that older 
persons show more support for old-age spending disappeared in Germany (in fact in the 2016 wave, 
this age gradient reversed, with younger persons showing more support for increases in old-age ex-
penditure compared to older age groups). In Japan, in contrast, an age gradient emerged (with 
younger persons showing significantly less support than older persons in the 2016 survey). Also 
overall, the share of those preferring more government spending on old-age increased in Germany 
but decreased in Japan. Thus, while societal solidarity in Germany is strong, it can also be said that it 
has been strengthening. In Japan, ceteris paribus, societal solidarity has been weakening. 
When classifying countries in terms of family solidarity, it needs to be taken into account that to 
provide (intergenerational) support requires considerable effort and sometimes sacrifice (different 
from indicating attitudes or preferences). In other words, percentage values well below 50 percent 
can still indicate a considerable level of solidarity. Bearing this in mind, results for Germany (showing 
the average values of the SHARE waves of 2004, 2007, 2011, 2013, and 2015) indicate that intergen-
erational solidarity is a common phenomenon in both directions. Overall, 16 percent of elderly in 
Germany respectively have made downward non-financial transfers (grandchildcare) and 38 percent 
have made downward financial transfers respectively. 21 percent of the elderly have received up-
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ward non-financial transfers (private eldercare). Overall in Japan (showing the average values of the 
JSTAR waves of 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013), even 63 percent of elderly respondents have provided 
downward non-financial transfers (grandchildcare) and 38 percent have made downward financial 
transfers. Regarding upward non-financial transfers, only 6 percent of respondents have received 
such services (private eldercare). Against this background, though there are relatively lower down-
ward non-financial transfers in Germany (compared to Japan) and lower upward non-financial trans-
fers in Japan (compared to Germany), the overall picture still shows that intergenerational transfers 
are common in both countries. Thus, both Germany and Japan are classified into “strong solidarity” 
in the family dimension. 
Again considering developments over time, there is further support for this classification. When 
comparing the first and the last year of survey in each country, there are mostly only slight changes. 
Regarding the provision of upward non-financial transfers (private eldercare), values have almost 
remained constant. In Germany (between 2004 and 2015), occurrence decreased by 5 percentage 
points while in Japan the decrease (between 2007 and 2013) yielded 2 percentage points. Regarding 
the provision of downward non-financial transfers (grandchildcare), there was a modest 2 percent-
age point increase in Germany but a 13 percentage decrease in Japan. The occurrence of downward 
financial transfers (compared to 2007 in both countries), in turn, showed significant increases for 
Germany in 2011 and 2013, while it showed no significant changes in Japan. In other words, while 
the overall level of intergenerational intrafamilial transfers appears to be relatively lower in Germa-
ny compared to Japan, there were some increases in Germany (downward financial transfers) and 
some decreases in Japan (downward non-financial transfers) over time. Overall, the family appears 
to be a strong network of support with transfers continuing to be a common phenomenon in both 
countries across most categories hereby observed. 
V.1.4.2 Results of classification 
Reconsidering the matrix proposed at the end of chapter II, as shown in figure 42, the following cat-
egorisation has resulted from the analysis. Germany, with strong societal solidarity and strong family 
solidarity, shows a strong basis for further intergenerational policies. In the logic of this outcome, 
there appears to be a favourable environment for addressing the challenges that have been dis-
cussed in this study (such as a growing elderly population, increased poverty risk, an unsustainable 
pension system). In Japan, in turn and following this stylised terminology, societal solidarity is weak 
but family solidarity is strong. There appears to be, thus, weakened potential to address the chal-
lenges the country faces in the light of demographic ageing, which are highly similar to those in 
Germany (a further growing proportion of old-age dependents, increasing precariousness at all age 
groups, an unsustainable pension system). 
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V.1.4.3 Limitations of classification 
It has to be noted that these classifications contain by no means all that is important regarding the 
results of this study. For instance, the above-discussed cohort effects are not accounted for, and the 
age gradients are highly stylised due to dichotomisation (old vs. non-old). Also, this typology is blind 
to social stratification: no wealth or outsider effects are included. In general, typologies as the one 
shown above contain a considerable degree of generalisation and can at best be a rough approxima-
tion to the real developments. 
There are at least three important reasons why such categorisations are running at risk of simplifica-
tion. Firstly, several important developments are unified in one dimension. Secondly, since intergen-
erational relations are fundamentally a dynamic phenomenon, especially once it is considered in the 
light of demographic ageing, developments over time have to be considered for both dimensions, 
which is not easily possible in such a representation. Thirdly, dichotomising the two dimensions into 
strong and weak inevitably simplifies matters (already because no medium state is considered). 
However, considering the two dimensions as two extremes of a continuum, which would theoretical-
ly be preferable, would require quantifying and weighting all of their elements. Such a step, in turn, 
would appear to be equally prone to simplification. Bearing these qualifications in mind, however, 
the results do summarise important parts of the results of this study and especially allow showcasing 
some notable differences that have appeared in the two countries. 
V.1.4.4 Final considerations 
With the above in mind, the overarching research questions, posed at the end of chapter I, shall be 
very briefly reconsidered. The first one asked under what conditions population ageing is associated 
with weakened intergenerational solidarity. Based on the two countries studied here, it appears that 
government finances and the sustainability of pensions, as well as dualisation and the resulting pro-
spect of future old-age poverty risk, play an important role in the fate of societal level solidarity (as 
observed in Japan). On the family level, however, solidarity is secured by means of intimate relation-
ships. The case of Japan, which shows weakened societal solidarity, may be extreme given its very 
fast population ageing and unprecedentedly high government debt levels. In this regard, Germany, 
where challenges are similar but important policy and economic tendencies are reversed, points in 
the opposite direction. 
Figure 42: Matrix of intergenerational solidarity, potential for solidary policies. 
 Family level 
Strong Weak 
 
Societal 
level 
Strong Strong basis for intergenerational policies (1) – 
Germany 
Welfare state can compensate for lack of family 
support (3) 
Weak Little potential for intergenerational policies 
(2) – Japan 
Open intergenerational conflict, collapse of soli-
darity (4) 
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The second research question asked under what conditions the family as an institution may mitigate 
or resolve challenges to solidarity that are taking place on the societal level. While it has been shown 
for both countries that the family does serve as a bulwark against frictions in society, the element of 
social stratification, again, is important to note. Reciprocity and social status reproduction, much 
more than the financial need of the child, have been found to be important drivers of downward 
financial transfers from elderly parents to (adult) children. In other words, one important determi-
nant of solidarity is the wealth of the donor. This indicates that not everybody is participating in soli-
darity in the same way, which in principle poses a policy challenge in both countries. 
The third research question asked whether weak intergenerational solidarity and strong intergenera-
tional solidarity have to be understood as mutually exclusive scenarios or whether it may be possible 
that both coexist. Provided the typology hereby proposed and the results obtained within its coordi-
nates, it could be shown how both strong and weak solidarity across generations can be present at 
the same time. It has also been shown how the often used term generational conflict can be thought 
of as a special scenario of intergenerational relations. The concept of intergenerational conflict here 
is used with caution in that it simultaneously requires weak levels of solidarity in both the societal 
and the family sphere. Following this logic, neither Germany nor Japan is experiencing an intergen-
erational conflict today. Considering the dynamics observed in this study, however, especially Japan 
may be moving towards such a scenario of conflict if current trends continue. 
V.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
V.2.1 Limitations 
This study comes with a number of limitations. Though various sources of descriptive data (NTA, 
WVS, ISSP) have been used and in addition, longitudinal (JSTAR, SHARE) and repeated cross-sectional 
formats (ISSP) have been analysed in a multivariate fashion, important questions remain unan-
swered. It would be desirable to have a longer time series or a higher number of repeated cross sec-
tions. This would not only allow a better understanding of developments over time, but also a clear-
er distinction of effects of age, period, and cohort. While data on the past is unlikely to be newly 
generated, future survey data will alleviate this problem. Other limitations of the data regard their 
quality. Starting with ISSP, additional questions regarding the role of government would be helpful. 
For instance, it would be insightful to analyse conceptions of intergenerational justice (for the analy-
sis of which, in the course of this study, WVS had to be consulted, as discussed in chapter III). Re-
garding SHARE and JSTAR, challenges appear to be considerably stronger. Though these datasets 
(and all those under the umbrella of Global Aging Data) are designed to be compatible, comparabil-
ity is in fact limited. Various questions are asked in slightly (but importantly, as discussed in chapter 
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IV) different ways, which compromises analytical scrutiny. In addition, surveys have so far not always 
been carried out in the same years, which is another limitation to comparability. In addition, high 
shares of missing values on important variables have been a drawback: most notably, information on 
the amounts of transfers in both financial and non-financial terms is unfortunately scarce. 
V.2.2 Suggestions for further research 
Other limitations of this study are also related to the scope of this study (and can only partly be ex-
plained by data constraints). For instance, although some distinctions have been made within Ger-
many (East and West), this analysis has not focused on regional differences within the two countries. 
As is well-known, rural and urban areas tend to be affected by demographic ageing in different ways. 
Some of the indicators by which they can be expected to differ include living arrangements or living 
proximity between parents and children, (real estate) assets, or educational attainment. Such differ-
ences may picture, especially on the family level, different patterns of intergenerational solidarity. 
Such regional differentiations could be researched in future studies. 
Another suggestion for future research, based on the matrix of intergenerational solidarity suggest-
ed in this study, regards to investigate paths and mechanisms of transition of countries within the 
typology. In other words, what are typical evolutions of intergenerational solidarity depending on 
economic, political and institutional developments over time? In a similar logic, studies have already 
analysed the transition of welfare regimes (see for example: Bosch and Jansen 2010; Seeleib-Kaiser 
2002; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). For related analysis in this case, it would help to include a 
larger set of countries in order to understand more general patterns. 
Including more countries into the comparison would be worthwhile in more general. Considering the 
data used for this study, this would indeed be feasible. Those countries that have both, longitudinal 
surveys following the concept of Global Aging Data (2018) as well as ISSP (2018), include to date: 
further European countries from the SHARE dataset, the US (Health and Retirement Study), England 
(English Longitudinal Study of Aging), Mexico (Mexican Health and Ageing Study), India (Longitudinal 
Aging Study in India), South Korea (Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging), and China (China Health and 
Retirement Longitudinal Study). Such a comparison on a larger scale would certainly allow gaining 
more general insights, and thereby also put the results of this study at a test. 
Besides including more countries, another way of enriching analysis would be to include more di-
mensions. Especially, it would be worthwhile to more closely study intergenerational policies that 
are directed towards young age. Though population ageing is essentially about the increasing share 
of old-age dependants, a fuller picture of intergenerational relations should also include an inquiry 
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into public support for young dependants. In this work, though this part has been included, it has not 
been at the centre of analysis. 
On the basis of the results of this study, in addition to all the above, it would be especially interesting 
to investigate the connection between public debate (or discourse) and intergenerational relations. 
For despite the explanations for the evolution of intergenerational relations that were offered here, 
there emerges a new puzzle: after all, why did Germany experience such a strong upwards shift in 
preferences for old-age expenditure overall and even across age groups and social strata (the word-
ing of the survey question remained unchanged)? Important explanations could be found in public 
debate and dominant narratives of what demographic ageing means for a society. To investigate this, 
stakeholder interviews and content analyses of (mainstream) media and parliamentary debates as 
well as political party agendas may be a useful approach. The link between public debate or domi-
nant narratives and policy change has been assumed to be direct in other intergenerational policy 
fields. For instance, Henninger et.al (2008) and Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen (2011a) have argued 
that Germany’s 2007 family reform could be realised because public debate had opened a window 
of opportunity for an overhaul. In a similar fashion, Germany (and in a different way Japan too) may 
today be ripe for pension reform. Regarding this policy field in particular, a comparison could be 
made with earlier pension reforms that were undertaken in both Germany (see chapter III, also: 
Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2004; Hinrichs 2012; Rürup 2002; Sinn 2000) and Japan (see chapter III, 
also: Horioka, Suzuki, and Hatta 2007; Okumura and Usui 2014; Takayama 2012) and respective pub-
lic debates from those years. It would certainly be worthwhile to study to what extent the link be-
tween public debate or dominant narratives and intergenerational relations or solidarity actually 
exists (and how this may differ across countries). 
V.3 Policy recommendations 
V.3.1 Assumptions underlying recommendations 
This study was by a fair degree motivated by its author’s concerns over the future of intergenera-
tional solidarity and the conviction that the institutionalised sharing of resources is a political and 
societal achievement that is worth safeguarding and strengthening. As this work has been structured, 
it is clear that institutionalised sharing refers to both the societal and the family level, hence one 
which is state-run (societal solidarity) and one where the state has little influence (family solidarity). 
Both dimensions are important ones that any country, especially those with an ageing population, 
cannot do without. Both Germany and Japan (and indeed the ageing industrialised countries as a 
whole) have seen increasing (labour market) dualisation. The policy recommendations below depart 
from these assumptions. 
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V.3.2 Raise the state’s profile of dealing with new social risks 
As alluded to by Esping-Andersen (2002), social vulnerability or poverty risk is path-dependent over 
the life cycle, in other words: those facing such risks at young age tend to be more prone to the 
same or additional risks at older age. It is hence straightforward to argue for a comprehensive strat-
egy on new social risks, which notably include combining family and work (most frequently this re-
gards single parents), the risk of one’s labour skills becoming obsolete (mostly regarding the low-
skilled at working-age), the risk of too low returns on educational investments (mostly regarding the 
young and high-skilled). 
The specifics of policy strategies go beyond the scope of this study. How to tackle new social risks 
has been addressed by other authors (see for example: Bonoli 2007; Esping-Andersen 2002). Promis-
ing approaches include active labour market policies, public expenditure for families (cash and ser-
vices), services for persons at old-age, and spending on social assistance (cash and services). Bonoli 
(2007) additionally includes universal basic pensions and universal access to healthcare as an im-
portant pillar especially for non-regular workers. 
What is more crucial than the specifics in this context is to stress that strengthening of policy sup-
port for those prone to new social risks is not just important for the prevention (or at least mitiga-
tion) of increasing inequality on the intragenerational but also on the intergenerational level. As ar-
gued above, mitigating inequality on the intragenerational level will have positive effects regarding 
intergenerational equality. 
Indeed, additional public support for those exposed to new social risks is needed in both countries. 
The main two reasons are that firstly, both countries have been experiencing strong tendencies of 
dualisation on the labour market over the last decades (in addition to older dualisms such as that 
based on gender). Secondly, both countries’ welfare regimes institutionally discriminate against la-
bour market outsiders, which, among other disadvantages such as lower incomes, results in lower 
expected pensions. An engaging welfare state in this regard would help prevent high poverty risks 
among the elderly of the future. 
V.3.3 Further de-familialise care 
Population ageing comes with an increasing need for care. At the same time, as shown above (espe-
cially in chapter IV) the conditions for the family to fulfil its traditional role as a network of mutual 
support is becoming increasingly difficult. In both Germany and Japan, albeit to varying degrees, it 
has been mostly women providing care work to elder (and younger) persons. To further complicate 
matters, with female labour market participation still on the rise, the increasing need for care (due 
to demographic ageing) is being confronted with an arguably falling capacity of family members to 
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provide this care. This trend is exacerbated by the increasing number of single elderly households 
and childless elders, many of whom cannot count on traditional family ties as a network of mutual 
support. 
If it is the aim to promote self-determination of family members to pursue their own lives as much 
as possible, the only policy response appears to be a further de-familialisation of care by means of 
an engaging welfare state. Such a welfare state leaves it up to parents whether one (of the two) 
stays at home to look after a child and whether it is family members taking care of the elderly. 
It is important to note that a radical expansion in public care systems (potentially for both elderly 
and children) may not only be considered as a cost factor but also an investment: firstly, it sets free 
labour capacities of family members and secondly, it creates jobs in the care sector. 
V.3.4 Raise retirement age 
Population being the consequence of various favourable developments such as overall improving 
health conditions and increasing longevity, humans tend to live longer healthy lives. As has been ar-
gued in this study, pension systems in both countries are not financially sustainable in the long or 
medium run. Thus, future reforms in the name of system sustainability will be more burdensome to 
later birth cohorts and their effect only be mitigated if statutory retirement ages are raised as soon 
as possible. While the picture may look different for cases of hardship, there are thus at least two 
justifications, a financial and a moral one, for a considerably higher statutory retirement age in both 
Germany and Japan (and indeed various other ageing economies). Firstly and financially, later re-
tirement (by imposing a higher statutory age) is one lever by which the burden on the pension sys-
tem can be eased. This is especially the case today as some members of the large baby boomer co-
hort (mostly in Germany) or of the second baby boomers (first in Japan as the post-war baby boom-
ers were born earlier than in Germany) are still about to retire. If a large cohort collectively post-
pones retirement, a considerable amount of public resources can be preserved. Secondly and moral-
ly, as long as technological levels of progress still require humans to be engaged in labour in order to 
provide for social prosperity, those who are in a position to work may be asked to do so. If humans 
today lead longer healthy lives, they can lead longer labour lives. This second argument would argu-
ably strengthen intergenerational solidarity on the societal level and raise public support for inter-
generational policies (as discussed in chapter III). 
Indeed, as was discussed above, retirement ages have been raised in both countries over the last 
few years. The policy measure as such is thus not a new one, which constitutes a promising condi-
tion to act further in this direction. 
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V.3.5 Attract labour migration 
Against the background of an ageing and eventually shrinking labour force, a comprehensive immi-
gration strategy could contribute to solving problems of labour shortages. Most notably, the care 
sector can benefit from personnel from abroad. Although both countries, Germany and Japan, are 
already implementing such policies, both are still suffering from continuing undersupply (see for 
example: Buchan and Perfilieva 2006; Vogt 2018, 2017). While Germany’s foreign national popula-
tion has recently been growing due to a sudden influx of foreign nationals, notably consisting of ref-
ugees, Japan continues to accept very low numbers of immigrants except for high-skilled labour and 
workers migrating on a specific visa based on bilateral agreements (see chapter II). Labour migration 
policies allowing the influx of foreign nationals, coupled with initiatives to fully integrate such labour 
migrants into society, should, thus, be pursued further.  
Both countries have been struggling with the idea of accepting a high(er) number of foreigners into 
their labour market and society. In Germany, this is best reflected in the success of the anti-
immigration platform party AFD (Alternative für Deutschland, or Alternative for Germany) in the 
2017 parliamentary elections, which attracted the third most votes of all parties (Der 
Bundeswahlleiter 2018). In Japan, opposition to comprehensive immigration policies can be inter-
preted to be even stronger than in Germany since migration as a policy issue has been largely ig-
nored or disregarded by major political parties (Lill 2012). A further opening to immigration would, 
however, be in the demographic and economic interest of both Germany and Japan. 
V.3.6 Feasibility of recommendations? 
With the challenge of large public opposition against immigration in mind, the question of political 
feasibility is relevant with respect to all of the policies proposed here. While raising retirement has 
been suggested by many scholars and policymakers across countries as a remedy for old-age biased 
welfare states (see for example: OECD 2006), the other two main policy recommendations may pro-
voke critical reactions. A popular critique may relate to fiscal constraints: how should a government 
spend more money on certain programs if its problem of demographic ageing is essentially one 
about the lack of fiscal sustainability of public services once relatively more persons become finan-
cially dependent (even once considerable raises in statutory retirement ages are priced in)? Three 
responses against such reservations are obvious (and by no means new), two of which have been 
alluded to in this section already. 
Firstly, regarding new social risks, there is path dependency of poverty risk over the life cycle. Invest-
ing into (vulnerable) persons at young age can be expected to ease the necessity of helping them out 
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at old age. Hence, government spending is not necessarily a zero-sum game, and it is arguably less so 
the earlier in their life cycle individuals can benefit from such support. 
Secondly, regarding more spending on care, there may be positive employment and thus purchasing 
power or demand effects to the economy once the need for (social) care is properly monetised. In 
other words, though such spending programmes would tend to cost more money to the public sec-
tor they can be considered investments on which beneficial returns can be expected. 
Thirdly, regarding all remaining doubts of the “yes, but all this will still be costly” sort, the following 
needs to be said: yes, demographic ageing is costly. With higher retirement ages, some of this bur-
den could (and should) be borne by those persons who have already reached higher ages themselves, 
while others should be borne by those at working-age. However, questions of (financial) affordability 
are not fundamentally questions about effects of age, cohort or period. Instead, they are about who 
has (access to) resources and who does not. In times of increased cross-border mobility of capital 
and recurring tax avoidance scandals, it should be a government’s priority to ensure or gain access 
to the necessary funds to provide for investments into social solidarity.66 The findings of this study 
have to be read in this light: any challenges to the welfare state (and thus social solidarity) posed by 
population ageing should not lead to the conclusion that the government should retreat. Instead, it 
must be reorganised because it is (and will be) in dire need. 
As shown at length in this study, to argue that the welfare state can no longer provide for intergen-
erational solidarity means to leave it to the family, which would further increase inequality as a 
whole and arguably jeopardise social solidarity as a cornerstone of the functioning of society. It 
would be a sad surrender of the welfare state when, after the “Golden Era” of the post-war decades, 
new proud times could just be approaching. 
V.3.7 Wider context 
Less than two decades into what Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov (2004) have called “the century of 
population ageing”, different patterns of intergenerational solidarity have become observable. Ger-
many and Japan, two of the pioneers of ageing, are sharing the same demographic and resulting pol-
icy challenges but differ considerably in at least one important aspect: intergenerational solidarity in 
the societal sphere has been strengthening in Germany but weakening in Japan. This finding may 
make it appear that if an ageing country can choose its policy path in the face of ageing, following in 
Germany’s footsteps would be preferable over those of Japan. While it is true that for the policy 
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challenges ahead Germany appears to find itself in a more favourable position, one should not dis-
miss the Japanese development as a lost case. 
Japan’s unprecedentedly high government debt levels are by far not exclusively to be explained by 
the welfare state’s old-age spending bias (economic stimulus spending and disaster recovery after 
the Great Tohoku Earthquake in 2011, each plays an important role; see chapters II and III). Thus, the 
government debt ratio, the notable increase of which has coincided with the population’s declining 
tolerance for further old-age spending expansion, can partly be considered an exogenous factor.67 
This is to say that part of the vanishing intergenerational solidarity on the societal level may be due 
to external circumstances. As shown in chapter III, when asked whether “Older people are a burden 
on society”, respondents in Japan agree even less often than those in Germany (though in Germany 
respondents show more societal solidarity on the policy level). 
Besides all other relevant factors shown here, it could not be generally tested in this study to what 
extent it is a welfare state’s (old-age) spending bias and to what extent it is a country’s government 
debt ratio that drives people’s discontent with the allocation of public resources. Such a step would 
require further country cases for comparison and possibly data that cover a longer sequence of years 
so that more within-country variation would become observable. What could be seen here, however, 
is that under certain circumstances population ageing comes with a widespread perception among 
society that public resources are increasingly limited. This indicates all the more that wise govern-
ment policies and resource allocation, that take care of all groups of society, are a crucial factor for 
solidarity in the face of demographic ageing. 
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 In addition, different from countries of the Eurozone, Japan has full control over its central bank, which tends to allow 
higher debt taking of the public sector and to some extent even the monetisation of debt in terms of expansionary mone-
tary policy. 
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VII.1 Significance of interactions for outsider effects 
Table 31: Model results of interactions between age and employment status, dependent variable: preference for gov-
ernment spending on old-age pensions, odds ratios. 
Interacted variables Reference category Category Germany Japan 
   OR z OR z 
Age category, employment status 15-24, insider 15-24, outsider 2.13 2.51 0.86 -0.33 
25-34, insider 25-34, outsider 0.95 -0.32 0.75 -0.95 
 35-44, insider 35-44, outsider 1.62 3.3 1.18 0.73 
 45-54, insider 45-54, outsider 1.37 2.09 1.49 1.83 
 55-64, insider 55-64, outsider 1.58 2.57 0.72 -1.4 
 65-74, insider 65-74, outsider 1.27 0.35 1.37 1.04 
 75+, insider 75+, outsider - - 1.95 0.9 
Total number of observations 6570 3692 
Controlled for: year, educational attainment, living arrangement, gender, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
Table 32: Significance of interactions between employment status and age, outcome variable: preference for more gov-
ernment spending on old-age pensions; odds ratios. 
Interacted variables Reference category Category Germany Japan 
   OR z OR z 
Age category, employment status Outsider, 15-24 Outsider, 55-64 1.24 0.62 0.77 -0.49 
Outsider, 25-34 Outsider, 55-64 1.55 1.93 1.21 0.53 
 Outsider, 35-44 Outsider, 55-64 1.39 1.61 1.12 0.42 
 Outsider, 45-54 Outsider, 55-64 1.64 2.43 0.70 -1.33 
 Outsider, 65-74 Outsider, 55-64 1.48 0.83 0.47 -2.48 
 Outsider, 75+ Outsider, 55-64 0.89 -0.43 0.55 -1.03 
Total number of observations 6570 3692 
Controlled for: year, educational attainment, living arrangement, gender, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
Table 33: Model results of interactions between gender and employment status (above) and educational attainment and 
employment status (below), dependent variable: preference for government spending on old-age pensions, odds ratios. 
Interacted  
variables 
Reference category Category Germany Japan 
  OR z OR z 
Gender,  
Empl. status 
male, insider male, outsider 1.92 4.94 1.13 0.73 
female, insider female, outsider 1.20 1.73 0.96 -0.26 
Educ. attainm.,  
Empl. status 
Higher sec. or less, insider Higher sec. or less, outsider 1.47 3.91 1.10 0.37 
Higher second./o., insider Higher second./o., outsider 1.35 1.88 1.02 0.11 
 Academic, insider Academic, outsider 0.99 -0.04 1.04 0.18 
 No info/missing, insider No info/missing, outsider 2.59 1.77 1.66 0.54 
Year, 
Empl. status 
1996, insider 1996, outsider 1.42 3.18 1.24 0.93 
2006, insider 2006, outsider 1.71 3.51 0.69 -1.9 
 2016, insider 2016, outsider 1.09 0.58 1.29 1.67 
Total number of observations 6570 3692 
Controlled for: year, age category, educational attainment, living arrangement, gender, partner's employment status, polit-
ical interest, political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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Table 34: Model results of interactions between survey year and age category, dependent variable: preference for gov-
ernment spending on old-age pensions, odds ratios. 
Interacted variables Reference category Category Germany Japan 
   OR z OR z 
survey year, age category 1996, 15-24 2006, 15-24 1.54 2.16 0.68 -1.5 
1996, 25-34 2006, 25-34 1.22 1.17 0.63 -1.98 
 1996, 35-44 2006, 35-44 1.13 0.87 0.84 -0.84 
 1996, 45-54 2006, 45-54 1.00 0.01 0.78 -1.18 
 1996, 55-64 2006, 55-64 0.73 -1.94 1.38 1.62 
 1996, 65-74 2006, 65-74 1.56 2.61 1.02 0.08 
 1996, 75+ 2006, 75+ 0.86 -0.6 1.19 0.53 
 2006, 15-24 2016, 15-24 4.17 4.96 0.61 -1.71 
 2006, 25-34 2016, 25-34 3.95 6.27 0.53 -2.36 
 2006, 35-44 2016, 35-44 3.60 6.42 0.56 -2.6 
 2006, 45-54 2016, 45-54 4.62 8.2 0.60 -2.48 
 2006, 55-64 2016, 55-64 4.36 7.38 0.53 -3.14 
 2006, 65-74 2016, 65-74 2.88 4.49 0.69 -1.69 
 2006, 75+ 2016, 75+ 2.83 3.62 0.91 -0.32 
Total number of observations 6570 3692 
Controlled for: employment status, educational attainment, living arrangement, gender, partner's employment status, 
political interest, political persuasion, East/West (Germany). 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
VII.2 Interactions of age and employment status by years 
VII.2.1 Germany 
Figures in this subsection show the results of interactions between age and employment for Germa-
ny across years. While an outsider effect among young age groups (outsiders showing more support 
for government spending than insiders) in 1996, this effect had turned around in 2006 and again 
switched back to the 1996 pattern in 2016. In general, outsiders at working-age mostly showed more 
support for more government spending on old-age than insiders, and retirees mostly topped the two 
other groups. However, these differences largely disappeared in 2016. An exception in 2016 is the 
age group 15-24 where an outsider effect is clearly marked. 
Figure 43: Interaction of age group and employment status by year for Germany, dependent variable: preference for 
government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
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Controlled for: educational attainment, living arrangement, gender, partner's employment status, political interest, political 
persuasion, East/West. 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
VII.2.2 Japan 
Figures in this subsection show the results of interactions between age and employment for Japan 
across years. As can be seen across figures, there are observable differences between employment 
statuses and age. However, these differ across years. While in 1996 outsiders showed higher support 
for more government spending than insiders across most of working-age (except for the youngest 
age groups), this picture was reverse in 2006 with outsiders mostly showing lower support than in-
siders (except for age 45-54). In 2016, again, outsiders showed higher support more often (except 
for age groups 25-45 and 55-64). Over the years, thus, while there are clear outsider effects observ-
able, they do not show a consistent pattern in Japan. 
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Figure 44: Interaction of age group and employment status by year for Japan, dependent variable: preference for gov-
ernment spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
 
 
 
Controlled for: educational attainment, living arrangement, gender, partner's employment status, political interest, political 
persuasion. 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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VII.3 Interactions of gender and employment status by years 
VII.3.1 Germany 
Figures in this subsection show the interaction effects between gender and employment status in 
Germany across years. In 1996 and 2006, there was an outsider effect among men (showing more 
support for spending than male insiders) though this effect disappeared in 2016. Among women, in 
turn, there is no such effect observable in any year. One interpretation for this gender difference is 
that (labour market) outsider women often have a male partner who is a labour market insider so 
that their preferences are those of a labour market insider (to check for this scenario, interactions 
between the partner's employment status and that of the respondents have been carried out, but 
no differences are observed; see below in this part of the appendix). 
Figure 45: Interaction of gender and employment status by year (1996-2016 from top to bottom) for Germany, depend-
ent variable: preference for government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
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Controlled for: age category, educational attainment, living arrangement, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion, East/West. 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
VII.3.2 Japan 
Figures in this subsection show the interaction results between gender and employment status 
across years for Japan. There does not appear to be an outsider effect for Japan marked by gender, 
as can be seen by the overlapping confidence intervals between the categories, which is the case for 
both genders in every year. 
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Figure 46: Interaction of gender and employment status by year (1996-2016 from top to bottom) for Japan, dependent 
variable: preference for government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
 
 
VII Appendix to chapter III 
195 
 
Controlled for: age category, educational attainment, living arrangement, partner's employment status, political interest, 
political persuasion. 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
VII.4 Interactions of educational attainment and employment status by 
years 
VII.4.1 Germany 
Figures in this subsection show the interaction effects between educational attainment and em-
ployment status in Germany across years. Two general patterns can be seen here: Firstly, higher-
skilled persons show lower levels of support for increases in government spending on old-age (as 
could be seen from the previous regression tables). Secondly, there is an outsider effect (more sup-
port than insiders) only among the low-skilled (and again, it vanished in 2016). 
The pattern of outsider effects being pronounced among the lower-educated is consistent with the 
discussion above in that dualism hits those harder at lower income levels (which are typically corre-
lated with education or skills). Thus, there appears to be an outsider gradient among the low-skilled 
in Germany but not among the high-skilled, which, though, was not observable in 2016. 
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Figure 47: Interaction of educational attainment and employment status by year (1996-2016 from top to bottom) for 
Germany, dependent variable: preference for government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
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Controlled for: age category, gender, living arrangement, partner's employment status, political interest, political persua-
sion, East/West. 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
VII.4.2 Japan 
Figures in this subsection show the plotted results of interactions between educational attainment 
and employment status across years in Japan. Similar to the interaction with gender, an education-
level marked outsider effect does not appear to have emerged over the years.  
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Figure 48: Interaction of educational attainment and employment status by year (1996-2016 from top to bottom) for 
Japan, dependent variable: preference for government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
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Controlled for: age category, gender, living arrangement, partner's employment status, political interest, political persua-
sion. 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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VII.5 Interactions of partner’s employment status and respondent’s em-
ployment status 
VII.5.1 Germany 
Figure 49: Interaction of partner’s employment status and respondent’s employment status by year for Germany, de-
pendent variable: preference for government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: year, age category, gender, educational attainment, living arrangement,, political interest, political persua-
sion, East/West. 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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VII.5.2 Japan 
Figure 50: Interaction of partner’s employment status and respondent’s employment status by year for Japan, depend-
ent variable: preference for government spending on old-age pensions, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: year, age category, gender, educational attainment, living arrangement,, political interest, political persua-
sion. 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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VII.6 Age gradient in preferences for government spending on old-age and 
intergenerational fairness 
Figure 51: Age gradient regarding the statement “Older people get more than their fair share from the government”, by 
country and age group (dichotomous). 
 
Source: WVS (2014), own calculations. 
Figure 52: Age gradient regarding for more or much more government spending on pensions and old-age, by country and 
age group (dichotomous). 
 
Source: ISSP (NHK 2018; GESIS 2008, 1999, 2017), own calculations. 
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VIII.1 Sensitivity analysis, grandchildcare/eldercare by charact. of 2nd child 
Table 35: provision of grandchildcare by characteristics of 2
nd
 child, column percent. 
 Germany: respondent received private care Japan: respondent received private care 
 No Yes no info - - Total No Yes no info - - Total 
No 83.78 85.75 84.11   84.24 37.1 47.87 17.65   37.45 
Yes 16.22 14.25 15.89   15.76 62.9 52.13 82.35   62.55 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
 Germany: married 2
nd
 child Japan: married 2
nd
 child 
 Yes No  No info - - Total Yes No  No info - - Total 
No 83.76 81.96 85.61   84.24 41.97 33.38 45.93   37.45 
Yes 16.24 18.04 14.39   15.76 58.03 66.62 54.07   62.55 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
 Germany: employment status 2
nd
 child Japan: employment status 2
nd
 child 
 Full-
time 
Non-
reg. 
School/ 
no job 
Leave/ 
carer 
No 
info 
Total Full-
time 
Non-
reg. 
School/ 
no job 
Leave/ 
carer 
No 
info 
Total 
No 83.91 84.25 89.69 81.97 84.31 84.24 37.51 33.6 46.9 33.62 42.95 37.45 
Yes 16.09 15.75 10.31 18.03 15.69 15.76 62.49 66.4 53.1 66.38 57.05 62.55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Germany: residence distance of 2
nd
 child Japan: residence distance of 2
nd
 child 
 <1km <25 
km 
>=25 km No info - Total Cores. Same 
town 
Same 
pref. 
No info - Total 
No 69.19 85.08 89.7 84.92  84.24 32.41 28.27 42.31 46.32  37.45 
Yes 30.81 14.92 10.3 15.08  15.76 67.59 71.73 57.69 53.68  62.55 
Total 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100  100 
Obs.      1,910      3,901 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), own 
calculations. 
Table 36: receipt of eldercare by characteristics of 2
nd
 child, column percent. 
 Germany: respondent provided grandchildcare Japan: respondent provided grandchildcare 
 No Yes no info - - Total No Yes no info - - Total 
No 75.64 78.34 80.03   78.57 93.81 95.94 93.5   94.17 
Yes 24.36 21.66 19.97   21.43 6.19 4.06 6.5   5.83 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
 Germany: married 2
nd
 child Japan: married 2
nd
 child 
 Yes No  No info - - Total Yes No  - - - Total 
No 78.18 75.94 79.52   78.57 94.88 93.96 93.13   94.17 
Yes 21.82 24.06 20.48   21.43 5.12 6.04 6.87   5.83 
Total 100 100 100   100 100 100 100   100 
 Germany: employment status 2
nd
 child Japan: employment status 2
nd
 child 
 Full-
time 
Non-
reg. 
School/ 
no job 
Leave/ 
carer 
No 
info 
Total Full-
time 
Non-
reg. 
School/ 
no job 
Leave/ 
carer 
No 
info 
Total 
No 77.17 75.85 75.51 74.78 81.21 78.57 94.42 94.03 95.97 94.08 92.86 94.17 
Yes 22.83 24.15 24.49 25.22 18.79 21.43 5.58 5.97 4.03 5.92 7.14 5.83 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Germany: residence distance of 2
nd
 child Japan: residence distance of 2
nd
 child 
 <1km <25 
km 
>=25 km No info - Total Cores. Same 
town 
Same 
pref. 
No info - Total 
No 74.8 75.9 77.59 79.79  78.57 94.85 94.07 94.16 93.24  94.17 
Yes 25.2 24.1 22.41 20.21  21.43 5.15 5.93 5.84 6.76  5.83 
Total 100 100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100  100 
Obs.      5,676      11,083 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), own 
calculations. 
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VIII.2 Sensitivity analysis, Germany higher cut-off values in financial assets 
Figure 53: Model A.IV GER I-GER II, Germany with higher and lower cut-off values for financial wealth, logistic random effects 
regression, dependent variable: made downwards intergenerational financial transfer, odds ratios. 
  Model A.IV 
(GER I) 
Model A.IV 
(GER II) 
  OR OR 
Survey year (ref.: 2007) 2004 0.95 0.95 
 2011 0.44*** 0.46*** 
2013 1.76*** 1.84*** 
 2015 1.01 1.04 
Age group respondent (ref.: 70-75) 60-64 1.11 1.12 
 65-69 1.13 1.15 
Gender (ref.: male) Female 0.81** 0.81** 
Marital status (ref.: married) Unmarried 0.72*** 0.73*** 
Currently working (ref.: yes) No/currently not 0.92 0.92 
 No info/missing 1.29 1.33 
Education (ref.: academic) High school or less 0.40*** 0.43*** 
Vocational 0.69** 0.72* 
 No info/missing 0.00 0 
Assets real estate (ref.: yes) No 0.54*** 0.56*** 
 Don’t know 0.82 0.84 
Assets financial (ref. for GER I: <10,000 EUR)) >10,000 (GER I) / 5,000-25,000 (GER II) 0.53*** 0.47*** 
(ref. for GERII: <5,000 EUR) >25,000 (GER II) - 1.31* 
left: GER I; right: GER II Don’t know 0.47*** 0.71*** 
Self-reported health (ref.: very good/good) Not good/poor 0.71*** 0.73*** 
No info/missing 0.96 0.96 
Received upward financial transfers (ref.: no) Yes  2.83*** 2.87*** 
No info/missing 0.00 0 
Received private care (ref.: no) Yes  1.54*** 1.56*** 
 No info/missing 1.34 1.25 
Provided grandchildcare (ref.: no) Yes  0.84 0.82 
 No info/missing 0.79 0.78 
1
st
 child’s gender (ref.: male) Female 1.01 0.99 
 Don’t know/missing 5.60* 5.42* 
1
st
 child married (ref.: yes) No 0.98 0.98 
 Don’t know/missing 1.17 1.13 
1
st
 child has children (ref.: yes) No 0.88 0.9 
 Don’t know/missing 0.60** 0.62** 
1
st
 child’s living proximity (ref.: <1km/same house) <25km/same town 0.96 0.97 
=>25km/same country 0.95 0.96 
No info/missing 1.01 1.05 
1
st
 child’s empl. status (ref.: full-time emp.) Non-regular 1.22* 1.21 
School/ unempl. 1.48** 1.50** 
On leave/ carer/other 1.18 1.2 
No info/missing 0.96 0.96 
1
st
 child’s education (ref.: academic) High school or less  1.01 1.06 
Vocational 1.04 1.05 
No info/missing 0.00 0 
Constant  2.21* 1.58 
lnsig2u  1.58*** 1.54*** 
Number of obs.  4865 4865 
Controlled for: age gr., children, educ.diff. (c1); age gr., gender, marital, empl. stat, children, educ. , educ.diff.(c2) 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), own calculations. 
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Figure 54: Interaction of having financial assets and 1st child’s employment status, Germany, dependent variable: made 
downwards intergenerational financial transfer, average probabilities. 
 
Controlled for: country, econ. growth, year, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate 
assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grandchildcare. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
VIII.3 Significance of interactions for country effects, wealth/social repro-
duction effects 
Table 37: Significance of interactions between country and year dummy (above) and country and age group (below), 
outcome variable: made downwards intergenerational financial transfers. 
Interacted variables Reference category Category pooled 
  OR z 
Country, year  
(dummy) 
GER, 2004-‘09 GER, 2011-‘15 0.96 -0.35 
JP, 2004-‘09 JP, 2011-‘15 1.37 4.37 
Country, age group GER, 60-64 GER, 65-69 0.01 0.11 
GER, 65-69 GER, 70-74 -0.09 -0.76 
 JP, 60-64 JP, 65-69 0.18 2.11 
 JP, 65-69 JP, 70-74 0.34 3.78 
Total number of observations 13787 
Controlled for: econ. growth, year/age group, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate 
assets, financial assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grand-
childcare, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 child’s characteristics. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
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Table 38: Significance of interactions between financial assets of the respondent and employment status of 1
st
 child 
(above) and real estate assets of the respondent and employment status of 1
st
 child (below), outcome variable: made 
downwards intergenerational financial transfers. 
Interacted  
variables 
Reference category Category Germany Japan 
  OR z OR z 
Financial assets,  
empl. status 1
st
 child 
Yes, full-time empl. Yes, non-reg. empl. 1.51 1.92 1.08 0.53 
Yes, full-time empl. Yes, school/unempl. 2.27 2.25 1.18 0.59 
 Yes, full-time empl. Yes, on leave/housem. 0.96 -0.14 1.19 1.24 
 No, full-time empl. No, non-reg. empl. 1.17 1.11 1.04 0.21 
 No, full-time empl. No, school/unempl. 1.17 0.73 1.55 1.23 
 No, full-time empl. No, on leave/housem. 1.26 1.18 1.07 0.38 
Real estate assets,  
empl. status 1
st
 child 
Yes, full-time empl. Yes, non-reg. empl. 1.29 1.82 1.04 0.29 
Yes, full-time empl. Yes, school/unempl. 1.70 2.34 1.41 1.48 
 Yes, full-time empl. Yes, on leave/housem. 1.28 1.27 1.19 1.49 
 No, full-time empl. No, non-reg. empl. 1.10 0.48 1.66 1.35 
 No, full-time empl. No, school/unempl. 1.16 0.54 0.73 -0.47 
 No, full-time empl. No, on leave/housem. 0.92 -0.27 1.04 0.08 
Total number of observations 4865 8922 
Controlled for: econ. growth, year/age group, gender, marital status, working status, educational attainment, real estate 
assets/financial assets, self-reported health, received upwards financial transfers, received private care, provided grand-
childcare, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 child’s characteristics. 
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
VIII.4 Amounts of financial transfers 
In both surveys SHARE and JSTAR, information on the amounts of financial transfers suffer from a 
very high share of missing values, which is the prime reason why the multivariate analysis has been 
carried out without transfer amounts. In SHARE, only waves 1 (2004) and 2 (2007) included transfer 
amounts, and while questions on transfer amounts are included in all waves of JSTAR, missing values 
are high. The figures below show transfer amounts for the years and cases available and divided up 
by some characteristics of the respondent or the 1st child respectively (below the figures are indicat-
ed the number of observations, for which information on the amounts is available, and in brackets 
the number of observations in the sample that have indicated to have made a financial transfer). In 
addition to low sample size, another major limitation here is that in both countries, the available 
observations seemingly tend to regard different types of financial transfers. This can be seen in the 
considerably different amounts of transfers: in the case of SHARE, mostly regular and smaller trans-
fers have been mentioned by respondents. In JSTAR, in turn, the few available cases tend to regard 
large gifts and (planned) inheritance. This major limitation in comparability has to be borne in mind 
and hence, the data below rather serve for country-separate consultation (rather than for a cross-
national comparison). Amounts have been converted into US-Dollar and adjusted by purchasing 
power parity of the respective year drawing on information of the OECD database (OECD 2018a). 
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Figure 55: Downward financial transfer amounts by age of respondent, for Germany (left) and japan (right), in USD and 
PPP. 
  
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Figure 56: Downward financial transfer amounts by respondent's possession of real estate assets, in USD and PPP. 
  
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Figure 57: Downward financial transfer amounts by respondent's possession of financial assets, in USD and PPP. 
  
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own  
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Figure 58: Downward financial transfer amounts by employment status of 1
st
 child, in USD and PPP. 
  
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Figure 59: Downward financial transfer amounts by gender of 1
st
 child, in USD and PPP. 
  
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
Figure 60: Downward financial transfer amounts by age group of the 1
st
 child, in USD and PPP. 
  
Source: SHARE (Börsch-Supan 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017a, 2017b), JSTAR (RIETI 2013b, 2013c, 2017, 2010, 2012, 2013a), 
own calculations. 
